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ABSTRACT
A naturalistic or real essence conception of men and persons is 
developed and defended, and the inadequacies of alternative 
nominal essence conceptions, especially those which specify 
psychological or social criteria of personhood, are demonstrated.
Part One of the thesis develops a version of Leibnizian essentialism. 
The attribution of de re necessary properties to objects is clarified 
and defended, and certain conceptual constraints on such attributions 
are argued for. The thesis that the origin of a material object 
confers essential properties on it is considered and rejected.
Part Two uses the theoretical framework of natural-kind or substance 
based essentialism in considering such issues as personal identity, 
euthanasia, abortion, free will and moral obligation. The 
conceptions of personhood implicit in the works of Aristotle, Kant, 
Marx and others, and some conceptions of personal responsibility, 
are also considered in relation to this essentialism.
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PART 0 N E
E S S E N T I A L I S M
PREAMBLE
In considering the history of a material object we can
distinguish between the properties the object can acquire and lose
during the span of its existence, and the properties which are
constitutive of the object itself - i.e., properties without which
the object would not exist. A judicious application of paint can
make a red chair blue, and the chair survives this change of colour,
but if fire reduces the chair to a heap of ashes, then the chair no
longer exists. So a colour appears to be a contingent or accidental
property of a chair, while a chair's structure is necessary or
essential. Yet some find such a distinction between necessary and
contingent properties of objects baffling. Quine, for instance,
writes of his "bewilderment" as follows;
Mathematicians may conceivably be said to be necessarily 
rational and not necessarily two-legged; and cyclists 
necessarily two-legged and not necessarily rational. But 
what of an individual who counts among his eccentricities 
both mathematics and cycling? Is this concrete individual 
necessarily rational and contingently two-legged or vice 
versa? Just insofar as we are talking referentially of the 
object, with no special bias toward a background grouping of 
mathematicians as against cyclists or vice versa, there is 
no semblance of sense in rating some of his attributes as 
necessary and others as contingent. Some of his attributes 
count as important and others as unimportant, yes; some as 
enduring and others as fleeting; but none as necessary or 
contingent.
(Quine(1), p.199)
If Quine's misgivings are well founded and the distinction 
between necessary and contingent properties is - as he goes on 
to say - "indefensible", then our practice of individuating and 
identifying persisting material objects is, I believe, inexplicable. 
For any plausible comprehensive account of this practice depends, I 
contend, on this distinction. The elaboration and defence of this 
contention is the major undertaking of Part One of this dissertation.
CHAPTER 1
ESSENTIALISM AND NECESSITY
1 DE BE AND DE DICTO NECESSITY
Quine's objections to essentialism have not gone unchallenged. 
In Some Remarks on Essentialism, Richard Cartwright has argued (see 
Cartwright(1)) that Quine's attack rests on the contention that 
"necessary" is always a qualification of sentences (de dicto) and 
never a qualification of things or their attributes (de re) . So 
given the de dicto interpretation of the sentences "Mathematicians 
are necessarily rational" and "Cyclists are necessarily two-legged" -
Necessarily (All mathematicians are rational)
Necessarily (All cyclists are two-legged)
- and the premise that Charles, say, is both a mathematician and a
cyclist, all that follows from these three premises is that Charles
is rational and two-legged;
Necessarily [(x)(mathematician x o rational x)]
Necessarily C(y)(cyclist y o two-legged g)]
Mathematicians (c) & cyclist (c)____ __________
rational (c) & two-legged (c)
And this conclusion is consistent with the sentences "Mathematicians
are not necessarily two-legged" and "cyclists are not necessarily
rational" -
Necessarily [ (x) (mathematician x => two-legged x) ]
Necessarily C(y)(cyclist y 3 rational y)]
If the third premise of the above argun^nt was qualified by
"necessarily" -
Necessarily [mathematician (c) & cyclist (c)3
- then the conclusion of the argument would also be so qualified. 
However, it is clear that neither sentence would be true. [I will 
show later that no logically simple sentence with a singular term
in its subject position can be a necessary truth.3 But essentialism
- Cartwright goes on to argue - is not concerned with de dicto 
necessities. It is concerned with the claim that particular objects 
have particular properties necessarily, however those objects are 
designated - e.g. "The number of the planets (i.e. 9) is necessarily 
greater than 7" or "Charles is necessarily rational". The de re 
interpretations of these sentences do not have the logical form of 
necessary truths, because the necessity operator in them qualifies 
the predicate and not the sentence as a whole. Cartwright concludes 
that Quine's attack leaves essentialism unscathed. Even if it is 
true that de dicto necessities are relative to methods of designation, 
and that de re necessities are not derivable from de dicto 
necessities, this does not show that de re modalities are 
unintelligible, or that essentialism is incoherent.
Of course, deflecting an attack on essentialism does not amount 
to showing that essentialism is a true theory. An adequate defence 
of essentialism would have to show not only that the theory was
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consistent, but that it had explanatory value (e.g. it showed that 
some aspect of our beliefs or practices was rational) , and that there 
were no serious theoretical rivals. If, for example, the only 
plausible theory of reference we have does depend on a distinction 
between essential and accidental properties of objects, and if the 
distinction does not entail any logical or conceptual inconsistencies, 
then it seems we are conanitted to accepting essentialism as true.
It is the task of the remainder of this chapter to show that 
essentialism is both a consistent and a useful theory.
Perhaps the major incentive for the attempt to reduce de re 
modalities to de dicto modalities is the belief that the criteria 
for distinguishing necessary and contingent properties are obscure, 
while criteria for distinguishing necessary and contingent truths 
are clear. The truth of a sentence is necessary if the sentence is 
analytic, or true in virtue of meanings and independently of matters 
of fact. Sentences which are contingently true, however, are 
synthetic, or true in virtue of the facts, .With regard to 
properties, though, there does not seem to be any way of dividing 
them t# into two classes - i.e. essential and accidental. Nor could 
there be if - as appears to be the case - the same property may be 
essential to one object and contingent to another: e.g. having ice
as a constituent is a necessary property of a glacier but a 
contingent property of a gin and tonic. But as Quine himself has 
argued in From a Logical Point of View the notion of analyticity 
itself is not all that clear. Atteints to explain the analyticity 
of sentences which are not truths of logic - such as "Bachelors are
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unmarried men" - by appealing to the notion of synonymy are circular 
if synonymy is explained in terms of substitution salva veritate, 
when substitution of that kind is itself explained by appealing to 
the notion of analyticity - i.e. the proof that "bachelor" and 
"unmarried man" are interchangeable salva veritate hence synonymous, 
is that the sentence "All and only bachelors are unmarried men" is 
analytic (Quine(2), p.29). Quine's conclusion is that there is no 
sharp distinction to be drawn between truths of meaning and truths of 
fact, and the belief that there is is an "unenpirical dogma of 
empiricism". This might suggest that the necessary or analytic 
truths are true not independently of the facts but whatever the facts 
- i.e. true whatever happens. But the same could be said of the 
de re interpretation of "Caesar is necessarily a man": it is true
not independently of the facts, but true however things are in a 
world in which there is Caesar. But then de re necessities appear, 
on the face of it, to be no more nor no less intelligible than 
de dicto necessities. And if attempts to explain the necessity of 
attributes prove to be more successful than the attempts to explain 
necessary truth, there might even be a case for reversing the 
standard procedure and deriving de dicto from de re modalities.
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2 IDENTITY AND INDIVIDUATION
That the doctrine of essentialism is of explanatory value 
becomes apparent when consideration is given to the way we refer 
to persisting material objects and trace their history. Our 
ability to pick an object out from its surroundings and to observe 
the changes it undergoes presupposes or involves the ability to 
identify the object and reidentify it at a later t±me. But this 
latter ability depends upon our knowing that an object perceived 
at one time is identical with an object perceived at another time.
So to individuate an object and follow what happens to it, we 
require a criterion of identity for the object. Such identity 
criteria I will argue depend upon a distinction between essential 
and accidental properties of objects.
Often when we identify an object for another person, we do 
so by means of a description - e.g. "The yellow car outside the 
PetersfieId Post Office is mine". It is intended that the definite 
description in that sentence uniquely identifies ny car (if there 
were two yellow cars outside the Post Office, I should have to 
augment the description to secure uniqueness of reference). It 
seems obvious that in general, identification of objects may be 
secured by descriptions, and that a complete description of an object 
uniquely identifies it. Fortunately, partial descriptions of 
objects usually suffice to identify them, as complete descriptions 
are beyond our capabilities. But however obvious the belief is that 
descriptions uniquely identify objects, the belief rests on the
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questionable assumption that no two objects can have exactly the same 
properties. This is the assumption which Leibniz designated "the 
Principle of the Identity of Indiscemibles" (see Leibniz, pp.36,62) , 
and which can also be expressed by :
No substances are completely similar or differ solo numéro
or
No two objects in nature can have all their properties in
common.
If the Principle of the Identity of Indiscemibles is considered 
to be an empirical generalization then there is some reason to think 
that it is true: our experience is that a thorough examination of
two similar objects will invariably detect some qualitative 
difference. But to even get started on such a comparison, we must 
already be able to distinguish the two objects, so the qualitative 
difference - which may be undetectable without a microscope - does 
not explain the distinction. If, instead, the Principle is 
considered to be a criterion of identity, which explains the 
individuation of objects, then there are considerable grounds for 
doubt about its truth. Clearly, the Principle is trivially true 
if the unique set of properties which are alleged to distinguish 
objects include such relational properties as is identical with 
Margaret Thatcher, for that property is true of Margaret Thatcher 
and no other object. But we could hardly explain identity in terms 
of property combinations if identity figured in the properties.
Ayer has suggested that identity relations with embedded proper names 
are not genuine properties so should be excluded from consideration
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(Ayer). He does, however, allow embedded definite descriptions.
But the distinction appears arbitrary, and the admission of definite 
description in place of proper names is question begging because it 
assumes that descriptions uniquely identify. If the significance 
of the Principle requires that no identity relations be counted 
among the properties, then it seems relational properties must 
be excluded altogether. For relational properties can only be 
determinate if the embedded 'teirms of the relations are uniquely 
identified. Some objects, it seems, must be distinguished 
independently of relations before a system of determinate relational 
properties can get started. In fact, to say that any object is 
a term in a relation presupposes its prior individuation. To be 
explanatory the Principle must be interpreted to hold that no two 
objects have all their qualities or monadic properties in common.
But the Principle when so interpreted has counter-intuitive 
consequences. Max Black has argued (Black) that it rules out the 
possibility of a radially symmetrical universe - i.e. one in which 
each object on one side of the universe has a mirror-image counterpart 
on the other side. The thought-e:q>eriment is easily extended to 
considerations of radially symmetrical objects: a perfect sphere,
say, having the top hemisphere qualitatively identical with the bottom 
hemisphere would not be possible either. For if the ijpper and lower 
hemispheres are indiscernible, hence identical, then there is only 
one hemisphere. And if the hemisphere which remains was further 
divisible into qualitatively identical fragments, these too would 
really be numerically identical, so we'll end up with only one. .
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fragment (see Wiggins(1), p.335 fn 7). A similar argument leads 
to the conclusion that there can be no qualitatively homogeneous 
material in the universe.
If these counter-intuitive consequences do not in themselves 
show that the Principle of the Identity of Indiscemibles is false, 
there are other, more fundamental reasons for doubting the truth 
of the Principle. For one, an explanation of the identity and 
distinctness of objects in terms of property collections presupposes 
the unproblematic identification of properties and sets of properties. 
But a set theoretic approach to property identification (i.e. 
coextensiveness in all possible worlds) - which seems to be the best 
approach we have - presiç>poses the identification of objects which 
have the properties, and which constitute the sets. Further, the 
enpiricist's "bundle of properties" conception of objects is 
incoherent beca\:tôe to correlate and distinguish the properties which 
constitute different bundles, we must already have a criterion of 
identity for bundles. But the very idea of a bundle of properties 
is incoherent, if properties are not things which can be bundled.
If a property is always a property of something, then to identify a 
property is to identify a thing which is the bearer of that property. 
But if objects and properties are not independently identifiable, 
then the Principle of the Identity of Indiscemibles is an attempt to 
explain -the individuation of objects in terms of entities which are 
at the same logical level.
If a criterion of identity for objects in terms of qualities 
is unsuccessful, we appear to get no further forward by admitting
16
spatial and temporal properties. For to identify the spatio-tenporal 
location of an object we require a frame of reference (e.g. a system 
of Cartesian coordinates) which must itself be fixed by reference to 
objects. At least four objects are needed to fix a three-dimensional 
reference system: three objects to define a plane, and a fourth
object to define the location of a perpendicular to that plane. If 
these objects are not identifiable independently of the reference 
system (as they needn't be if the monadic property interpretation of 
the Principle is false and distinct objects can be qualitatively 
indistinguishable) and yet the establishment of such a frame of 
reference presupposes the unique identification of objects, then 
it seems that our practice of identifying objects could never have 
got under way. Perhaps we sometimes apprehend objects and the space 
that separates them simultaneously, as in our perception of a circle 
in which each point on the circumference is qualitatively 
indistinguishable from every other point (see Wiggins(1), p.335 and 
Postscript) . The presupposition of object identifications to place 
and tin» identifications and the converse may be mutual : though
each kind of identification presupposes the other, neither need 
tenporally precede the other. Space, as Kant claimed, may be the 
form of our perception of distinctness: i.e. to apprehend distinct
objects is to apprehend the space that separates them. Like 
qualities, spatio-temporal locations appear to be on the same logical 
level as objects, so that their identifications are inseparable.
Given that we have a frame of reference which allows for unique 
identifications of places and times, it might be thought that we can
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identify persisting material objects by their spatio-temporal 
histories without considering their qualities at all. For purposes 
of identification, we might consider such objects to be parcels of 
matter occupying at each instant of time a volume of space which can 
be defined with mathematical precision. But this approach to 
identification depends upon the truth of the principle that no two 
such objects can occupy the same place at the same time. This 
principle would provide a criterion of identity for material objects 
in general, which is independent of the various ways these objects 
may be described, referred to, or conceptualised: in so far as a
spatially extended parcel of matter (or body) A occupies exactly the 
same volume of space at exactly the same time as bo<^ B, then A=B. 
There are, however, apparent exceptions to this principle which 
suggest that it cannot be affirmed without qualification - not, 
that is, consistently with the affirmation of the principle that 
identicals have all their properties in common (Leibniz's Law).
Suppose A is a body or parcel of matter which is picked out, 
identified and distinguished from its surrounding matter under a 
substance concept, such as man, and B is a body or parcel of matter 
similarly identified under a material or stuff concept, such as (for 
sinç>licity) quantity of flesh and bones. And suppose there is a 
time at which A and B occupy exactly the same volume of space - i.e. 
a time at which the man is constituted by and fully exhausts the 
quantity of flesh and bones. Then the principle under consideration
commits us to the claim that man A and quantity of flesh and bones B 
are identical. But this identity claim is not consistent with the
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Leibnizian requirement that if A is identical with B then anything 
true of A is true of B. For the man A enjoys Haydn quartets and the
quantity of flesh and bones B does not; A was smaller ten years
ago and B was not (a smaller quantity of flesh and bones would be a
different quantity); and when the man is dead and is no more, the
quantity of flesh and bones persists for a time as his corpse. By 
Leibniz's Law, A and B are not identical even though they coincide for 
a time. Wiggins considers a similar example (Wiggins(2)) of a tree 
and the aggregate of cellulose molecules of which it is constituted: 
though the tree and the aggregate coincide for a time, the aggregate 
survives when the tree is destroyed (cut down and reduced to sawdust, 
say), and the tree survives change in size (by pruning or growth) 
while the aggregate does not (a larger or smaller aggregate is not 
the same aggregate). Another of his examples considers a quantity 
of y a m  which coincides with a sweater for a time though it pre-exists 
the fabrication of the sweater and survives its destruction when the 
yarn is unravelled. The unravelled y a m  is then reknitted into a 
pair of bedsocks. Now if spatio-temporal coincidence of parcels of 
matter is a sufficient criterion for their identity then the sweater 
and the bedsocks are each identical with the yam, and hence, by the 
transitivity of identity, the sweater is identical with the bedsocks 
- even though the sweater and bedsocks have different and even 
contrary properties (e.g. the sweater had two sleeves at time t and 
the pair of bedsocks did not, as it did not exist at that time).
What these examples indicate is that the properties which can be 
truly attributed to an object depend on the way its matter is arranged
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or organised, so that the spatio-temporal coincidence of parcels of 
matter is not a sufficient condition for the identity of objects 
composed of that matter. Even the truth-conditions of material 
object identity claims are indeterminate in the absence of substance 
or sortal concepts which reflect the principles of organisation of 
the terms of the identity. If Leibniz's Law is to be preserved, then 
it seems that the austere spatio-temporal coincidence criterion of 
identity will have to be restricted to parcels of matter or bodies 
which belong to the same category: i.e. substance or stuff.
Identity claims which bridge these categories would seem to be 
undecidable, if not false. But the relation between a substance and 
the stuff of which it is made is one of constitution rather than 
identity, and constitution is not a relation bound by Leibniz' Law. 
Further, it is not at all clear that the spatio-tenporal coincidence 
criterion of identity is adequate even for stuffs. For if a quantity 
of stuff is understood to be a parcel of matter with a certain mass, 
then two such quantities can occupy the same volume of space at the 
same time : two quantities of oxygen with the same mass each occupy
one litre of space at normal atmospheric pressure, but they occupy 
only one litre between them when the atmospheric pressure is doubled 
(Boyle's Law). The identification and reidentification of stuffs 
seems rather to depend upon the identification and reidentification 
of the substances which constitute the stuff - e.g. quantity of 
oxygen A is identical with quantity of oxygen B because they contain 
the same molecules (as verified, say, by radioactive tracing 
techniques).
20
If the spatio-temporal criterion of identity is adequate at all, 
if would seem to be so for material objects in the category of 
substance. But even the principle
No two substances can occupy the same place at the same
time.
may be too general, for it is not inconceivable that a single parcel 
of matter can be organised in such a way as to allow more than one 
substance to be picked out in the place it occupies. Though I 
occupy the same space as my appendix (and more besides) , the appendix 
can continue to occupy that space when I cease to do so. As I am 
not a spatially discontinuous object, then it cannot be true that the 
appendix after surgery continues to be identical with part of me. 
Further, I occupy exactly the same volume of space as my body, but 
that bo<^ can continue to occupy the space when I am dead and cease 
to occupy anything. So if I am a substance and ny body is a
substance and my body is not identical with me - for there is not 
conplete community of properties when it exists and I do not - then 
it would seem that two substances of different kinds can occupy the 
same place at the same time. What is less conceivable is that two 
substances of the same kind can occupy the same volume of space at 
the same time.
If space is mapped by the substances it contains and substances 
of different kinds pan occupy the same place at the same time, then 
the non-identity of substances of the same kind must be enough to 
distinguish the spaces they occupy: things of the same kind must be
separate if they are distinct. Conversely, things of the same kind
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which occupy the same place at the same time - i.e. things which
coincide under that kind-concept - must be identical. Wiggins's
formulation of the a priori principle that coincidence is sufficient
for identity is as follows :
A is identical with B if there is some substance concept 
f such that A coincides with B under f (where f is a 
substance concept under which an object can be traced, 
individuated and distinguished from other f's, and where 
coincides under f satisfactorily defines an equivalence 
relation all of whose members <x, y> also satisfy the 
Leibnizian schema Fx = Fy,
(Wiggins(2) , p.93)
From this principle it follows that no two things of the same 
substance-kind can occupy the same place at the same time : the
coincidence of A and B under a kind-concept settles the question of 
their identity. If coincidence under a substance-concept is also a 
necessary condition of identity - i.e. if such coincidence is what it 
is for material objects to be identical - then it follows that 
identical material objects must be of the same kind, and that there 
being no kind-concept under which material objects coincide settles 
the question of their non-identity. The necessity of coincidence
for identity becomes apparent when we consider what it is to be a 
material object which can be a term in the identity relation.
If a material object is not just a collection of matter but is a 
continuant - i.e. a thing which persists though its qualities and 
constituent matter may change, and which can be picked-out, traced 
through time and space, and distinguished from other objects - then 
it is an entity of some kind. For material objects, to be is to be 
something, and that is to be some kind of thing. To put the point
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another way, if an identity statement has a sense, or has determinate 
truth-conditions, then the names or designating expressions in the 
statement have references, and these are references to things of some 
kind: things of no kind (if there could be such things) could not be
referred to. So much, at least, is implicit in our conception of 
continuant material objects which can be the terms of the identity 
relation.
Furthermore, if material objects must be of some kind, then
identical objects must be of the same kind. For if object A is of
kind f and B is identical with A, then by Leibniz's Law B has every 
property A has: so B is of kind f, and A and B are the same f .
Then if A and B are identified under different kind-concepts, the 
identity of A with B entails that there is some kind-concept under 
which both fall, and which their identifying kind-concepts restrict 
or qualify. For example, suppose identicals A and B are the same 
tadpole, and identicals C and D are the same frog. Then if B and C 
are identical, there is some kind -concept f such that B and C are the 
same f. Neither tadpole nor frog can be that concept, for a frog is 
not a tadpole and a tadpole is not a frog. The concept f must be a 
more general concept which tadpole and frog restrict: e.g. an f is a
tadpole at one phase of its existence and a frog at a later phase.
And if an f can truly be said to be identical with an object which is 
neither a tadpole nor a frog - i.e. some creature of kind g - then 
that identity entails that there is some higher kind concept h such 
that the f is an A, the g is an h, and the f and the g are the same 
h. If there is no such higher kind-concept which each of the
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purported identical objects satisfy - e.g. the f is an h but the g is 
not - then the objects do not have community of properties, so cannot 
be identical. The highest sortal concept in the hierarchy of sortal 
concepts identicals satisfy qualifies no higher sortal, so if a thing 
ceases to be of the kind the highest sortal collects it ceases to be 
of any sortal kind. There is then no thing it can be of the same 
kind as, so there is nothing it can be identical with: it ceases to
exist. The sortal concept a thing satisfies so long as it exists is 
the sortal concept under which that thing must coincide with anything 
with which it is identical. This sortal concept (or its concordants) 
is the ultimate sortal or substance concept for the thing: it
provides the most conprehensive answer to the "What is it?" question, 
and is adequate to cover every conceivable true identity statement 
about that thing. As a continuant at any stage of its existence is 
identical with itself at any other stage, it is of the same kind at 
every stage, and that kind is its substance-kind.
If an essential property of a thing is a property it must have 
so long as it exists (of. Kripke(l), p.137) and if a material object 
must be of the same substance-kind so long as it exists, then the 
sub stance-kind a thing is is essential to it: being an f is an
essential property of each member of substance-kind f . What it is
for a thing to be essentially of a kind will be considered more fully 
in the next section.
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3 KINDS AND SUBSTANCES
In the last section I cited transitivity as one of the formal 
properties of identity (i.e. a=h & h=c => a=c) . The other formal 
properties of the identity relation are symmetry (i.e. a=b o b=a) 
and reflexivity (i.e. a=a). These formal properties are not 
distinctive of the identity relation, for "is the same size as" 
is also transitive, symmetrical and reflexive. What is distinctive 
of the identity relation is expressed by Leibniz's Law, which holds 
that if a is b then anything true of a is true of b . In its 
contrapositive form
Things without all their properties in common sure not
identical
the Law has the obvious consequence that if no properties of objects 
are relative to times, then there can be no qualitative change nor 
spatial movement. For any change in the set of monadic and spatial 
properties exemplified by an object would amount to a distinct object; 
things which are qualitatively or spatially distinguishable are 
numerically distinct.
Some thinkers have held that our primary experience is of a 
succession of static two-dimensional images, and that persisting 
physical objects are our own constructions out of parts of these 
"snapshots". But invariably these accounts of objects resort to 
principles of causality and ten^oral succession which were alleged 
to be outside our experience: e.g. the succession of static images
which is taken to constitute an ashtray, say, are selected for 
assembly because they are ordered in time in a way which conforms
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to our causal expectations, Ashtray images which differed radically 
in size from one instant to the next in defiance of our knowledge of 
causal relations would not be considered to constitute an ashtray, 
but, like Macbeth's dagger, they would present us with a quandary.
Part of what distinguishes real ashtrays, daggers, and material 
objects in general from illusory ones is that their successive states 
are ordered in a way which conforms to causal laws. Furthermore, the 
"construct" account of objects assumes that each of the successive 
images which are constitutive of an ashtray are independently 
identifiable, hence, not only distinguishable from each other but from 
the other parts of their respective static fields. But as earlier 
consideration of the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles 
indicated that we cannot individuate objects without introducing 
spatial and temporal locations, and these locations are conceptually 
dependent on the identification of spatio-temporally continuant 
objects, it would seem that the parts of the static "snapshot" 
universe could not be articulated. Given that we have a 
spatio-temporal reference system in which ashtrays can be 
individuated, we can then go on to identify time slices of an 
individual ashtray. We could not, however, start with parts of 
successive static, atemporal universes and construct persisting 
ashtrays or the spatio-temporal system in which they persist.
We articulate the matter of the universe, we may suppose, in 
such a way as to maximize the number of causal laws which govern our 
environment so that our environment is optimally predictable and 
controllable._ This articulation is not - as Copi believes - merely
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a matter of classifying objects so as to maximize scientific 
knowledge: for such classification presupposes the individuation of
things (cf. Copi, p.229). Rather, it is a matter of individuating 
things in accordance with a conceptual scheme which engages the 
causal regularities of the universe in such a way as to maximize the 
success of our endeavours. This is not to say that the ability to 
formulate causal laws is a precondition of individuating, or that one 
who denies the existence of causal laws is incapable of apprehending 
objects. It is to say that our reliance on causal laws is implicit 
in our practice of individuation. Even to walk across a room 
involves an implicit acceptance of some causal laws (e.g. Newton's 
Laws of Motion), in that a man who acted consistently with a belief 
that there were no such laws could have no confidence in the outcome 
of his efforts to move himself. Such a man would also, it seems, be 
unable to distinguish real and illusory objects. And if he was so 
afflicted as to have no implicit understanding of or sensitivity to 
causal regularities, he would not, it seems, be able to articulate a 
world of persisting material objects at all.
If the role that causality plays in our conceptions of reality 
is taken as seriously as I believe it should be, then it is 
reasonable to suppose that our fundamental apprehension of material 
objects in the world depends upon their being foci of causal 
regularities which register upon our attention in such a way as to 
permit the application of substance concepts. Objects with 
significantly similar causal characteristics engage the same substance 
concepts, so are of the same substance kind. The specific
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combination of causal laws which govern the activity of a parcel of 
matter - i.e. how the parcel of matter develops over time and 
interacts with its environment - may define a principle of unity 
which enables us to pick that matter out (i.e. isolate it from the 
material heap) as an object of a substance-kind (cf. Hacking).
Where there are no causal regularities significant enough to engage 
our attention in the appropriate way, no relevant principle of unity 
will be exigent and no substance will be picked out. Clhere may be 
objects of a kind which is not a sub stance-kind because members of 
that kind are not as such foci of significant causal regularities, so 
are not objects of fundamental individuation. Such an object may be 
an assemblage or aggregate of genuine substances, with a principle of 
unity which may be defined in qualitative or functional terms - e.g. 
a motor car. More will be said of these when artifacts and nominal 
essences are discussed in Chapter III. In so far as the elementary 
particles which are the subject of quantum mechanics do not have 
significant causal regularities, these would also - on the view I am 
developing - not qualify as substances. The problems associated 
with the individuation, identification and reidentification of such 
particles, consequent on their apparently unpredictable behaviour, 
suggest that it is still far from clear just what these constituents 
of matter are (Is an electron a thing or a phenomenon?).
Conceivably, they belong to something other than the Aristotelian 
category of substance (Are they bearers of properties? Do they 
admit of degree? . . .). My concern here is, in the first instance, 
with the macroscopic material objects which furnish our es^^erienced
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world and which are subject to the laws of Newtonian mechanics. The 
doctrine of substance as the paradigm of permanence - i.e. that which 
is changeless - also falls outside this concern. Such an entity is 
presumably not subject to Newton's Laws, so is not a material object. 
(Newton's Laws, of course, are not about point masses - though they 
treat bodies as if their mass were concentrated at a point which is 
their centre of gravity. Point masses do not exist.)]
In so far as a substance is a focus of causal regularities 
determining a principle of organisation and unity which makes it 
possible for us to pick out an object in a place at a time, these 
causal regularities are constitutive of the existence of that 
object. Consequently, the set of causal laws under which these 
regularities are subsumed govern the existence of the substance.
They determine its conditions of persistence and development - i.e. 
how it continues and changes in relation both to its external 
environment and to its own successive states - and they establish 
the limits of its possible modifications. Should the causal laws 
which bind a parcel of matter into a substance cease to hold, then 
the substance no longer is: it ceases to exist. An f thing which
ceases to be of substance-kind f ceases to be. It follows, then, 
that it is conceptually impossible for an object to change its 
substance-kind. For if the set of causal laws which govern the 
conditions of existence of a parcel of matter as a substance changed 
sufficiently to permit a substance of a different kind to be picked 
out in that parcel of matter, while not permitting the original 
substance to be simultaneously picked out, then the original
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substance does not persist through the change, so does not persist. 
The original substance exists no longer: another substance has
assumed its place. All that persists through the change is the 
matter out of which the two substances are composed. Where a 
subset of the causal laws which determine the principle of unity 
of the latter substance continues to do the same for the former, so 
that the original substance does persist through the change, then 
the former substance has not changed into the latter (for the former 
is still there) but it may be a constituent of the latter - as in the 
earlier suggestion that a man's b o ^  is a constituent of a man (this 
suggestion will be considered more fully when personal identity is 
discussed in Chapter IV).
What makes the causal theory of the individuation of material 
objects compelling is that it accords so well with our practice of 
identifying material objects and reidentifying them over time, Part 
of the rationale for our judgement that A, perceived at time t, and 
B, perceived at time t+n, are identical - even though B may have 
very different properties from A - is that it is causally 
characteristic of objects of the kind that A and B are to undergo 
such modification of properties: the causal laws governing the
existence and development over time of such objects, together with 
the conditions pertaining over times t to t+n, are sufficient to 
explain A ' s coming to have B ' s properties. And when A and B are 
spatio-temporally coincident - i.e. tracing the successive spatial 
positions of A over time leads us to B - then our judgment that A*=B 
is assured. When the spatio-temporal link is brcdcen, then we have
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sufficient reason to consider the identity judgement false - e.g. if 
we saw a live television broadcast of Tony Benn speaking in Edinburgh 
two minutes after watching him speak in Portsmouth, then we'd be 
justified in believing that one of the speakers was an inposter, 
because human beings are not known to move that quickly. 
[Reincarnation and resurrection are not identity preserving processes 
then, because there is no spatio-temporal continuity. If physical 
persistence is held to be irrelevant to personal identity in these 
cases, why is it ever relevant?] And when there is spatio-temporal 
continuity but the apparent changes an object has undergone defy our 
causal expectations - they go beyond what we know to be the limits of 
changes an object of that kind can survive - then we are equally 
justified in denying the truth of an identity claim.
Consider the fairy tale case of the handsome prince who is 
transformed into a frog by a wicked witch. Our conviction that such 
things happen only in fairy tales and cannot happen in real life 
rests, it seems, on the conceptual truth that there are limits to the 
changes an object can undergo, and these limits are set by what we 
know to be the causal characteristics of things of the kind the 
object is. Our knowledge of men is not such as to permit us to 
construct a causal explanation of a man's coming to have the 
properties of a frog, because the causal laws which are known to 
govern the persistence and development of men do not subsume such 
modifications. But these laws also do not extend to men suddenly 
disappearing or going out of existence. Nor is our knowledge of 
frogs adequate to account for one emerging fully formed in the place
■L . ■ K'
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formerly occupied by a man. When we do accept that one substance 
has been supplanted by another or others, we believe there to be a 
process involved which can itself be causally explained (e.g. the 
production of hydrogen and oxygen from water by electrolysis) . The 
replacement of one set of laws governing a parcel of matter by 
another or other sets of laws is itself a law governed process, 
though the relevant laws here govern the common constituents of 
the substance defined by the sets of laws (i.e. it is causally 
characteristic of hydrogen and oxygen atoms to combine with each 
other as H2O under some conditions and to remain separate as O2 and 
hydrogen ions under other conditions). When no such causal 
explanations are forthcoming - as in the alleged prince/frog 
transformation - then we are not justified in believing that the 
frog is identical with the prince, or even that the prince's matter 
is reconstituted in the frog. In such a case we'd be inclined to 
believe that an observer of the apparent transformation was the 
victim of an illusion - e.g. the frog was surreptitiously switched 
for the prince, or the obseiver imagines he sees a frog. However, 
if such seeming substance transformations happened frequently enough 
for us to suspect that there was a causal explanation (where what is 
"enough" depends on considerations associated with the problem of 
induction and which I will not discuss) then doubts about the 
adequacy of our knowledge of the two substances would be justified. 
The apparent transformation of tadpoles into frogs occurs frequently 
enough to engender such doubts. Die se doubts are resolved by the 
introduction of a scientifically confirmed theory to the effect that
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there is a substance-kind whose members characteristically take the 
form of tadpoles at one stage of their life span and take the form 
of frogs at a later stage, and all tadpoles and frogs are members of 
this kind (which I'll call "batrachos"). The set of causal laws 
which govern the persistence and development of a batrachos, and 
which establish the limits to the changes a batrachos can undergo and 
survive, do subsume its having tadpole properties and its having frog 
properties. These causal laws define the principle of unity for the 
substance which enables us to trace that substance's history from its 
genesis to its demise : the spatio-temporal coincidence of a tadpole
and a frog under the concept batrachos entitles us to affirm their 
identity. The concepts tadpole and frog, on the other hand, do 
not cover the entire possible span of a thing's existence but only a. 
segment of that span. They are not genuine substance concepts but 
only restrictions on substance concepts (as child is a restriction on 
man) , or what Wiggins calls "phased-sortais" (Wiggins(3), pp.24-7, 
59,64).
It might seem that the way in which we resolve the question of 
the identity of ta(%>ole A and frog B is merely a matter of taste. 
Instead of saying that the ta^ole metamorphoses into the frog and 
that identity is preserved, mightn't we just as well say that the 
frog reconstitutes the matter of the tadpole and that identity is not 
preserved? Well, we can't have it both ways; either A is identical 
with B or it isn't. If we persist in holding that it isn't, in 
spite of the batrachos metamorphosis theory, then I think we must 
refute the theory and show that no genuine substance concept of which
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tadpole and frog are restrictions has been defined. And if we 
insist that the tadpole is a substance which comes to an end by 
decomposing into its constituents, and that the frog is a substance 
which comes into being by the recomposition of those constituents, 
then I think we need a theory of the genesis of frogs which has at 
least as much scientific confirmation as the metamorphosis theory has 
to support that insistence. Such a theory would attribute to frogs 
the rather peculiar property of coming into existence full-formed, 
which is not characteristic of other living creatures. Were such a 
theory to supersede the metamorphosis theory, we would be committed 
to revising our judgements about ta(%)ole/frog identities. Such 
revisions are motivated by the need to maintain the consistency of 
our beliefs rather thcin by something so subjective as taste.
Identity judgements are not isolatable from our conception of 
persisting material objects, but support and are supported by this 
conception. Our beliefs even about which identity judgements are 
candidates for truth are constrained by our a priori and ençirical 
beliefs about the changes it is possible for objects of various kinds 
to endure. And our need to be able to identify and reidenti^ 
objects over time and to recognise and rely on causal links between 
them constrains our individuative practices. So far as we are 
capable, and so far as the world allows, we pick out substantial 
objects - which begin, persist and end in predictable ways. If 
there were no such constraints and anything could be identical 
with anything - e.g. if Socrates could be identical with the Eiffel 
Tower - then there could be no clear sense to a claim that an
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object has begun or ceased to exist or that it has a distinct 
history. We do apply our knowledge of what is characteristic of 
things of a kind to resolving questions of identity, and we do so 
not because we subscribe to a convention, but because the causal 
characteristics of things figure essentially in our apprehension of 
the things. A thing without significant causal characteristics 
cannot be singled out from the matter it is embedded in.
If causal factors constrain the individuation and identity 
conditions of material objects to tdie extent claimed, then some 
modifications are not even physically possible for members of a given 
substance-kind - i.e. some modifications are incompatible with the 
set of causal laws upon which the existence of the substiance depends. 
To conceive of a man becoming the Eiffel Tower or becoming a frog is 
to conceive of the set of causal laws which govern the persistence 
and development of a man - the laws we implicitly recognize in 
picking out the man, and which empirical investigations may ar-ticulate 
- altering to the extent that they subsume his coming to have the 
properties of the Eiffel Tower or of a frog. But the set of causal 
laws we end up with in such speculations is not the set of causal 
laws we started with, and it is not a set of causal laws which define
or constitute a substance of the kind man. If in speculating about
what could happen to a man we conceive of circumstances in which the 
conditions for there being men no longer pertain, then we lose the 
object of our speculations. Coherent speculations about substances 
are constrained by belief in the persistence of the substances, and
our knowledge of what the persistence conditions for substances of
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various kinds are may emerge from or be augmented by empirical 
observation: e.g. if in testing speculations about the behaviour of
men under extreme temperatures we leaim that there is a range of 
temperatures which is a condition for the existence of men, then 
speculations about the behaviour of men outside this range of 
temperatures is incoherent.
It is a consequence of such constraints on our speculations 
that we cannot coherently believe that, even though men don't turn 
into frogs, this man has turned into a frog. What is causally 
characteristic of men, it might be thought, does not impose 
exceptionless limitations on what can happen to a particular man.
But if this man has turned into a frog, then some man has turned 
into a frog, so it must at least be possible for men to turn into 
frogs. If the causal laws which govern the existence of men are - 
as they appear to be - such that it is not possible for men to turn 
into frogs, then it is not possible for this man to turn into a frog. 
What is conceivable is that this object which we mistakenly took to 
be a man is really of a substance-kind which can take on frog 
properties - e.g. it is really a batrachos at the ta<^ole stage which 
looks like a man. But then it is false that this man turned into a 
frog, for it is not a man. What is also conceivable is that the 
conditions for there being men do not cover all the circumstances in 
which the substance which is a man persists. Being a man, it might 
be discovered, is only a tenporal phase in the life of a creature. 
This creature (call it a "mog") has man characteristics at one stage 
of its life and frog characteristics at a later stage, so that man is
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not a substance concept but a phased-sortal or restriction on the 
substance concept mog. It might be the case that up until now all 
mogs died before emerging or metamorphosing from the man stage.
Given the discovery of such a substance, one could be justified in 
believing that man A was identical with frog-like thing B - for they 
could be phases in the life of the same mog. But I think we'd have 
to have a scientifically confirmed theory of the metamorphosis of 
mogs before we'd concede that there was such a substance, and such 
confirmation would presumably require more than one purported 
instance of the metamorphosis. [Diis is not to say that the truth 
of the claim that man A = frog-like thing B depends on there being 
such a theory of mogs, but only that our justification for believing 
the claim to be true so depends, Die truth of the claim depends 
upon there being mogs - not on our knowing this. How many instances 
would be enough to confirm the theory of mog metamorphosis, and what 
counts as confirmation of a theory, will not be discussed here.]
What is not coherently conceivable is that such a theory could 
explain the metamorphosis of a man into not just a frog-like thing 
but into a frog. For a frog is a batrachos, and a batrachos we may 
stppose is not of the same substance-kind as a mog. Suppose being 
a frog was a phase in the life of both substances: i.e. a frog
could develop from a man or from a ta^ole. Dien frog B which is 
identical with man A is a batrachos, so (by Leibniz's Law) man A is 
also a batrachos. As A and B are identical, they are of the same 
substance-kind, so they are of the same substance-kinds. A and B, 
then, are both mogs, and are both batrachos. Further, anything
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which is of the same substance-kind as frog B will also be of the 
same substance-kind as man A, even the frog which is identical 
with (is the same batrachos as) ta^ole C. But then the mog 
substance-kind and the batrachos substance-kind are coextensive.
Even if substance-kinds cannot be defined extensionally - because 
they persist although their membership diminishes or increases - the 
substance a thing is determines its conditions of existence so long 
as it exists. So a thing which is a mog and is a batrachos has mog 
and batrachos conditions of existence. But if mog A and batrachos B 
are identical, then they have the same conditions of existence so mog 
and batrachos conditions of existence are the same. Dien either the 
mog kind and the batrachos kind are the same kind, or at least one 
is not a substance-kind but only restricts a substance-kind. It 
follows that distinct substance-kinds cannot share members. In so 
far as men and frogs are of distinct substance-kinds, a man cannot be 
identical with a frog. So it cannot be coherently asserted that a 
thing has changed its substance-kind - not if the assertion implies 
that the very same thing which was of substance-kind f is now of 
sixbs tance-kind g - for Leibniz's Law requires identicals to be of the 
same substance-kind: things of distinct substance-kinds cannot be
the same. [Nothing is said here, or implied, about the offspring of 
members of a substance-kind. In so far as animal species are 
substance-kinds, the theory of the evolution of species would seem to 
require it to be possible for a thing to be of a different species 
from its ancestors.]
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The speculation that men might metamorphose into another form if 
they lived long enough, or if peculiar conditions obtained, has not 
been shown to be incoherent, so long as it is a form of the substance 
a man is and not a form of another substance, The discovery of such 
a metamorphosis would I think be an extension of our knowledge of the 
substance man picks out: that substance can be a man at some phase
of its life and not be a man at another phase. Such a discovery 
would seem to involve the relegation of the concept man from the 
ultimate or unqualified substance concept division to the 
phased-sortal division. This would not be a change in the extension 
of the concept, for it would continue to have the same actual and 
possible members: the substances which are in the man-phase of their
existence (not phases, stages or time-segments of these substances: 
these are not material objects) . It would be a change in the status 
we accord to the concept, in recognition of its limited application. 
If we were to modify the concept man sufficiently for it to cover the 
entire possible temporal span of its compliants' existence, then we 
would change its extension. But this would be a different concept - 
though we might continue to use the same word "man" for it. The 
original, unmodified concept would I think continue to be of use to 
us - we would employ it much as we did before the metamorphosis 
discovery - but our beliefs about the truth-values of some statements 
about men would have to be revised: e.g. "If a thing ceases to be a
man, it ceases to be" would be false.
Ian Hacking suggests that some extensions to our knowledge of 
material objects would imply a more radical change to substance
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concepts than that envisaged above:
Were humans to fission or fuse, what would be the same man?
"Man" is a substance universal because it indicates an 
active principle of unity associated with regularities many 
of which we understand. If the regularities were to change, 
"man" might no longer be a substance universal.
(Hacking, p.153)
The suggestion here seems to be that if men were to divide and fuse 
so that we could not regard them as substances, then we could not 
regard man as a substance concept - or even as a restriction on a 
substance concept (i.e. phased-sortal). I would prefer to say that 
man continues to be a substance concept, but there no longer are any 
men: what we took to be members of the substance-kind men have been
discovered to be something else. To alter a concept so that it 
accommodates such a radical change in the known characteristics of 
its compliants seems to me to be rather like stretching a ruler as 
man grows to ensure that he is always two feet tall. But the 
question of concept change is not the main issue here. What is of 
greater interest is the question "Can substances divide and fuse?" 
Hacking seems to think not, because substances have determinate 
identity conditions and things which split and fuse do not. But if 
they do not, and it turns out that splitting and fusing is possible 
for material objects of any kind, then it would follow that there are 
no substances: no substance concept would have an extension. But
amoeba are a paradigm case of things which split and fuse, and yet 
the question "how many amoeba are there on the slide at time t?" has 
a determinate answer . And to even begin to enumerate amoeba we have 
to be able to avoid counting the same one twice, which requires a
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determinate answer to the question "Is this the same amoeba as the 
one I just counted?" (cf. Geach, pp.38-39) . For the purpose of 
enumeration then, amoeba seems to be an adequate concept for 
resolving identity questions. It does not, however, seem to be a 
concept which bridges the processes of fission and fusion, so it is 
perhaps not a concept which covers the entire possible tenporal span 
of its compliants' existence. But there are independent reasons for 
doubting that the fission and fusion of amoeba are identity-preserving 
processes. Suppose amoeba A divides into amoeba B and C, and does so 
so that B and C are qualitatively indistinguishable : they are the
same size, have the same genetic characteristics, etc. In fact, any 
property B has which makes it a candidate for identity with A (e.g. 
spatio-temporal continuity with A) is a property C has. Then any 
reasons offered for identifying B with A would be equally good 
reasons for identifying C with A. Now we can't claim that both B 
and C are identical with A, because identity is a transitive relation 
(i.e. {a=b & a=c) d Jb=c) and this would make B and C identical, so 
not two amoeba. And if we wish to preserve the Principle of Excluded 
Middle we can't claim that "A-B" or "A=C" are neither true nor false. 
Nor would it be reasonable to suspend judgement on the issue - for what 
new information could there be which would resolve the issue by giving 
B a greater or lesser claim to identity with A than C has? All the 
relevant facts are at hand. The only option open to us is to say 
that neither B nor C is identical with A, But this is to say that 
A does not persist through the process of splitting: it does not
retain its identity. And as after the split there is nothing A is
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identical with, A does not exist after the split. Cl take the schema 
"A exists = (3x)x = A" to be true and indubitable.] So the splitting 
of A is the end of the existence of A. A similar argument can be 
offered to demonstrate that the symmetrical splitting of an amoeba 
resulting in A is the beginning of the existence of A. With merging 
the issue is even more straightforward, because the results of a 
merger of amoeba needn't be genetically like either of the merged 
amoeba - so by Leibniz's Law the merger is distinct from either of the 
merged, for there is not couplets community of properties. A can 
begin with a merger and end with a merger just as it can begin and 
end with splits. So if the concept amoeba does provide an adequate 
criterion of identity for amoeba from the time they begin by fission 
or fusion up until the time they end by fission, fusion, or some 
other process (e.g. death), then it does cover the entire possible 
temporal span of its compliants ' existence and it is a substance 
concept . I see no reason to doubt that the above argument would 
be just as valid when applied to men - i.e. if all occurrences of 
"amoeba" in the statement of the argument were replaced by "man". 
Though in the case of men, the meeting of the symmetry requirement 
might involve much more than size and genetic likeness : similarity
of psychological properties might outweigh similarity in size in 
giving one of the results of a man-split a greater claim to identity 
with the splitter than the other has. [More will be said about 
symmetxy when personal identity is discussed in Chapter IV.] The 
preservation of man as a substance concept, having an extension, in 
the face of evidence of fission and fusion would not preclude the
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introduction of concepts outside the category of substance, e.g. 
clone, to the consideration of men. The availability of substance 
concepts would seem instead to be a precondition for the significant 
employment of clone concepts: if we could not distinguish clones
without distinguishing their members, then we need a criterion 
of identity (and distinctness) for members, and this involves a 
substance concept.
An interesting elaboration of the fission and fusion speculations 
considers a purported substance. A, which splits symmetrically at time 
t into B and C and merges at time t+n into D. In this case one might 
seem to be justified in believing that A and D are identical, for A 
and D are of the same kind and are spatio-temporally continuous. But 
the strength of the claim depends on what B and C are. If B and C 
Eire each substances of the kind that A is, and neither is identical 
with A, then by the argument offered above the emergence of B and C 
is the end of A. Similarly, the merging of B and C is the beginning 
of D, for it is identical with neither B nor C. A and D cannot be 
identical, then, because they do not exist at the same time. A and 
D are each, perhaps, identical with the pair B and C. But if B and 
C are a pair - a pair of fs, say - and A is identical with this pair, 
then by Leibniz's Law A is a pair of fs. But A is an f - a single 
substance - and not a pair of substcuices. A pair of substances is 
not itself a substance, but an aggregate or collection of substances. 
The spatio-temporal continuity of substances of the same kind is not 
sufficient for identity: the continuity must also be under the
relevant shbstance concept so that there is coincidence. Suppose
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instead that B and C are not substances of the kind A is, but are 
parts of the substance A is. A and D are identical, then, if each 
is identical with the sum of B and C. But B+C is not the same 
substance A is, and A is not the same aggregate B+C is. A substance 
is not identical with the sum of its parts, but is constituted or 
composed of those parts. What might, it seems, retain its identity 
through dispersal and re combination of its parts is a parcel or 
collection of matter which is not individuated by its causal 
regularities but is identified by the description or purpose it 
satisfied: e.g. the wall which collapses and is rebuilt is the same
wall - the bicycle which is disassembled and reassembled is the same 
bicycle. Such things are not strictly substances, but artifacts 
which are substance-like in some respects. Criteria of identity for 
these have a difference provenance, and may be rather different in 
content, from the criteria of identity for substances. [But more 
will be said of artifacts in Chapter III.]
Some comment is required, I think, on the specificity of 
substance concepts. Why, it may be asked, do we need concepts as 
specific as man and batrachos to resolve questions of identity when 
a general concept such as creature or organism appears to do the 
job just as well? The specificity requirement which emerges from 
Geach's observations on counting - i.e. concepts more specific than 
thing or object are needed for counting: we get a very different
answer to the question "How many things are on the shelf?" if we 
count pages rather than books - would seem to be met by a, concept 
specific enough to exclude the possibility of more than one of
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its compliants occupying the same place at the same time, If 
creature or organism is that specific, then the additional 
specificity of man, batrachos, etc., is surplus to requirements.
But creature and organism, I submit, do not have this specificity. 
Consider the case of a man, who is a creature or an organism, 
occupying the same space as the collection of cells he is constituted 
by. If each cell is a creature or organism, then we do have more 
than one creature or organism occupying the same place at the same 
time. The case in question is even clearer if we consider a 
colonial organism such as a volvox. To say, here, that either the 
volvox or a cell of which it is constituted is not an organism would 
be arbitrary. As in the case of the books and pages on a shelf, we 
have to know what kind of organism to get a determinate answer to the 
question "how many?". But the kind, perhaps, needn't be so specific 
as the substance-kinds I have been referring to (e.g. man, batrachos) . 
Multi “Cellular organism^ would be specific enough for counting here, 
so would vertebrate, mammal and primate — which are more specific, 
but not so specific as the substance concept man. And, perhaps, 
they would be specific enough in all conceivable circumstances in 
which the determinacy of enumeration - and, hence, the determinacy 
of identity - is threatened by the constitution of one organism by 
others. But these are not the only cases in which the determinacy 
of identity judgements depends cai the application of substance 
concepts. Consider the case of a butterfly emerging from a 
caterpillar and the use of the genus concept insect in resolving the 
question of the butterfly's identity with the caterpillar. Here,
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the caterpillar is an insect, and the butterfly is an insect, and 
if the spatio-tenporal career of the caterpillar is traced under the 
concept insect we end up with the butterfly - they appear to 
coincide under insect. Hence, the butterfly is identical with the 
caterpillar - for they are the same insect. But suppose instead 
that tracing the caterpillar's history leads us to an adult ichneumon 
wasp. Here there is also spatio-temporal continuity under the 
concept insect, but the wasp is not identical with the caterpillar.
The wasp is a parasite which passes the egg, pupa and larva stages of 
its life in the bo(^ of the caterpillar, and then emerges as a winged 
adult. What justifies our belief in caterpillar/butterfly identities 
and our disbelief in caterpillar/wasp identities is a theory of 
lepidoptera metamorphosis which explains the transition from 
caterpillar to butterfly, and a theory of ichneumon wasp metamorphosis 
which precludes the transition from caterpillar to adult wasp. These 
theories are associated with specific substance concepts : they enable
us to establish when things coincide under these concepts. There is 
no theory of insects per se which is specific enough to allow us to 
establish that there is coincidence. For us to know, or be justified 
in believing, that A=B we must know what A and B are. And that is 
to know enough about what is characteristic of A and B to be able to 
identify, reidentify, and distinguish them from like and unlike things 
at different stages of their temporal-careers. To know that A and B 
are organisms, vertebrates, mammals, or fs - where f is a concept 
general enough to cover things with significantly different conditions 
of persistence and development - is not, generally, to know enough
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(though it may be in those cases where there happens to be no 
rival candidate for identity). To know enough is to know the 
substance-kind - i.e. only the substance concepts A and B satisfy 
is conceptually adequate for resolving the question of their identity.
The connection between the individuation of substances and the 
identification of substances perhaps requires further comment.
Someone might be sufficiently inpressed by the causal regularities or 
causally conditioned characteristics of a substance to say "Something 
is there (in the corner of the attic) but I don't know what it is". 
Now if there is something there, then there is some subs tance-kind, 
f, the thing belongs to (an f the thing is) and there is some 
substance concept - perhaps an assortment of them - the observer 
applies (or the substance engages) in the picking out of the thing.
If there is an assortment of concepts which fit the thing;, they may 
be sufficiently related for the observer to be justified in claiming 
"Whatever it is, it's an animal" or "Whatever it is, it's alive".
One of the concepts may even fit well enough for the observer to 
say "Maybe it's a rat". But when individuation is as vague or 
inconclusive as this, the observer is not, I believe, justified in 
claiming "Whatever it is, it's the same thing again". Until he 
knows enough about the thing to say what it is - which implies 
settling on a substance concept - he does not have the conceptual 
resources to reidentify the thing; "Same again", then, can only 
express an opinion or a guess. And he cannot be said to have 
adequately individuated the thing until he can reidentify it. If
further knowledge is such as to disconfirm identity judgements
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inplicit in reidentification, then the individuation itself may 
be open to revision: what one took to be an f may turn out to be
something else. An unexpected movement of the thing in the attic, 
for exanple, may indicate that it is a bird or a bat rather than a 
rat. Individuative judgements, like the identity judgements they 
support and are supported by, are empirical and révisable.
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4 CONCEPTUAL RELATIVISM
Opposition to the doctrine defended here - that the substances
which occupy our universe are objective entities and not merely
subjective constructions out of peculiarly human and often parochial
phenomenal experience - often appeals to some variant of the argument
Locke offers about the relativity of essence to vocabulary in his
Essay Concerning Human Understanding:
A silent and a striking watch are but one species to those 
who have but one name for them: but he that has the name
"watch" for one and "clock" for the other, and distinct 
complex ideas, to which those names belong, to him they are 
different species.
(Locke, Bk.3, Ch.6 , sect.39)
[Quotation marks around "watch" and "clock" are my addition, 
for clarity.]
and
. . . boundaries of species are as men, and not as nature, 
makes them . . . .
(Ibid, Bk.3, Ch.6 , sect.30)
Ignoring for the moment the fact that Locke is here speaking of 
artifacts, and that there is ample evidence throughout his Essay 
to indicate that Locke did not generally adhere to a relativistic 
conception of species and essences, the passages quoted suggest that 
the criteria for mentoership of a species or kind are stipulated 
rather than discovered, and that these stipulations are not merely 
a function of human understanding as such but are a function of 
parochial interests and divergent beliefs of various sub-grouping 
of human beings. If this is so, then it is foolishly presumptuous
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to project these parochial interests on to the objective world and 
claim that there are watches, clocks, horses and trees, etc. 
independently of human experience, or to claim that members of the 
extension of these kind-concepts have certain properties essentially 
rather than (as Quine claims) the necessity of a property being 
relative to the kind to which we assign its bearer.
There is a short way to deal with the purported anti-essentialist 
implications of the Locke passage, and that is to reject as false the 
claim that the boundaries of a species may vary from one thinker to
another. For it is not the case that the persons Locke considers
have the same concept, watch, with different extensions. Rather, 
non-equivalence of extension is sufficient for the concepts to be 
distinct - though the two concepts are signified by the same word
"watch". Given that the persons have the same concept of a watch,
then the extension of the concept depends on how things are in the 
world: it is not relative to ways of thinking. A person who did
not have distinct concepts of watches and clocks would not produce a 
different answer to a request for their enumeratiion from a person who 
did, as he would not know how to count them. No anti-essentialist 
consequences follow from the fact that there are concepts which are 
not universally understood.
A subtler way of considering Locke's remarks concedes that 
it is creatures who enploy concepts who divide the material of the 
universe up into discrete entities, so that how the universe is 
divided up depends on the concepts employed. It is then conceivable 
that creatures with different interests and beliefs, and different
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concepts from our own, would segment the universe in a manner 
radically different from our manner. To believe that the universe 
is already articulated into things of various kinds and that we 
acquire our thing-kind concepts by having these distinctions 
inpressed upon us, is to take an unnecessary and gratuitous 
anthropocentric attitude toward the universe. With a sensible 
objectivity and humility, it might be urged, ontological theories 
could only be understood to have significance in relation to 
conceptual schemes which are peculiar to specific thinking beings.
The universe is informed by human concepts and concerns, and it is 
conceptually impossible for us to circumvent this human perspective 
and know how the universe is in itself. Substance-kinds, it may be 
further urged, are not mind-independent articulations of reality 
which we happen upon; they are categories we human beings impose 
upon reality for our own convenience.
But clearly the anti-essentialist conclusion reached in the 
above exposition of "subtle" conceptual relativism depends on the 
premise that we can conceive the inconceivable. For if we cannot 
conceive of a reality independent of the concepts with which we 
understand it, or conceive of thinking independent of the concepts 
our thinking enploys, then we indulge in nonsense in supposing a 
thinker inposes a conceptual scheme on reality. However, it does 
not follow from the unintelligibility of conceptual-relativist 
anti-essentialism that the way we conceptualize reality is the only 
possible one, for con ceptual-abs olutism is no more intelligible than 
its negation. If there is no criterion of identity for matter which
51
is prior to or distinct from the substance concepts with which we 
individuate parcels of matter, then it is as senseless to claim that 
there is no alternative to the concepts under which we individuate 
this matter as it is to claim the opposite. For all we know, there 
might be creatures who conceptualize reality in a manner radically 
different from our manner, but anything we could recognize as thought 
about our universe would have to employ individuative concepts much 
like our own. Any evidence that creatures unlike ourselves 
understood the world could not be evidence that they did not en$>loy 
the same concepts as ourselves, for any distinction we might draw 
between beliefs of alien beings which are true but employ alien 
concepts, and beliefs whiCh use the same concepts as our own but are 
false, would be quite arbitrary (cf. Davidson(1)).
Toward the claim that there could be conceptual articulations of 
reality radically different from our own, we must it seems take an 
agnostic attitude: such conceptual schemes are unknown and unknowable
by us. We can, however, qualify the agnosticism by urging that any 
creature capable of human-like behaviour to the extent that it could 
act to bring about preconceived objectives must understand the world 
in a way which involves causal explanations, and this condition 
constrains the range of possible conceptual schemes. An adequate 
conceptual scheme for a creature capable of acting deliberately must 
include individuative concepts which allow for the formulation of 
causal laws and generalizations. Though the substance concepts found 
in such a scheme needn't be ours - we may have no understanding or 
need of such concepts - they don't undermine the objectivity of our
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own substance concepts. Hypothetical causally significant conceptual 
schemes complement rather than rival our own. Though it is 
conceivable that no conceptual scheme employed by any thinking being 
with finite capacities and limited concerns is so conplete as to pick 
out everything that there is to be picked out in the universe, nothing 
follows from this about the objectivity or otherwise of human 
judgements. The "subtle" version of conceptual relativism is as 
powerless as the obvious version is to refute essentialism.
The issue of conceptual relativism has been considered here 
purely for the sake of deflecting, or nipping in the bud, objections 
to the doctrine of essentialism which might be based on relativist 
scruples. In fact, the doctrine of essentialism defended here is 
quite independent of any thesis for or against the primacy of any one 
conceptual framework of thought. All that essentialism insists upon 
is that given a particular conceptual scheme, the objects we pick out 
under the substance concepts of that scheme have essential properties 
- e.g. given that we employ a conceptual scheme that provides for the 
individuation of men it follows necessarily and independently of 
human decisions that anything which is a man is essentially a man.
And if being a man necessarily entails the possession of other 
properties, such as, perhaps, being mortal and being animal then 
anything which is a man is essentially mortal and essentially animal. 
[This deduction of essential properties will be defended in Chapter II. 
I make no claim here about the truth-value of the suggested property 
entailments.] To say that these properties are essential only 
relative to the application of the conœpt man is to say that Socrates
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is essentially mortal relative to his being a man, and not - as for 
Quine - relative to his being called a "man". But the qualification 
"relative" is pointless here, for there is nothing else Socrates can 
be other than what he is: a man. There is no possible world or
counter-factual situation in which this very man, the man Socrates 
is, can be a donkey, a lyre, or a Persian galley. In so far as 
Socrates is at all, he is a man and has essentially whatever 
properties his essential manhood entails.
Once we are committed to an individuative conceptual scheme, 
then it is the way things are in the world and not merely in our 
minds which determines the extensions of these concepts. If we 
enployed a different conceptual scheme in our thought about the world 
- one, say, which lacked the concept man or its cognates - we would 
not pick out Socrates under a different concept, but would abandon 
the conceptual resources which enabled us to pick Socrates out at all. 
In such circumstances, talk of Socrates would be meaningless because 
"Socrates" would not have a reference. The claim that the sentence 
"Socrates is essentially a man" is tirue relative to our conceptual 
scheme but false relative to another scheme is a false claim because 
in any conceivable circumstances in which the sentence has a sense, 
the sentence is true (cf. Wiggins(4)).
If the material objects which satisfy our substance concepts are 
discovered in nature rather than invented or fabricated by men, then 
it is appropriate to consider them natural objects and to consider 
the extension of these concepts - the sets of things which satisfy 
the concepts - to constitute natural kinds (but see discussion of
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artifacts in Chapter III). That there are things in nature which 
constitute natural kinds, and that we have some knowledge of them, 
would seem to be inplicit not only in our practices of individuating 
and identifying material objects but also in our successful inductive 
generalization: e.g. we believe a thing to be water-soluble although
it has never been placed in water because it is of the same 
natural kind as things which have dissolved in water. Quine 
considers the notion of natural kinds to be crucial to our 
understanding of dispositional properties, subjunctive conditionals, 
singular causal statements - and, generally, to any learning which 
involves induction or expectation - and suggests (metaphorically) 
that things are of the same natural kind in so far as they are 
"interchangeable parts of the cosmic machine". That is to say, they 
are of the same kind "in proportion to how much of scientific theory 
would remain true in interchanging those things as objects of 
reference in the theory" (Quine(3), p.134). If "scientific theory" 
is interpreted broadly enough to take in empirical knowledge which 
justifies our predictions and expectations generally, then the 
conceptual scheme we use in individuating objects and considering 
their properties is hardly an arbitrary one. For if conceptual 
schemes are justified by the explanatory force of the theories they 
facilitate, then the conceptual scheme we have - a scheme in which 
substance concepts have a dominant role - would seem at least to be 
appropriate for the world we live in.
Schemes associated with theories of even greater explanatory 
force - the sets of concepts employed in the basic physical sciences.
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say - would seem, then, to be even more appropriate. Quine believes 
that as the exact sciences mature, natural-kind concepts are 
superseded by precise, scientific notions of similarity - e.g. when 
water-solubility can be defined in terms of molecular structure, then 
kinds become superfluous (ibid. pp.137-8). But much of the point 
and significance of sophisticated scientific theories is due to their 
clarification of our naive, intuitive theories. The scientific 
theories can confirm and augment our beliefs about members of 
natural kinds, or they can lead us to modify those beliefs. In so 
far as explanations in natural-kind terms and explanations in 
scientific terms are intertranslatable - which they must be if we are 
to understand the explanations to have the world as their common 
subject matter - and in so far as translation depends not on the 
reduction of natural objects to the scientific entities, but on the 
former being constituted or composed of the latter, then the 
conceptual schemes the two sorts of explanations employ are 
complementary rather than competitive. For example, scientific 
knowledge of the chemical conpositions of sugar and of salt, together 
with scientific knowledge of the way certain structurally similar 
chemical compounds combine with H2O, confirms and reinforces our 
beliefs that sugar and salt are not just universally, but necessarily, 
soluble in water. Similar knowledge justifies our attributing 
water-solubility to things of kinds previously not believed to have 
that property, thus augmenting our knowledge of kinds . And 
scientific knowledge of the relationships between the properties of 
gold and its atomic structure lead to the revision of the belief that
56
gold is necessarily yellow. If it is the causal regularities 
inherent in substances which enable us to individuate the substances, 
then scientific theories may be seen as articulating the natural 
laws which subsume these regularities. Once we have scientific 
confirmation that some properties of things are a consequence of 
their internal structure or constitution and the laws of nature, and 
we have similar confirmation that members of natural kinds are what 
they are because of their internal structure or constitution, then it 
seems that we have all the scientific confirmation we need to justify 
our belief that these members have the relevant properties necessarily 
or essentially (see Chapter II for a more rigorous argument).
The intertranslatibility of natural-kind explanations and 
scientific explanations is sufficient evidence that the sets of 
concepts that each employs belong to a single conceptual scheme. In 
so far as the most explanatory and comprehensive theories we have for 
making sense of the world depend on this conceptual scheme, the 
conceptual scheme is as suitable for the world - or fits it - as well 
as a conceptual scheme can. New theories, employing new concepts, 
may be even more explanatory and conprehensive than the ones we have 
- but for these theories even to be intelligible, tdie concepts they 
employ must be correlatable to our current concepts. If they are 
correlatable (i.e. if sentences employing the new concepts can be 
translated into sentences employing the old concepts) then they are 
exrtensions to our conceptual scheme, not rivals to it.
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CHAPTER II
ESSENTIALISM AND LOGICAL FORM
1 NECESSARY TRUTHS AND ESSENTIALIST CLAIMS
I have attempted to show that the concept of an essential 
property is sound, is not reducible to or definable in terms of de 
dicto necessity, and is non-vacuous. Consideration of the 
individuation of objects indicates that the class of essential 
properties is a large one: for every substance concept, f, under
which objects are (or could be) individuated there is a property 
being an f which is essential to any object which has that property, 
Having such a property, I have claimed, sometimes constitutes a 
thing a member of a natural kind. There may, however, be classes 
of material objects which do not constitute a natural kind (e.g. 
motor cars); and there could it seems be natural-kinds which are 
not associated with individuation - water, for instance, seems to 
single out a stuff rather than things. Cwhen the phrase 
"natural-kind" occurs without further qualification in this work, 
it should be understood to designate kinds which have material 
objects as members - i.e. natural-thing kinds. Kinds of natural 
event or phenomena (e.g. thunder, lightning, eclipse) may be called 
"natural-event kinds".] There are also apparently true sentences
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such as
Postmen are essentially employees of the Post Office
which elude a substance analysis (a man who is a postman does not
cease to exist when he is sacked) and for which a de dicto analysis
seems more appropriate:
Necessarily [All postmen are employees of the Post Office].
So before going on to consider which essentialist claims are true or
likely to be true, I will first consider what it is that makes a
sentence a genuine essentialist claim.
In the preceding chapters, I used the concepts of de re
necessity and de dicto necessity in expounding the doctrine of
essentialism. Here, I hope to give the de re / de dicto distinction
all the clarity it needs to be serviceable in this work.
By de dicto necessity I understand "necessarily" to be a
qualifier of complete (i.e. closed) sentences, as in
Necessarily, all men are mortal
and its variants
It must be that all men are mortal.
It is necessarily the case that all men are mortal.
It is necessary that if anything is a man then it is 
mortal.
To indicate that the scope of "necessarily" is a complete sentence,
I shall prefix the sentence in brackets by "necessarily"
Necessarily (All men are mortal).
When clarity and economy of expression may be aided by using the 
notation of the predicate calculus, I shall use "D" in place of
59
"necessarily":
□ ( (x) (man x mortal x) ) .
I understand a necessary sentence to be a sentence which must be 
true, has to be true, or is bound to be true. A sentence which must 
be false is an impossible sentence; and a sentence which is not 
impossible can be true, whether it is necessarily true or just 
contingently true. As possible world semantics for "necessarily" 
rest on a prior understanding of "possible", I shall rely only on the 
intuitive understanding of these modal expressions . Using "0" in 
place of "possibly", the relationships between necessary, possible, 
and impossible sentences may be summarized as follows:
0|p =
=  *^ 0 p
Op = ~ □ ~p
O'p = ~ D P
i.e. a sentence is necessarily true if and only if it is not possibly 
false, etc. Other equivalences and principles of logical inference 
which I take to accord with the intuitive understanding of de dicto 
necessity and possibility are as set out in standard systems of modal 
logic, such as lewis's S4 (see Hughes & Creswell) . Axcioms 5 and 6 
of s4 are specially relevant to chapter I of this work 
A5 0 p 3 p
A6 □ (p = q) => ( Dp = Dg)
as they may be used in proving the validity of the following
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argument forms
a) 0(p o q) b) 0(P ^ q)
P Op
q Oq
while
c) D (P => g)
P
□g
cannot be proved. Hence, the argument
□[cyclist(c) D two-legged(c)]
cyclist(c)_________________
two-legged(c)
is valid, but
□ [ ma thema ti ci an ( c) d rational (c)]
mathematician (c)_______________
Q rational(c)
is not valid.
By de re necessity I understand "necessarily" to be a qualifier
of predicates, or open sentences, as in
Socrates is necessarily a man.
or its variants
Socrates is essentially a man.
Socrates must be a man.
Being a man is an essential (necessary) property of Socrates.
In the notation of the predicate calculus, the "necessarily" 
qualification of predicates will be indicated by prefixing the 
predicate by
□man (Socrates)
In essentialist sentences with two or more place relational 
predicates, the "necessarily" qualification may apply to some but 
not all the terms of the relation - e.g. we may wish to affirm that
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Aristotle essentially has Nicomachus for his father while denying 
that Ni coma chus essentially has Aristotle for his son. In such 
cases, predicate abstract notation seems to be indispensable (see 
Camap, pp.129-33, and Wiggins (4), (5)). This notation allows 
Nicomachus is the father of Aristotle 
to be represented by either
(1) [(Xx)(Ay) (F(x,y))],<Nicomachus,AristotIe>
(2) [ ( Ax) (F(x,Aristotle) )], <Nicomachtzs>
or (3) L{Xy) iF {Nicomachus ,y))2 f<Aris tot le >
The first may be read as
The property of x and the property of y such that x is the 
father of y are had by the ordered pair <Nicomachus,Aristotle>.
If the predicate abstract in the third representation is prefixed
by "0"
[□(Ay) {F{Nicomachus,y)) 1 ,<Aristotle>
then this may be read as
The property of y such that Nicomachus is the father of y is 
essentially had by Ar'stotle
which leaves it open that Nicomachus only contingently has the
property of being Aristotle's father. Where this degree of
precision is not required - i.e. when only one term of a relation
has that relation essentially - I shall convert n-place predicates
to one place predicates by assimilating to the relation all terms
other than the one which has the relation essentially and eschew
predicate abstract notation. Hence
□Ni comachus- fathered/Aristotle)
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will be read as
Aristotle is essentially fathered by Nicomachus
or
Aristotle is essentially Nicomachus's offspring.
Relations, that is, will be treated as relational properties.
As open sentences may be conditional in form, there may be
essential properties which are conditional - e.g. a thing may have
essentially the property
[□(Ax) (man x o mortal x)~\ ,<Socrates>
But if this property is truly attributable to Socrates, then it is
truly attributable to anything in the universe : everything is
essentially (mortal if a man) . It would seem, then, that a
universally attributable essential properly^ can be derived from
every true dé dicto necessary universal affirmative, e.g.
Necessarily, all triangles are three-sided o 
Everything is essentially (three-sided if triangular).
Necessarily, everything is se If-identical =>
Everything is essentially self-identical.
As "□ (a)A o (&)□ A" is a theorem of modal logic, this is to be
expected (see Hughes & Cresswell, p.143). What are of greater
interest here, however, are essential properties which are not
derived from analytic truths.
I understand an essential property of a thing to be a property
it must have, has to have, or is bound to have - i.e. a property
without which that thing could not excist. A property a thing
cannot have is an impossible property for that thing; and a property
which is not impossible for that thing is one it can have, either
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essentially or contingently. These de ze modalities are related as 
the de dicto modalities are: e.g.
Of (a) = -O-f(a)
(a is essentially f iff a is not possibly not f)
etc. The important de re counterparts of the S4 axioms are:
A5' a is essentially F = a is F
A6 ' a is essentially (G if F) =>
(a is essentially F o a is essentially G).
These may be used to prove the validity of the following argument
forms :
a') a is essentially 
a is F
(G if F)
a is G
b') a is essentially (G if F) 
a is essentially F
a is essentially G
while the following cannot be proved:
c' a is essentially 
a is F
(G if F)
a is essentially G
Hence, the argument
Socrates is essentially (mortal if a man)
Socrates is essentially a man____________
Socrates is essentially mortal
is valid, but
Fred is essentially (a GPO employee if a postman)
Fred is a postman_____________________ ___________
Fred is essentially a GPO employee
is not valid.
Now suppose that the justification for taking the property 
being mortal if a man to be essential to everything has nothing to 
do with the meaning of "man" or with "All men are mortal" being an
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analytic or conceptual truth. Suppose instead that it is a thesis 
of some well-confirmed empirical theory that things constituted as 
men are must die - i.e. we know by scientific investigation that the 
laws of nature are such that anything which is a man is mortal.
Then it can be said of everything in a world governed by those laws 
that it is essentially mortal if a man. And suppose further that 
it is scientifically confirmed that a man cannot cease to be 
constituted as he is and continue to exist - i.e. anything which is 
a man must be a man. Given these suppositions, the conclusion of 
the "Socrates" argument above is also true: Socrates is essentially
mortal. Given similar suppositions and the same argument form,
"Gold is essentially soluble in aqua regia" can be shown to be true.
The scientifically confirmed thesis, however, does not 
immediately entail "Necessarily, all men are mortal". The scope of 
the necessitation in "Everything is essentially (mortal if man) " is 
smaller than in "Necessarily, everything is (mortal if man)", so the 
two sentences are not equivalent nor does the latter follow from the 
former. [" (a) D a  a 0(a)A" is not a theorem of modal logic without 
the controversial Barcan Formula (see Hughes & Cresswell, Ch.10). ]
To get to the de dicto necessity from the de re necessity requires 
the further premise that the laws of nature hold wherever there are 
men. For if the laws of nature were different, then there m i ^ t  be 
men who were not mortal, so it would not be necessary that everything 
is essentially mortal if man. But the required extra premise is 
alreacty implicit in the suppositions about scientific confirmation 
- as it is inpiicit in the theoxry of substances and natural kinds so
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far expounded. For if to be a substance of the kind man is to be 
constituted in such a way that laws of nature govern existence 
conditions, then in a world in which the appropriate laws do not 
hold there are no men. The dependency of the existence of 
substances on natural laws requires the laws to hold wherever the 
substances exist. So whatever the laws of nature are 
"(x) (man x o mortal x) " will be true: it will be true when there
are no men and the antecedent of the conditional is false. Hence, 
the de dicto necessity is true if the de re necessity claim is true. 
What makes it true is not just lœanings or logic but also the way 
things are in the world: the world as it is conceptualized by us,
and which is the subject of empirical knowledge. The de dicto
necessity is a posteriori, But more will be said of substances and 
natural laws in Chapter III.
In this section I have attempted to clarify the distinction 
between de dicto and de re necessity by elucidating differences in 
scope the word "necessarily" or "must" has in ordinary English 
sentences. For a more rigorous explication of the sense of 
"necessarily" - i.e. an account of the contribution "necessarily" 
makes to the truth conditions of sentences in which it occurs - see 
Wiggins's "The Be Re Must" and Peacock's Appendix to it (Wiggins(5) ) .
A possible objection to the procedure of this section is 
to claim that I have merely manufactured a de re context for 
"necessarily" by shifting the de dicto sentence modifier to a 
predicate modifier position. For the objection to be sustained 
it must be shown that the de re contexts so generated are ei#ier
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vacuous because there are no true sentences of the form " []P (t)", or 
superfluous because the truth conditions of such sentences are the 
same as those for the related de dicto sentence. But both of these 
disjuncts appear to be false. First, if the claims of Chapter I of 
this work are true, then any sentence of the form " Of(a) " is true 
when "a" is the name of an object and "f" is a predicate expression 
for the sortal concept under which the object is individuated. For 
instance
□man (Socrates)
is true - i.e. Socrates is essentially a man - because Socrates is 
picked out under the substance concept man, and he cannot continue 
to exist as anything but a man: if he ceases to be a man he ceases
to be. The individuating sortal a thing satisfies is a paradigmatic 
case of an essential property of the thing: a property without which
the thing cannot exist. Hence, de re contexts for "necessarily" 
are not vacuous. Second, if it is t m e  that de re necessity 
sentences have the same truth-conditions as their de dicto 
counterparts, then "Socrates is essentially a man" is true just in 
case "It is necessary that Socrates is a man" is true 
□man(Socrates) = □ [man (Socrates) ] .
But "Socrates is a man" entails, by existential generalization, 
"Something is a man" - i.e.
man (Socrates) o (ax) man(x)
As the scope of the necessity qualifier in the de re sentence 
"Socrates is essentially a man" is only the predicate (the sentence 
may be represented by a formula in first order predicate calc#us,
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which does not include the symbol " □ ", because " □ " is merely part 
of a predicate expression), then that sentence entails "Something is 
essentially a man"
□ man (Socrates) o (3x)^ man(x) .
In the de dicto necessity sentence "Necessarily, Socarates is a man", 
however, the scope of the necessity operator is the entire sentence, 
so "Socrates" does occur within its scope. Here, the sentence may 
not be represented by a formula in first order predicate calculus, 
but it may be represented by extensions to it which do include the 
symbol " □ ". How existential generalization works on such formula 
is a matter of some dispute. If sentences introduced by "It is 
necessary that . . . "  like sentences introduced by "It is believed 
that . . . "  may be referentially opaque, so that substituting 
identicals and quantifying into such contexts is not always valid 
(see Quine, Smullyan and Kaplan in Linsky) , then the validity of the 
following is at least suspect
□ [man(Socrates) ] = (ax) □ man (x) .
But if a formula of first order predicate calculus remains such a 
formula when it is qualified by □, then the rule of EG should it 
seems apply to such a formula without restriction. If "(ax) man(x)" 
is derivable from "man (Socrates) " even when the latter is embedded 
in "□[. . .]", then from "□ [man(Socrates)]" we may expect it to 
follow that "□ [(ax) man(x)] ". [Note: EG is a rule of lower or
first order predicate calculus. "A is essentially f" or "□f(A) " 
("(□f ) A”) may be represented by a formula of LPC, because " □ " is 
embedded in aipredicate exqpression. "Necessarily, A is F" or
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" 0[f (A)]" may not be so represented, because " □" is not a symbol
of LPC. So from "Of(A) " we may derive "(3x) Q f  (x) " by EG, though
we may not so derive it from "0[f (A) ] ". But "A(t) o (3x)A(x) " is a
theorem, so "0[f (A) o (3x) f (x)] " is true. Then
□ Cf(A) 3 (3x)f(x)]
0[f(A)]
DC (3x) f (x) ]
by A5 and modus ponens. Hence, from "□ [man(Socrates)]" derive 
"□[ (3x) man(x)] " (cf. Wiggins (5) , p. 301-3) .] But we may conceive 
of a circumstance in which Socrates does not exist, and a 
circumstance in which there are no men at all, so "□[(.3x)man (x)] " 
("Necessarily, there are men") must be counted false - for men exist 
contingently. As a false premise cannot follow from a true one,
"D [man(Socrates) ]" must also be counted false. But if 
"□ man (Socrates) " is true and "0 [man (Socrates) ] " is false, then de re 
necessity sentences and their de dicto counterparts do not always 
have the same truth-conditions.
[ Note : The modal theorem "(3a)0A 3 0(3a)A" (see Hughes and
Cresswell, p. 144) - which could be used to derive (Hx)Oman(x) " 
from "~ □(3x)man(x) " - is not valid, I maintain, when given a de re 
interpretation. From "Something must be f" or "Something is f in 
any circumstance in which it exists" it does not follow that in 
every circumstance there is something which is f - not unless in _ 
every circumstance there are exactly the same individuals. Read 
de dicto as "For some value of x, it is necessary that fix) "
(metalinguistically: for some value of x, "f(x)" is true in all
possible worlds) , the sentence "(3x) 0 f (x) " does imply that there is
.■ ■ 1 ■
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that value for x in all possible worlds. The narrower scope of
essentialist " □" (the predicate "f" rather than the propositional-
variable "fix) ") is not captured in the notation of IPC +T (see
Hughes & Cresswell, p.183 fn 131 and p.199 fn 151). For further
objections to the propositional-variable reading of "Of(x) " see
Ch.III.4 (end) below, and Cartwright(2)).]
I have used a sentence which has a proper name rather than a
definite description in its subject place in discussing de re and
de dicto necessity to avoid any suggestion that the distinction
depends on a prior distinction between rigid and non-rigid
designators (Kripke(l), (2)). The de re / de dicto distinction is
more strikingly apparent, however, when definite descriptions are
used. If we take as our model sentence not "Socrates is a man" but
"The basket-weaving teacher of Plato is a man", then the de dicto
necessity exaitple may be analysed (after Russell and Smullyan) as
□ C(3x) iiy) (basket-weaving teacher of Plato (y) = y=x)
& man(x) )]
But this sentence is false unless there must have been something
which uniquely wove baskets and taught Plato, and which was a man.
For the de re necessity example, however, the analysis is
(ax) ( (y)basket-weaving teacher of Plato (y) 5 y=x)
& DmanCx) )
which is true if there was something which uniquely wove baskets and 
taught Plato (though there need not have been), and which could not 
help but be a man (see Wiggins (4)) . The difference in de re and 
de dicto truth-conditions is less obvious when the term is a proper 
name, but it is still there.
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2 REAL AND APPARENT ESSENTIALIST CLAIMS
Given that the logical forms of essentialist claims and 
necessary truths can be precisely distinguished by means of 
differences in the scope of necessity qualifiers, the dubious truth 
values of certain English modal sentences or utterances may be seen 
to stem from their ambiguous truth-conditions. For example, the 
sentence
Postmen are essentially employees of the Post Office 
appears to be an essentialist claim, having the logical form 
(x)(Postman(x) = Demployee-of-the-Post-Office(x)).
But if this is what the sentence says, then it is false : no one
ceases to exist in losing his employment by the Post Office, so no 
one is essentially a Post Office employee. The sentence cannot be 
both true and an essentialist claim. If, however, the apparent 
logical form is misleading and the sentence actually has the logical 
form of the de dicto necessity
Q[(x)(Postman(x) = employee-of-the-Post-Office(x))] 
then the sentence may legitimately be taken to be true. Here, the 
grammatical form of the sentence obscures the logical form.
On the other hand, the sentence 
Necessarily, Socrates is human 
cannot be both true and a de dicto necessity, for it implies the 
false sentence
Necessarily, there are humans.
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Here, the essentialist interpretation 
□human (Socrates)
is the plausible one. And as an existentially quantified variable 
occurring within the scope of a de dicto necessity qualifier will 
always imply the necessary existence of an object, no sentence of the 
form "S is P" can be both true and a de dicto necessil^ unless "S" 
denotes a necessary existant (e.g. a number).
The above prohibition on the occurrence of singular terms within
the scope of a de dicto necessity qualifier clearly rules out a de
dicto interpretation of the sentence 
Necessarily, Cicero is Tully.
For if the sentence was interpreted as the de dicto 
DC Cicero = Tully] 
then EG, quantifying over "Cicero", would yield 
DC (ax) (x = Tully)] 
or "It is necessary that Tully exists", which is false.
The sentence is true, however, when read as an essentialist claim, 
and there are three ways this may be done:
(1) Cicero and Tully are essentially identical
i.e. [□(Ax) (Ay) (x = y)] , <Cicero,Tully>
(2) Cicero is essentially identical with Tully 
i.e. □ i denti cal-wi th-Tully ( Ci cero)
or (3) Tully is essentially identical with Cicero
i.e. □ identical-with-Cicero (Tully)
Options (2) and (3) take the sentence to say that a specific
individual has essentially the relational property of being
identical with a specific individual. Existential generalization
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on (2) yields
Something is essentially identical with Tully 
i.e. (ax) (□ identical-with-Tully (x) ) 
but does not yield the false
Necessarily, something is identical with Tully
or
Necessarily, Tully exists 
i.e. DC(ax) (x = Tully)] .
Further, if there is no principled objection to quantifying over 
terms occurring in relational predicates we ought to be able to 
derive from "Cicero is essentially identical with Tully" the curious 
Cicero is essentially identical with something
or
Cicero essentially exists 
though Cicero is not a necessary existant. But given the intuitive 
understanding of an essential property as being a property an 
individual must have to exist, then the property of existence itself 
is manifestly such an essential property: whatever exists, must
exist - or exists essentially. It remains false, though, that it 
is necessary that any ordinary individual exis-ts. In this case, 
our faltering intuitive grasp of the distinction between necessary 
existence and essential existence may be fortified by the resources 
of possible world semantics. For to say that it is necessary that 
Cicero exists is to say that in every possible world there is 
something which is Cicero. But a world without Cicero - indeed, an 
empty world - is readily conceivable, so "Cicero exists" is not a
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necessaiy truth. To say "Cicero exists essentially", however, is 
to say that in every possible world containing Cicero he has the 
property of existence - which is a truism (cf. Kripke(l) , p.151) .
Sentences employing mass terms, such as "gold", may also have 
ambiguous truth-conditions in modal contexts. Though the sentence 
Necessarily, gold is a metal 
appears to be an identity statement, it clearly cannot be one 
because the principle of symmetry is violated:
Necessarily, metal is gold 
is false. If the sentence is a candidate for truth, it is better 
read as a predication. But if the logical form is 
DCmetal(gold)]
- i.e. if "gold" is treated as a name of a substance - then 
existential generalization yields 
□C(ax) metal (%)]
which is also false, for it is not necessary that there is metal. 
"Gold" it seems should also be treated as a predicate if the 
necessity operator is considered to have large scope. In this 
case, the logical form of the sentence would be 
□ E(x) (gold X. 3 metal x) ] .
Alternatively, the sentence could be interpreted as a de re 
necessity claim, e.g.
Gold is essentially metal.
Similarly,
Necessarily, gold dissolves in aqua regia 
could be interpreted as the de dicto necessity
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OC (x) (gold X 3 dissolves-in-aqua-regia x)] 
or as an essentialist daim
□ dissolves-in-aqua-regia (gold) .
But a de dicto inteiprotation of
Necessarily, gold is the element with AN79 
would not be compatible with the truth of that sentence.
OC(x)(gold X 3 element-with-atomic-number-79 %)] 
is an inadequate representation of the logical form of the sentence, 
because it omits the infoirmation that there is one and only one 
element with AN79, If the sentence is taken to mean what it says, 
then it is better read as an identity statement in which a name of 
a substance and a definite description are linked by the identity 
predicate "is". But then the necessity operator cannot include 
the definite description within its scope without implying that the 
existence of gold is necessary. This unacceptable existential 
implication is only avoided, it seems, by a de re necessity 
interpretation, such as;
(ax) (y) ( e lemen t-wi th-AN79 (y) = y=x & Qidenti cal ( x , go Id) )
i.e.
There is sonBthing which is uniquely an element with 
atomic number 79 and it is essentially identical with gold
(cf. Wiggins (4) ) .
In evaluating colloquial English sentences employing the
necessity qualifier, the grammatical form of the sentence will
often be a poor guide to the logical form - hence, to the truth
conditions - of the sentence. By examining various interpretations
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of the logical form of such sentences, it is often possible to 
eliminate interpretations which are inconsistent with sentences 
we consider truisms. Such a procedure will often be a necessary 
preliminary to evaluating modal sentences, and it will be used 
in considering the merits of certain essentialist claims in the 
chapters which follow.
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CHAPTER I I I
NATURE AND ESSENCE
1 THE NATURE OF NATURAL KINDS
In Chapter I, Section 4, substances or natural-kind things were 
distinguished from artifacts by their being individuated by their 
causal characteristics rather than identified by their qualities or 
functional properties. This distinction would appear to have the 
consequence that natural-kind words are initially defined 
ostensively, by demonstrative reference to typical examples of the 
kind, while artifact-^kind words are introduced by verbal definitions 
A thing is deemed to be of a specific artifact-kind just in case 
it satisfies a description, so artifact-kind words have verbal 
definitions which express such descriptions: e.g. "bicycle, n. a
vehicle with two wheels, one before the other, driven by pedals or 
a motor" (Chambers) . But attenpts to define natural-kind words by 
similar verbal definitions generally fail because no identifying 
description will pick out all and only the members of the kind - 
e.g. "horse, n. a solid-hoofed ungulate . . . with flowing tail and 
mane" (Chambers) doesn’t cover horses with cropped manes and tails, 
does cover atypical zebras, asses, etc., and depends on the further 
defini-^on of "ungulate". Such definitions fedl to provide
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necessary and sufficient conditions for kind-membership. To be 
adequate, a natural-kind word would have to describe the unique 
causal characteristics of things of that kind, and this would amount 
to a highly developed conception or theory of the kind. Such a 
theory is usually the result of empirical investigations which 
follow the identification of a kind, and the fixing of the sense of 
the kind word. As Kripke, Putnam and others have argued, such a 
theory is no part of the meaning of a natural-kind word, for one can 
use a natural-kind word such as "gold" coupetently with little or no 
knowledge of the theory of gold and even with a false theory (e.g. 
"gold is a yellow metal"), and the statements of even a true theory 
are not analytic truths. As with proper names, natural-kind words 
appear to have definitions which are essentially extension involving 
or deictic. The sense of the natural-kind word "gold", for example, 
would be initially fixed by "This and anything like it in the 
appropriate respects is gold" - where "this" involves a demonstrative 
reference to a paradigmatic or typical example of the kind, and 
"appropriate respects" refers to an intuitive sense of relevant 
similarity which may be elucidated by the articulation of the 
natural laws which govern the existence and persistence conditions 
for kind members (see Kripke(2) Lecture III, Putnam, and Wiggins(4)) . 
Even in the rare cases in which a theory of a kind is available 
before the discovery of kind members (e.g. the properties of 
transuranic elements were predictable from Mendeleev's Periodic 
Table before they were synthesized), the existence of an 
exemplification of the theory is a precondition of there being an
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adequately defined natural-kind word. A theory which is true of 
nothing is not a natural-kind theory, and a word defined by such a 
theory is no more a natural-kind word than is "unicorn".
Although natural-kind words are typically defined ostensively, 
they needn't be so defined. For there are words which 
unquestionably designate natural-kinds, but which clearly were not 
defined ostensively: e.g. "pterodactyl", "tyrannosaurus". As
pterodactyls were extinct long before there were men, no one ever 
pointed one out and said "This and anything nomologically like it is 
a pterodactyl". In this case, it is the fossilized remains of 
kind-members which provide the evidence that the kind has an 
extension: they indicate that at some time there was a pterodactyl.
What an os tensive definition of a kind implies is not only that 
there is some theory of what is causally characteristic of kind 
members, but that the theory has an instance. If we had a complete 
description of the causal characteristics of kind members (or 
complete enough to distinguish the kind from others) , then such a 
description together with an existence claim could supplant the 
ostensive definition of a natural-kind word, or stand in lieu of an 
ostensive definition when kind members are unobservable (e.g. 
subatomic particles) . But, t^ically, descriptions of natural 
kinds are not complete enough to guarantee uniqueness: for objects
which satisfy the same kind description may be discovered to have 
further properties which differ enough to indicate different 
natural-kinds (e.g. the discovery that the kind jade includes the 
kinds j'adeite and nephrite) . So_long as the possibility of_future
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discoveries precludes the completion of a theory for a kind, 
ostensive definitions may be ine spendable in practice though 
eliminable in theory. But if a kind description may be discovered 
to cover more than one kind, then the samples used in an ostensive 
definition may be discovered to be of more than one kind. If an 
ostensive definition of a natural kind word implies that there is 
some theory the satisfaction of which is necessary and sufficient 
for kind membership, and it is satisfied by the indicated samples, 
then samples which are actually of different kinds satisfy no 
consistent theory - e.g. there is no theory both jadeite and 
nephrite satisfy. If the attempt to articulate criteria of 
membership in a kind may indicate that no kind is uniquely designated 
by an ostensively defined kind-word, then ostensive definitions are 
provisional and defeasible. The use of ostensive definitions to 
convey the sense of natural-kind words can only be relied upon when 
there is a true theory to guide the accurate selection of examples. 
But the initial selection of examples could be done by some espert: 
everyone who knows the sense of a natural-kind word needn't know the 
criteria of samples selection (see Putnam) . But then the way 
natural-kind words have their sense does not appear to differ from 
the way words for other kinds have their Sense : for one could it
seems learn and teach the sense of "aeroplane" by example, though 
only esperts know precisely what it is for something to be an 
aeroplane. The way â kindr-word is linked to the kind it designates 
does not reveal what is peculiar to natural kinds. If natural-kinds 
are peculiar in that the criteriai properties for kind-^meiBbership
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cannot be known prior to experience - even by experts - then it is 
an enquiry into the nature of natural-kinds rather than into the 
meaning of kind-words which may indicate why this should be so.
It has alreac^ been urged that the essential causal or 
dispositional properties of substances - i.e. the properties things 
of a natural-kind invariably exdiibit in accordance with natural laws 
- determine a principle of continuity through change which enables 
us to individuate them. The set of natural laws associated with a 
natural-kind enables us to predict the physical properties its 
members will have under various external conditions, or at various 
temporal stages of their existence, and this makes it possible for 
us to trace their persistence in space and time although their 
phenomenal properties may radically alter. [As any predicate true 
of a substance can be taken to attribute a property to the substance, 
the qualification "intrinsic" is used to restrict the range of 
properties considered to those which inhere in the physical make-up 
of the substance, and to exclude such propertu.es as being seen by me 
in Trafalgar Square at 2:15 pm, 12th May 1982, Intrinsic properties 
can be expressed by monadic predicates, but needn't be; being 
brittle and being soluble are intrinsic physical properties, but 
these may be expressed by predicates which are conditional or 
relational in form^ References to properties of substances which 
are not explicitly qualified as "intrinsic" should be understood to 
be so qualified;] Given that the laws of nature are such that the 
substahce gold is soluble in aqua regia, melts at 1063°C» etc., then 
gold may be considered to have essen-tially the , disposi-tional
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properties expressed by the subjunctive conditionals "If it were 
placed in aqua regia, it would dissolve", "If it were heated to 
1C63°C, it would melt", etc. These are properties a substance must 
have to be gold, hence properties gold must have to excist. If the 
laws of nature were to change so that nothing had these properties, 
then that would be a situation in which there was no gold, and there 
could not be any gold. It would not be a situation in which gold 
had different dispositional properties. In so far as laws of 
nature determine what gold is, then any counter-factual situation 
in which the concept gold has an exrtension is a situation in which 
these laws of nature hold. And this will also be a situation in 
which the accidental properties of gold (at least the accidental 
properties which are conditioned by essential dispositional 
properties) would be manifested as a consequence of natural laws 
and antecedent conditions; e.g. when gold had the contingent 
property of being 1063°C, then it would have the contingent property 
of being fluid, etc. Consequently, a situation in which a substance 
had the first of these contingent properties but not the other would 
be a situation in which it was not gold.
A theory which listed the essential dispositional properties of 
substances of a kind, and elucidated these by reference to natural 
laws linking contingent properties of the substances, would be a 
theory of the real essence of the kind (i.e. of the substances which 
constitute the kind: ' a kind is a collection and not itself a 
substance or a uni versai) . In some cases - as in the case of gold 
- such â theory iuay progress to the point at which it may be shown
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that the essential dispositional properties of a substance are a 
consequence of the laws of nature and the constitution or internal 
structure of the substance. That the internal structure of gold
- i.e. its being constituted of atoms with 79 protons in the nucleus
- actually accounts for the essential properties of gold seems to be 
confirmed by the accurate prediction of the properties of elements, 
generally, on the basis of their atomic number in Mendeleev's Table. 
Similarly, the essential properties of chemical compounds are now 
known to follow from their molecular structure, and there is 
evidence that the properties of biological organisms follow from 
their genetic structure. [Evidence of variations in the DNA 
molecules found in different members of the same species does not in 
itself refute the claim that they have a common DNA structure, for 
the common structure needn't include all the elements of the 
molecule. As the common structure of gold atoms depends on
their having the same number of protons but not the same number of 
neutrons (i.e. there are isotopes), so DNA molecules can have the 
same structure though they are not exactly similar. The significant 
structure of a DNA molecule for a species will be that which accounts 
for the essential dispositional properties of species members, rather 
than that which has a purely geometrical pattern. In so far as DNA 
structure does uniquely identify the real essence of a natural-kind, 
and in so far as biological species are natural-kinds (one may have 
an interest in defining species differently), advances in genetics 
may show that sqme organisms were mistakenly considered to be of the 
same species because of their similar phenomenal properties . On
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the other hand, if it is learned that creatures with the same real 
essence considered in terms of dispositional properties have 
significantly different DNA molecules, then the unique link between 
DNA structure and real essence would be disconfirmed.]
If we consider the set of essential dispositional or relational 
properties a substance has to constitute the nature of that substance, 
then one of the primary aims of the enterprise of science is to 
reveal the internal structures upon which the natures of substances 
depend. It is also a primary aim of science (not always realized) 
to demonstrate that all the properties of a substance follow from 
antecedent conditions in accordance with the natural laws which 
define the substance's nature. The scientific approach to 
essentialism accords with Locke's claim that the real essence of 
things is "the real internal, but generally, in substances unknown, 
constitution of things, whereon their discoverable qualities 
depend . . . "  (Locke, III.3.15). But where Locke sometimes suggests 
that the discoverable qualities are entailed by the internal 
structure, the scientific view posits a causal or nomological 
connection between properties and structure. Even if it were true 
that the internal structure a substance had was essential to the 
substance, so that substances with the same nature had to have the 
same structure, the Observable properties of a sib>stance could not 
be deduced from the structure because these properties depend on the 
antecedent cbn(iLtibus subsumed by the natural laws, and these 
antecedent conditions needn't be implicit in the substance's internal 
structure. "%hat are "deducible "from the essential internal structure
J L . J j
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of a substance and the laws of nature are the essential properties 
of the substance - not the properties which are contingent on 
circumstances.
If, as I have urged, it is the nature of a substance which
determines the substance's conditions of existence, persistence, and
development, then to have that nature is to have a property the
substance cannot exist without, so a substance's nature is essential
to it. But it does not follow that the inner constitution or
structure upon which the nature of a substance depends is itself
essential to the substance (i.e. it can be true that structure s o
nature n but false that nature n o structure s) . For at least some
substances, it is conceivable that a structure other than the one it
actually has will engage natural laws that confer the same nature
upon it - i.e. it is conceivable that a substance has different
structural realizations. Though Kripke appears to agree with
Locke in identifying the real essence of a substance with its
internal structure when he writes
. . . present scientific theory is such that it is part 
of the nature of gold as we have it to be an element 
with atomic number 79. It will therefore be necessary 
and not contingent that gold be an element with atomic 
number 79.
(Kripke(2), p. 125) 
the agreement should, perhaps, be limited to substances which are 
basic elements. That gold has the AN79 structure uniquely seems to 
be a consequence of a one-one relation between elements and 
constituent structures which needn't prevail for substances in 
general. _ Though,auy combination of protons greater or less than 79
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results in a substance with a different nature, different chromosome 
structures could result in creatures of the same species. But even
if the identification of essence with structure is restricted to 
basic elements, the Locke/Kripke thesis that structure is essential 
will not coincide with ray preferred thesis that nature is essential, 
because the two theses will have different consequences in some 
counter-factual situations.
It is, perhaps, conceivable that there is an alternative 
universe in which the laws of nature differ enough from our own so 
that the nature of gold belongs to an element with the atomic number 
of silver (AN47) while the nature of silver belongs to an element 
with AN79, In this situation, what Kripke takes to be gold will 
have AN79 but will not dissolve in aqua regia, whereas what I take 
to be gold will dissolve in aqua regia but will have AN47. As what
we take to be gold in our universe was picked out by its 
dispositional properties long before anything was known about 
atomic structure, the substance with AN47 seems to me to have a 
better claim to being gold than the substance with AN79. It might 
be objected, though, that we cannot coherently conceive of substances 
with AN47 and AN79 swapping natures: for what conceivable
modification to the laws of nature could give a substance with, AN47 
a higher density than a substance with AN79, or give it an electron 
structure which would account for its entering into the appropriate 
chemical compounds and having the chemical bond between atoms 
appropriate to the malleability, ductility, melting point, boiling 
point, etc., of gbid? A change in the laws of nature sufficient to
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swap the dispositional properties of AN47 and AN79 substances would 
require a radically altered theory of matter - one which would alter 
the natures of all the atomic structures. In such a situation even 
the properties of protons, neutrons and electrons would be different, 
so our conceptions of atomic structure would be inapplicable. And 
if the conditions of existence and persistence for the constituents 
of atoms are themselves law-governed, then the imagined alterations 
to the laws of nature may leave nothing which could constitute atoms 
or substances. But if we cannot coherently conceive of elements 
having the same natures but different atomic constitutions, we also 
cannot conceive of their having the same atomic constitutions but 
different natures. What remains conceivable, though, is that the 
atomic theory of matter is only a partial theory, so that there 
might be some other, non-atomic structure, governed by unfamiliar 
natural laws, which nevertheless resulted in a substance with a 
nature indistinguishable from that of AN79 atomic structures. The 
discovery of such a structure and laws would I think be a discovery 
that gold had an alternative structure - i.e. it did not have the 
AN79 structure uniquely, so did not have it essentially. On the 
other hand, an alteration to the laws of nature sufficient to 
preclude any structure having the nature of gold would I think result 
in a world in which there was no gold.
In the case of substances which are living organisms, the 
essential dispositional properties would seem to depend upon the 
organism's physical constitution - e.g. the characteristics of the 
organs, skeletal and muscular structure, nervous system, etc., and
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their relationships. In so far as two organisms which appear to be 
of the same kind are found to have causal characteristics different 
enough for them to have different natures, they are of distinct
kinds, and it is to be expected that they will have significantly
different physical constitutions. And if the physical constitution 
of an organism depends on the natures and, hence, the physical 
constitutions of the cells of which it is conposed, then the nature 
of the organism indirectly depends on the genetic structures of 
these cells. But whether or not the nature of an organism depends 
essentially on a particular genetic structure is a further question. 
If only cells with a specific DNA structure, say, could be 
constituents of an organism of a specific kind, then these organisms 
do have that DNA structure essentially. It is conceivable, though, 
that cells with different DNA structures could have natures similar
enough for them to be alternative constituents for an organism:
e.g. the extra chromosome in the cells of human-beings who are 
mongoloid idiots. What is less conceivable is that cells with 
different natures could have the same structural basis for that 
nature. For if time nature of a cell is a consequence of the 
organization and natures of its constituents, and the natures of 
these depend upon the organization and natures of their constituents, 
and so on, then thê nature of an organism ultimately depends on 
molecules, atoms, and their constituents, which - according to 
current scientific theory - must have the nature they do have. But 
if no structure in the hierarchial tree of structures which 
constitute an organism could have a nature other than one which is a
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consequence of its constitution, and on which the next higher 
structure it constitutes depends, then organisms must have different 
constitutions to have different natures, We can conceive of forms 
of life which are similar in nature though constituted radically 
differently from the forms of life we know - e.g. men whose chemistry 
is silica rather than carbon based. We cannot coherently conceive 
of creatures similarly constituted though with different natures 
- e.g. men with superhuman powers. [A change in the laws of nature 
which enabled what is constitutionally a man to bend spoons by 
contact would enable all men to do that. If Yuri Geller is a man, 
then his uniqueness lies in manifesting rather than possessing a 
spoon-bending capability.]
The scientifically grounded thesis that the natures of 
substances depend upon their internal structures clarifies and 
reinforces the earlier stated thesis that a substance is 
distinguished from a mere quantity or aggregate of matter by a 
principle of organization which binds the constituent matter into 
a unity. What substances have because of their structure or 
organization is a nature, and it is the possession of a common 
nature which makes substances members of the same natural kind.
Unless there are good reasons to believe that members of a specific 
natural-kind have a unique structure, a structural description is 
not a short-cut to a theory of what it is to be of that kind, though 
it may constitute part of such a theory.
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2 NATURAL LAWS AND NEŒSSITATION
I have stressed the essential role laws of nature play in the 
individuation of substances. Hide Ishiguro, following Leibniz, 
argues that "the individuation of properties is even more involved 
with nomological concepts than is the individuation of things which 
have properties" (Ishiguro, p.67). For if coextensiveness in all 
possible worlds is the criterion of identity for properties, and the 
ascription of physical properties to things presupposes law-governed 
regularities in nature, then we can only ascribe physical properties 
to things in other possible worlds (i.e. in counter-factual 
situations) when there are similar law-governed regularities.
Possible worlds for physical properties are physically possible 
worlds : worlds in which the laws of nature hold. We don't inspect
possible worlds with a telescope (as Kripke has suggested) and 
observe that being hot and having high kinetic energy, or being red 
and reflecting light of wavelength n, have the same extension.
Rather, we conclude that these properties are necessarily coextensive 
because we have evidence that the structural properties of material 
c±)jects and the laws of nature are such that whatever has the one 
property has the other. A world in which the laws linking 
Structure, heat and colour did not hold would be a world in which 
the properties of heat and redness - and other properties with 
necessary relations to these - could not be attributed. Worlds 
with natural laws significantly different from those of our own 
would not be describable with our concepts. Furthermore, the
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identification of properties by their extensions is only possible 
in worlds in which the objects which comprise the extensions can be 
individuated - i.e. in worlds sufficiently like our own for there 
to be substances. But the very existence of the substances we 
individuate, I have argued, is conditional on the holding of certain 
laws or law-like principles in nature. A hypothetical suspension 
or deviation from the laws of nature which would, for example, allow 
gold to assume the properties of silver or a man to assume the 
properties of a frog would involve the ceasing to hold of laws whose 
holding is a condition for the application of the very substance 
concepts used in describing the hypothetical situation: things then
could not have the natures in virtue of which they are gold, silver, 
men or frogs. A world which lacks the laws or law-like principles 
in nature upon which the existence of substances depend is a world 
in which these substances cannot exist.
I have argued that the nature of a substance is a consequence 
of the organization of its constituents and the natures that they 
have. Most physicists now believe that physical phenomena at the 
subatomic level are not strictly determined, or necessitated in 
accordance with exceptionless natural laws, but occur in accordance 
with probabilistic principles that may be expressed by statistical 
generalizations; e.g. it is highly probable, rather than necessary, 
that an agitated atom of sodium will emit a photon of the yellow 
wavelength. But if there are no laws or law-like principles 
describing the dispositional properties of sodium atoms, then there 
is no set of laws defining the nature of these atoms - i.e. sodium
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atoms do not have natures. Furthermore, if it is only highly 
probable that an individual atom of sodium will emit a yellow photon 
when it is agitated, then it would appear to be possible for all (or 
enough) of the atoms which constitute a quantity of sodium vapour to 
emit exceptional photons when they are agitated, with the result 
that the sodium vapour is not necessarily yellow when electrified. 
But if indeterminism at the subatomic level introduces indeterminism 
in the ascription of colours to substances, it must also introduce 
indeterminism in the ascription of the other physical properties 
which are consequences of subatomic phenomena: e.g. if the
breaking of the chemical bond which accounts for the solidity of 
sodium is only highly likely at 97.5°C, then sodium does not 
necessarily melt at that temperature, and the malleability, 
ductility, solubility, etc. - which also depend on chemical bonding 
- will also not be necessary properties of sodium. So if the 
nature of a substance depends on the natures of its constituents, 
and these do not have natures, then substances do not have natures. 
But the theory of substances advocated here holds that to be a 
substance is to have a law-governed nature. Consequently, if there 
are no law-governed natures, then there are no substances.
If the prima, facie incompatibility between my theory of 
substances and indeterministic quantum theory is genuine (and it 
is if no object in nature can satisfy both theories) then a 
reconciliation might be achieved by modifying the substance theory 
to allow for probabiiiStic natures. Sodium - it may be held - has 
an essential nature, but that nature is described by statistical
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generalizations rather than laws or law-like principles; e.g. it is 
yellow when electrified with a probability of 0, melts at 97.5°C with 
a probability of Ÿ, etc. But the notion of an essential 
probabilistic property is a dubious one, for though there is clearly 
a notational difference between "melts at 97.5®C with probability 
0.9" and "necessarily melts at 97.5®C with probability 0.9" it is 
intuitively obscure how the notational difference is to be 
interpreted. [The latter of these modalities is no more perspicuous 
than is "necessarily possibly p" - which is equivalent to "possibly 
p" in Lewis's system S5, though not in the more intuitive system, S4. 
But S4 is the preferred system for the modal relationships of 
substance essentialism (see Chapter 2 above and Hughes & Cresswell, 
Ch.3-4) .] Furthermore, a possible world in which sodium does not 
melt at 97.5°C is a world in which causal regularities are similar 
enough to those of our own for there to be sodium. There must, it . 
seems, be at least a core of unprobabilistic properties sodium has 
wherever and whenever it exists for us to conceive of sodium in some 
circumstances having exceptional properties. If all the properties 
of sodium were probabilistic, then there would be possible 
circumstances in which it had only exceptional properties. But 
how in such circumstances are we to conceive of it being sodium 
- and the same sodium - which is the subject of our counter-factual 
speculations? To conceive of substances having no necessary 
properties is to conceive: of them as substrata, for which there 
can be no criteria of identity . But if there is no criterion of 
identity which makes it possible for us to trace the history of a
■■ '  ^ . 
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substance through change - or to imagine an alternative history for 
it - then counter-factual speculations about substances are empty.
If a possible world or counter-factual situation is one in which we 
consider the consequences of modifications to what is actual, then 
there must be something constant or shared by the actual and the 
possible for there to be anything modified. But if there are no 
substances - no objects with some invariable properties - to provide 
a link between the actual and possible worlds, then there is no 
fixed point from which modifications can be assessed. A world 
in which everything is different is a world in which nothing is 
the same, and this is not a comparable world. If there were no 
necessitated properties of sodium, there would be no nature of 
sodium, so nothing which could be picked out in the relevant 
possible worlds as the bearer of the non-necessitated properties.
We can only attribute the probabilistic properly of being yellow 
when electrified to sodium because we individuate that element by 
the nature in virtue of which it necessarily melts at 97.5®C, boils 
at 892°C, has valency 1, etc. For the non-necessitated properties 
in the universe to be identified by their extensions, there must be 
natural laws which make it possible for the objects which constitute 
these extensions to be individuated. Whatever exceptions there may 
be to natural law necessitatipn, these cannot entail there being no 
natural laws, or laws which are intermittent in their operation.
What is conceivably true is that phenomena involving stbatomic 
particles are not law^governed, though phenomena involving 
substances are. -- - -
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If - following Locke and Kripke - we take internal structure 
rather than nature to be essential to a substance, then we may take 
having ANll to be an essential, core property of sodium while 
melting point, boiling point, etc., are probabilistic. We may 
conceive of counter-factual situations, then, in which the substance 
with ANll does not melt at 97.5®C, boil at 892°C, or emit yellow 
light when its vapour conducts an electric current. But here, it 
seems, we may be conceiving of a quantity or aggregate of atoms with 
eleven protons which is not\^e substance sodium, but which may 
constitute that substance whe^appropriately organized. If a 
substance is not the mere sum of the atoms of which it is conposed, 
then a collection of matter with ANll neeii^^t~be sodium. Nor need 
a substance inherit or perpetuate the probabilistic properties of 
its constituent matter. As water is not a mere aggregate of 
hydrogen and oxygen, having some resultant of the properties of both 
elements, but is an organization of these elements with distinctive 
properties of its own, so elements themselves are not mere 
collections of atoms, and they may have properties which are distinct 
from those of the atoms. Quantities of sodium, for exanple, have a 
melting point and a boiling point though individual atoms of sodium 
do not, and collections of these atoms need not. It is not to be 
expected, then, that where the probability of an agitated atom of 
sodium emitting yellow li^t is 0, the probability of a sample of 
sodium composed of U  agitated atoms emitting yellow light will cmly 
be 0 to the Nth power. As the sample is not identical with the 
aggregate of atoms but is constituted by them, it may emitu yellow
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light with a probability of 1.0 when it is vaporized and conducts 
an electric current.
If the smallest part of a substance which is an example of the 
substance must have the substance's nature, then an atom may be a 
constituent of a substance but not a substantial part of it. Then 
if atoms do not have natures because their properties are not law- 
governed, it does not follow that the substances they constitute do 
not have natures. If quantum theory and substance essentialism 
are about distinct sets of entities, then their inconrpatibility is 
harmless: it does not follow from no object satisfying both
theories that the theories are inconsistent. But if at some level 
of decomposition the constituents of substances need not themselves 
be substances, then the thesis that the nature of a substance is a 
consequence of the organization and natures of its constituents 
requires revision. What has to be allowed for - given the truth of 
quantum theory - is constituents which are only substance-like, or 
which behave "for the most part" as if they had law-governed natures. 
As the dependency of nature on structure allows for different 
structures having the same nature, it should also allow for 
structures which are similar but have some dissimilar constituents 
also having the same nature - e.g. some of the atomic constituents 
of sodium can have, exceptional properties. As the statistical 
generalizations which describe the behaviour of atoms are such that 
in any samp 1% of a substance only a minute proportion of the atoms 
will have prqperffes which vaty from the norm, the effect these 
aberrant atoms have, on the properties of the substances they
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constitute is barely significant (e.g. spectroscopy indicates that 
the yellow of sodium-vapour street lamps is accompanied by some light 
of other wave lengths) . If the possible but highly improbable were 
to happen and all or enough of the atoms in a sample of electrified 
sodium-vapour emitted non-yellow photons, then the sanple would not 
have the property of being yellow when electrified. But other 
properties of sodium depending on chemical bonding would also be 
absent in this circumstance, so that the nature of sodium would be 
absent. But what does not have the nature of sodium is not sodium, 
so in the circumstance the atoms would have ceased to constitute 
sodium: the sodium has ceased to exist, for it has decomposed, and
the concept sodium no longer applies to the matter remaining.
If the conceptual constraints on the individuation of substances 
are such that the conditions for the application of substance 
concepts are not sensitive to random or probabilistic variations in 
the properties of constituent matter, then the consequences of 
indeterministic physics do not register - or are filtered out - at 
the substance level. Given that there are enough causal 
regularities associated with the matter in a place at a time to 
permit the application of a substance concept, then the intrinsic 
properties of the substance will be necessitated. If these 
regularities cease to be enough, then the substance ceases to exist. 
That random variations in the properties of constituents of 
substances can lead to the non-existence of the substance is 
evident in the process of radioactive decay of heavy elements.
Here, it is worth noting that the unpredictable disintegration of
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the individual atoms which constitute heavy elements accounts for 
a rate of decay (half-life) of the substances they constitute which 
is utterly predictable. That substances can be governed by 
exceptionless laws though their constituents admit random variations 
ought, perhaps, to be no more controversial than is the fact that 
a suit is blue though its fibres exemplify every colour of the 
rainbow.
If the existence of substances depends upon the operation of 
necessary laws of causality, and the recognition of a substance is 
the implicit recognition that there are these law-governed causal 
regularities, then the provenance of these laws cannot be - as 
Hume claimed - habits of mind induced by observations of constant 
conjunctions. For in as much as the constant conjunctions observed 
presuppose the identification of substances, the habits of mind 
arrive too late to be explanatory. Furthermore, substances are 
subjects of subjunctive conditionals, counter-factuals, and 
unfulfilled hypotheticals. But sentences of these forms are 
licensed by laws or principles of necessitation, and not by mere 
universal generalizations which are supported by evidence of 
constant conjunctions. From the premise that all sodium so far 
observed is yellow when electrified we cannot conclude that this 
sample of sodium would be yellow when electrified - any more than 
we can conclude from "All the animals in this cage are tigers" that 
this animal would be a tiger if it were in the cage. But from the 
premise that sodium necessarily is yellow when electrified we can 
conclude that if this sample of sodium were electrified, it would be
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yellow - i.e. it is yellow when electrified in all possible worlds 
(see Kneale). But the necessity of causal laws is not logical 
necessity either - not in the strict sense of "logical" which would 
require expressions of causal laws to be tautologies (true in virtue 
of the meanings of logical constants), or even in the weaker sense 
which would require them to be analytic (true in virtue of explicit 
definitions of words). Substance-words do not have explicit verbal 
definitions from which the necessity of property dependencies can be 
derived: e.g. analysis of the meaning of "sodium" will not yield
the knowledge that sodium necessarily melts at 97,5°C, boils at 
892°C, has ANll, etc. The necessity which governs the property 
dependencies of substances is a necessity attaching to things, not 
sentences - i.e. it is de re not de dicto necessity. But as these 
necessities figure in accounts of the truth-conditions for the 
application of substance concepts, and as it is inconceivable that 
substances should lack these property dependencies, the necessity of 
natural laws governing substances merges or collapses into conceptual 
necessity (see Wiggins(4), p.29f, (3) , p.87, and Ishiguro, Ch.IV) .
If it is objected that we can perfectly well conceive of, say, an 
iron rod which does not expand when heated, then the objection may 
be turned by a demonstration that the conceiving is incoherent.
For if this is to conceive of heat without agitated molecules, or of 
agitated iron molecules without increased spacing, or of increased 
spacing of molecules without the rod they constitute occupying a 
greater volume, then the objection rests on the conceivabi lity of 
an iron rod being either not iron or not a rod.
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The theory of substance essentialism excpounded here is a
deterministic theory in as much as it presupposes the truth of the
following deterministic thesis:
Every event which is a modification to the intrinsic 
properties of a substance follows necessarily from some 
earlier event in accordance with laws of nature.
This formulation of substance determinism is insulated from the
issue of the truth of total determinism, for it does not entail
(though it is entailed by) the stronger or more comprehensive
deterministic thesis that every event in the universe is causally
determined. The intrinsic physical properties held to be
necessitated include the dispositional properties a substance con^s
to have when it comes into excistence - i.e. properties necessitated
by the physical structure or organization of a substance - and also
the properties necessitated by physical conditions in accordance
with the laws or law-like principles which define the dispositional
properties. But it is not a consequence of the thesis of substance
determinism that the physical circumstances which modify substances
must themselves be necessitated. Though it is inconceivable that a
rod of iron could be bombarded with electrons without heating, or
be heated without excpanding, etc., it is conceivable that the
bombardment itself - which involves the movements of individual
electrons - could occur in accordance with probabilistic principles.
Indeterministic processes in the universe are compatible with
substance determihism.unless the universe itself is a substance
- i.e. if there ate indeterministic processes, then the universe
is not a substance, though it may be a collection or aggregate:of
' - I -'i
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substances and other entities (see next section) .
Some further clarification of terminology may be in order here.
I use the word "cause" in the traditional sense of what makes a 
particular event happen or brings it about. The cause of a 
particular event is the condition or set of conditions which are 
sufficient for the occurrence of that event, and the events held 
always to be caused are temporal modifications to the physical 
properties of substances. The laws of nature in accordance with 
which such events are made to occur are called "causal laws" to 
distinguish them from more general laws which define the limits of 
the physically possible: e.g. "Nothing can move faster than light".
Explanations of the occurrences of events - i.e. answers to questions 
of the form "Why did x happen?" - are called "causal explanations" 
when the reasons offered speci:^ necessitating conditions. As what 
is explanatory for a person depends on his knowledge and interests, 
explanations needn't be causal and specifications of causes needn't 
be explanatory. The explosion of . a bomb triggered by a Geiger- 
counter reading may be explained by the presence of radioactive 
material, though that presence alone does not necessitate the 
triggering - while an account of the necessary consequences of high 
alpha-particle bombardment for a Geiger-counter may not es^lain the 
explosion if no reason is given for the unusual presence of the 
radioactive material (see Anscombe, p.78) . If all explanations of 
physical phenomena are deemed to be "causal" - even when the rêasons 
specify conditions which are only necessary or enabling - then there 
can be causes which do not necessitate and necessitations which do
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not cause. But to draw sceptical conclusions about the connection 
between causation and necessitation from this consequence is to be 
misled by verbal ambiguities. For example, Anscombe's question 
"May there not be enough to have made something happen - and yet 
it not have happened?" (ibid, p.66) only casts doubt on the thesis 
that causes necessitate if one confuses the metaphysical and 
epistomological interpretations of the question. We can conceive 
of an event not happening though there are sufficient or enough 
reasons to explain its happening (e.g. the radioactive material 
which explains the explosion) but we cannot conceive of it not 
happening if objective conditions are enough to make it happen.
For if it does not happen, then some additional condition might have 
made it happen. How then could the unaugmented conditions have 
been enough? The conditions which are enough for the occurrence of 
an event include certain substances having certain properties. But 
in any circumstances in which those conditions obtain, the substances 
exist, and the laws of nature upon which the existence of the 
substances depend will hold. In those conditions it will not be 
possible for the consequences of those conditions not to follow.
Anscombe's scepticism about causal necessitation also seems 
to have roots in a confusion which is logical. In considering the 
striking of a match, she claims that the relevant law of nature does 
not have the form of a generalization running "Always, if a sanple 
of such a substance is raised to such a temperature, it ignites" 
but rather "If a sample of such a substance is raised to such a 
temperature and doesn’t ignite, there must be a cause of its not
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doing so" (ibid, p.70). This conception of causation is later 
expressed more schematically:
The concept of necessity, as it is connected with causation, 
can be explained as follows: . . .  a necessitating cause C
of a given kind of effect E is such that it is not possible 
(on the occasion) that C should occur and should not cause an 
E, nor should there be anything that prevents an E from 
occurring, A non-necessitating cause is then one that can 
fail of its effect without the intervention of anything to 
frustrate it.
(Ibid, P.77)
But this explanation of causal necessitation is hardly adequate if 
the qualifying clause in the explanans enploys the same concept it 
is attempting to explain. If the cause of the match not lighting, 
or the cause which prevents E from occurring, is a necessitating 
cause, then it has an explanation of a similar form. But then 
every explanation of a necessitating cause involves an infinite 
regress of qualifications, so no necessitating causes are 
determinate. If the point of the qualification is the 
specification of conditions under which C is not sufficient for E, 
then the explanation reduces to the tautology "C necessitates E 
unless it does not necessitate E". If, however, the cause involved 
in the qualifying clause is non-necessitating, then the match could 
light, or E could occur, even if there is a cause for its not doing 
so. But if a match may or may not light when there is a cause for 
its doing so, and may or may not light when there is a cause for its 
not doing so, then the point of calling a set of conditions a 
"cause" is lost. Qualifying conditions which specify conditions 
in which a cause is rendered Ineffective only make sense if the 
cause necessitates: when Üie qualifying conditions obtain, the
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necessitating conditions do not, so the effect does not follow.
But if there is no effect, there is no cause: a set of conditions
which do not necessitate an event do not cause it either. There 
can be no point in calling a set of conditions which precede an 
event its "cause" if the event cannot be predicted from the 
conditions. If, as Anscombe claims, events are caused when they 
happen but needn't be determined in advance (ibid, p.73), then it 
seems any set of conditions preceding an event - however remote 
their connection with the event - could be deemed to be its cause. 
And if these conditions obtain but the event does not occur, then 
they can be considered to be a "non-necessitating" cause - i.e. "one 
which can fail of its effect without anything to frustrate it".
But unless anything may be the non-necessitating cause of anything 
- which would deprive the notion of cause of significance - there 
must be constraints on what can count as a set of conditions having 
an effect. Perhaps the constraint is that conditions of a kind are 
at least usually followed by events of a kind. But if the 
consequences of conditions are not exceptionless, what assurance 
could we have that the conditions have been accurately identified, 
or that conditions which can frustrate the effect have not been 
overlooked? We cannot conceive of a cause failing of its effect 
unless we know what that effect is. But to identify an event or 
kind of event as the effect of a set of conditions is to inply 
something more than that the event usually, or even constantly, 
follows the conditions. - It is to imply that if the conditions 
were to obtain, the event would occur ^ i.e. that the conditions
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necessitate the event.
If conditions which are sufficient or necessitating are causes 
in the strict sense - i.e. the sense in which the application of the 
predicate "% causes y" has clear and determinate truth-conditions 
- there may still be special or restricted senses of "cause" which 
do not imply necessitation. Any one of a set of conditions 
sufficient for an event may be considered to be a cause of the 
event, though it does not in itself necessitate the event. And a 
cause of this sort which engages our interests in an appropriate way 
may be considered to be the cause. Collingwood, for example, 
identifies the cause of a situation as its manipulable feature : the 
"handle" by which the situation may be altered or controlled 
(Collingwood, pp.296-312), Such a notion of cause is derivative 
though, for a condition can only be a cause in the restricted sense 
if it belongs to a set of conditions which are a cause in the strict 
sense. Though a particular waving of a red flag may have caused 
the bull to charge, waving red flags do not have as their effect 
the charging of bulls. The rationale for deeming a non­
necessitating condition to be the cause of an event is provided by a 
ceteris paribus clause which includes the other conditions which are 
jointly sufficient for the event. Similarly, explanations of 
events which identify some causal factor which is not in itself 
sufficient for tha event to occur may be considered to be causal 
explanations if, in the context of the explanation, the other 
conditions which are jointly sufficient for the occurrence of the 
event may be understood to obtain. "Causal" explanations
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characteristically identify "the last straw" - i.e. the final, 
unusual or interesting addition to a set of conditions which makes 
it necessitating. Explanations which identify only the enabling or 
necessary conditions for an effect (e.g. radioactive material and 
bomb triggerings, smoking and lung cancer) are not causal 
explanations. Such escplanations only succeed in being explanatory 
because they identify a framework or background in which necessitating 
conditions are possible or probable: their explanatory force derives
from the possibility of there being a genuine causal escplanation.
The presence of radioactive material of a sufficient quantity for it 
to be probable that the Geiger-counter will register N units of 
radiation would explain nothing if those N units did not necessitate 
the esqplosion of the bomb. But enabling explanations of this sort 
are of a lower grade - are less plausible - than genuine causal 
explanations because they do not support reliable predictions. The 
explanatory theories of the physical sciences typically begin witdi 
such enabling explanations, but are completed when a theory emerges 
in accordance wi-th which effects may be reproduced by reproducing 
the causes. If Anscombe's notion of non-necessitating causes had 
any scientific respectability - if generate.ons of scien-tists had 
been satisfied witdi the adequacy of non-causal e3q>lanations
- scien-tific inquixy would it seems have ended where it began.
If causal relations obtain in an objective, mind-independent 
reality, while explanations are subjective - in as much as what is 
explanatory for a person depends on his beliefs and expectations
- then there can be no question of deriving the notion of causation
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from a more fundamental notion of explanation, and then going on to 
further distinguish necessitating and non-necessitating causation.
If causal relations and the natural laws which they depend on are 
there in the world to be discovered and articulated, then these 
discoveries have explanatory value: the occurrence of an event may
be explained by identifying a prior event and the law which links 
events of those kinds - or events of kinds of which these events 
are constituted. [it is implausible that there is a law subsuming 
every pair of causally related events: if A determines B in
accordance with a law and B determines C in accordance with a law, 
then A needn't determine C in accordance with a single law - though 
there are laws in accordance with which A determines C (see 
Hornsby(2)) .] But we cannot conclude from anyone's belief that an 
event or state of affairs explains another one that the first causes 
the second - e.g. that one's walking under a ladder causes one's 
subsequent misfortune. Surely, it is objective causal relations 
which support ejqplanations and not the reverse. That it is causal 
relations which are objective and escplanations which are subjective 
is indicated by the successful application of the principle of 
substitution salve veritate to statements of causal relations and 
the lack of success in applying that principle to explanations.
If we take as a representative explanation some true sentence of the 
form "p because g", then we cannot expect the truth-value of that 
sentence to be preserved by the substitution of coextensive 
expressions in that sentence, for the swapping of p and g or the 
replacement of either, by some other true sentence can change a true
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explanation into a false one: e.g. though "George laughed because he
was tickled" is true "George was tickled because he laughed" or 
"George laughed because 2 + 2  = 4 "  is false. Similarly, the 
substitution of coextensive terms or predicates in an explanation may 
change its truth-value: e.g. "George laughed because Mrs. Murphy's
nephew was tickled" is at best misleading. Explanations, it seems, 
are intensional contexts in which substitution salve veritate is 
obstructed. But in singular causal statements of the form "Event C 
caused event E" we may expect truth-va lues to be preserved by the 
substitution of coextensive singular terms, because the relation 
between objective events in the world which makes such a statement 
true cannot be altered by referring to those events in different 
ways. If it is true that the tickling of George caused the 
laughing of George, and George is Mrs, Murphy's nephew, then the 
tickling of Mrs. Murphy's nephew caused the laughing of George (see 
Davidson(3)). Here, there is no principled reason available for 
treating the singular terms involved as anything other than 
referentially transparent. Clearly, substitution of coextensive 
singular terms in "Oedipus wanted to marry Jocasta" turns a true 
sentence into a false one when the result is "Oedipus wanted to marry 
his mother". But here the singular term "Jocasta" occurs in the 
context of a propositional attitude introduced by the verb "wanted", 
and it has been recognized at least since the time of Frege that 
substitution salve veritate is not guaranteed in such contexts. As 
it may also be supposed that the expressions "because", "explains", 
"is explained by":introduce prOpositional attitudes, these contexts
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may also be expected to be referentially opaque - i.e. the 
descriptions employed in explanations may have explanatory 
significance. But in a singular causal statement there is not even 
an indirect reference to any prepositional attitudes of persons 
which would justify a belief in referential opacity: if event C is
the cause of event E then it is so regardless of what anyone 
believes, so is so however C and E are described. If for every 
causal relation between particular events there are causal laws 
which subsume those events or their constituent events, and some 
descriptions of the events or their constituents which engage the 
relevant causal laws, then some expressions of event causation will 
have more explanatory significance than others because they suggest 
the relevant causal laws. But the truth-value of a singular causal 
statement does not depend upon its explanatory significance.
Given the comprehensiveness of the deterministic or natural law 
necessitation model of explanation (its success in generating 
explanations of disparate phenomena which are not only similar in 
form but interrelated in content), its predictive power, and its 
verifiability (deterministic explanations may be disconfirmed by 
evidence), I shall consider necessitation to be the paradigm of 
e^lanation and shall only consider alternatives when necessitation 
explanations are impossible or manifestly inadequate. And they do 
appear to be impossible or inadequate when for the phenomenon 
considered, no natural law of necessitation is evident or even 
conceivable (e.g. phenomena involving indeterministic processes or 
coincidences), or when deterministic e3q>lanations clash with
109
cherished truisms (e.g. that men act freely and responsibly) . If 
the behaviour of electrons and other subatomic particles is not 
determined, then there can be no causal or deterministic explanation 
of the simultaneous arrival in the space occupied by a Geiger- 
counter of enough particles to cause a particular reading. As such 
an occurrence involves many substances or entities, while the 
deterministic thesis implicit in substance essentialism is concerned 
with internal modifications to individual substances, the 
indeterministic and the deterministic phenomena are compatible. 
Furthermore, unless it can be shown that the histories of distinct 
substances intersect, there needn’t be a common causal ei^lanation 
for the substances having the same properties - i.e. there can be 
coincidences even without the presumption of indeterministic physics. 
[if a coincidence is a relation between events (i.e. their occurring 
at the same time) and not itself an event, then its not having a 
cause is even compatible with unrestricted event-determinism.] 
Determinism and human action will be considered in Chapter VI.
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3. NON-NATURAL KINDS
I have argued that substances - things which are members of 
natural-kinds - have natures, and that these natures inhere in the 
internal structure or physical constitution of the substances. But 
there are also classes of things which do not have common natures, 
so do not constitute natural-kinds. Things of a sortal kind which 
do not have a common nature are members of non-natural kinds, which 
I shall call for verbal convenience (following Wiggins) "artifact- 
kinds". Clocks constitute an artifact-kind, for although they have 
a common function or purpose their methods of construction and 
principles of operation vary too widely to admit a common structure 
and nature. Similarly, knives and forks, hammers and saws, tables 
and chairs, sweaters and socks, and motor cars and computers 
constitute artifact-kinds and not natural-kinds, for they too do not 
have common natures though they have common functions.
Although man-made things are the favoured examples of 
artifacts, it is not a feature of the "natural-kind/artifact-kind" 
distinction drawn here that the former are found in nature or 
originate naturally, while the latter are artificially produced.
For there are manufactured, synthesized or cultivated things which 
have common structures and law-defined natures - e.g. plutonium, 
steel, PVC, and nectarines - and there are naturally occurring 
things with no such structures and natures - e.g. sand, dung, 
mountains, and forests. If coming into being without human 
intervention was a criterion for natural-kind membership, we could
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not even say that men constituted a natural-kind, or poodles, pigs, 
cherry trees (these, as Marx noted, are not indigenous to Europe), 
cotton plants, brass, etc. The manner of origin of a thing is only 
a rough guide to its natural-kind status. If artificially produced 
or cultivated things have law-governed dispositional properties, and 
these laws define a distinctive nature for things of that kind, then 
they constitute a natural-kind. And if naturally occurring things 
of a kind have no such common properties - or not enough of them to 
define a distinctive nature for the kind they belong to - then they 
constitute a non-natural or artifact-kind.
Though members of artifact-kinds as such do not have natures or 
real essences, they do have the law-govemed properties and, perhaps, 
even Idie rudimentary nature that all physical objects have: they
are subject to Newton's Laws, cannot move faster than light, etc. 
Members of an artifact-kind may also have the law-govemed 
properties of the substances of which they are composed (e.g. a 
bicycle will melt at the tenperature the steel it is made of melts at) 
and when an artifact is composed of a single substance, it will have 
the distinctive nature of that substance (e.g. a conveyance might have 
the nature of a horse) . But as menbers of the same artifact-kind 
needn't have the same substance constitution, they can have 
different natures and different law-govemed propertzies. To be 
of an ar-tifact-kind is not as such to have any of these natures and 
law-governed properties necessarily, and these proper-ties cannot 
constitute a criterion for meidDership in the artifact-kind. What 
does constitute a criterion of kind membership for artifacts is a
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function, purpose or relation, which may be expressed in a verbal 
description of the kind: e.g. bicycles are two-wheeled vehicles
. . . , forests are uncultivated tracts of land covered with trees 
and underwood, etc. In so far as these things can be said to have 
an essence at all, it is a nominal essence, deriving from the verbal 
definition of the kind. The satisfying of an identifying 
description - or the conforming to a conception which may not have 
an explicit verbal formulation - is criterial for artifact-kind 
membership, and to have the nominal essence of a kind is to meet 
its criteria. Descriptions expressing the nominal essence of an 
artifact-kind may be straightforward conjunctions of predicates (as 
for "bicycle") or they may be complex disjunctive statements such 
that the satisfaction of at least one, or enough, or most of 
the predicates is a necessary and sufficient condition for kind 
membership (as in abortive attempts to specify the nominal essence 
of biological species via cluster concepts).
As it is the nature of a natural-kind thing which determines 
its conditions of existence, such a thing cannot exist without that 
nature, so has that nature essentially. Properties implicit 
in that nature are also had essentially: e.g. gold essentially
dissolves in aqua regia because it is in the nature of gold to do so 
- that is, the law of nature in accordance with which gold invariably 
dissolves in that acid is constitutive of the nature of gold. 
S imilarly, the metamorphpsis of a caterpillar into a butterfly under 
appropriate conditions is in accordance with laws of nature which are 
constitutive of lepidoptera, It is in the nature of lepidoptera to
113
change their form under those conditions, so this disposition to 
metamorphose is essential to lepidoptera. But it cannot be in the 
nature of sweaters to be garments or in the nature of clocks to 
record the passage of time, because sweaters and clocks do not have 
natures - i.e. the extensions of "sweater" and of "clock" are not 
collected by sets of natural laws which determine conditions of 
existence and change. A thing is a sweater or is a clock because 
of the use to which it is or may be put, and not in virtue of its 
nature, so these things do not have significant essential properties 
by nature. In so far as a thing meets the criterion for an artifact- 
kind it will necessarily have the properties specified in the 
criterion (or enough of them) but it still needn't have any of these 
properties essentially (i.e. as de re necessities). It would follow 
that they were essential if the thing was the artifact-kind it was 
essentially (by modal axiom A6 and modus ponensi see Chapter II 
above) . But if a thing is not by its nature that kind of artifact, 
then some other justification is required for the claim that it is 
essentially that kind.
Earlier, I argued that a sweater is not identical with the yarn 
of which it is fabricated because it is not identical with the bed- 
socks the yarn is subsequently knitted into after it is unravelled 
from the sweater: there is no common, higher sortal concept f of
which sweater and bedsocks are qualifications so that the sweater 
and socks are the same f . So even if the yarn is reknitted into a 
sweater, it will not be the same sweater, for there is no f the 
thing which was a sweater continuously is between the unravelling
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and the reknitting. Here, in ceasing to be a sweater the sweater 
ceases to be, so being a sweater seems to be an essential property 
of a sweater. But for clocks the case appears to be different. A 
disassembled clock ceases to satisfy the clock criterion, for it does 
not indicate the passage of time, but it does not cease to be, for 
when it is reassembled it is the same clock. The reassembly cannot 
mark the coming into being of the clock again, for things can only 
come into existence once. So it would seem that the thing which was 
a clock did not cease to be when it was disassembled and ceased to 
perform its function. If a clock which stops continues to exist 
though it no longer performs its timekeeping function, then a 
disassembled clock may continue to exist though it is no longer even 
intact. Here, a member of an artifact-kind seems to persist merely 
as a collection of parts which could perform the function of the 
artifact (where "could" indicates a capacity), and actually fulfilling 
the artifact’s function seems merely to be a phase or episode in the 
history of that collection (see Wiggins(3), p.97).
One reason for considering clock disassembly to be identity 
preserving and sweater unravelling otherwise is that the parts of a 
clock are in a way made for each other: the principle of organization
for the clock e3q)lains why the parts are as they are - i.e. 
identifiably parts of a clock. Quantities of yarn, on the other 
hand, are not identifiably parts of a sweater. The making of the 
clock palpably lingers on in the disassembled parts ; the making of 
the sweater does hot linger on in the unravelled y a m . Hence, it 
is reasonable to say that the clock persists in the parts but not
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that the sweater persists in the yarn. However, if the clock was 
melted down so that little trace of the timekeeping capacity 
remained, then it would be reasonable to say that it no longer 
existed. For if the metal was separated, recast, forged, turned, 
etc. so that a clock was made, it would be a new clock - one which 
was not identical with the clock which was melted. Here, the metal 
would be to the clock what the y a m  was to the sweater: something
approaching mere constituent matter, which could just as easily 
constitute something other than a clock. But if a thing which 
ceases to satis:^ the criteria for being a clock does not necessarily 
cease to exist, then being a clock is not an essential property of a 
clock. Nor it seems is being a sweater an essential property of 
sweaters: for if a sweater is not unravelled but merely rearranged
so that the fabric remains intact though the sweater function is 
lost, then it might be capable of being the same sweater again. If 
it is, then the sweater did not cease to exist when it ceased to 
satisfy the criteria for being a sweater.
As there are few significant empirical discoveries which will 
enrich the conception of what it is to be of an artifact-kind, the 
resolution of artifact identity questions depends to a degree on 
conventions while the resolution of substance identity questions 
does not. In so far as what it is to be an artifact of a kind 
depends on convention rather than nature, then what it is to persist 
as that artifact depends on convention. But the above 
considerations suggest that the decision to treat some but not other 
decompositions- of artifacts as identity preserving is not .merely a
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matter of convention. In addition to the logical criteria which 
must be met by any relation qualifying as identity (Leibniz's Law, 
etc.), there also seem to be standards of reasonableness which must 
be satisfied. And what is reasonable here appears to derive from 
our expectations about substance identities : identity is preserved
when the principle of organization of the object is preserved. But 
as artifacts of the same kind can have very different principles of 
organization, no particular principle of organization need be 
specified or implied by the kind criteria. Further, if things can 
be individuated by persons with no conception of the artifact 
criteria they satisfy, principles of organization needn't involve 
artifact classification. An aborigine, say, with no knowledge of 
bicycles, could it seems pick but a bicycle because there is 
sufficient causal interaction between its parts to suggest that 
something like a nature is present. Similarly, the common stitch 
pattern for the continuous fabric of a sweater might account for its 
being picked out by someone who did not even know about garments.
In both cases, the identification of the thing as an artifact would 
be subsequent to its individuation, and the thing could even be 
simultaneously identified as different artifacts. SO even if 
artifacts have no nature as such, so no nature in particular, they 
may still have to have some nature (or something approaching one) if 
they are to be picked out at all and subsequently classified as of 
an artifact-kind.
Artifact concepts may be to some underlying sortal or 
subs tance-like eohcept as postman is to man: a postman doesn't
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cease to exist when he retires, but only when he dies and ceases to 
be a man. But where postman and other substance qualifications 
necessarily and unequivocally restrict a single underlying sortal, 
artifact concepts may restrict many or none (i.e. for any artifact 
kind f, a variety of substance-like things could be an £, or f 
itself may be an individuating concept). Also, the underlying 
individuating concept artifact concepts may qualify may only be 
specific enough to distinguish a thing from other things (i.e. 
allow it to be picked out from its surroundings) but not specific 
enough to provide determinate answers to the "Same again?" question: 
there may be a criterion of distinctness associated with an 
individuating concept, but not a criterion of identity. Generally, 
we do not have a good enough conception of what it is for a 
substance-like thing which satisfies an artifact criterion to 
persist when it ceases to satisfy that criterion. Perhaps, the 
question of persistence here has little interest for us, as it is 
the artifact-ness which we take to be important.
If f is a concept under which things are identified and 
reidentified (i.e. if there is an adequate criterion of identity 
associated with it) and if it is not a substance concept, then, 
generally, things which fall under f do not fall under f essentially 
amd do not satisfy the criteria for being an f essentially. All 
that can be said with any conviction is that such things have 
essentially those properties which are essential to all material 
objects: e.g. the f that A is is essentially identical with A, is
essentially the same size as A, . . . , is essentially subject to
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the laws of physics, etc. There may be other distinctive 
properties which are essential to A, but our classification of A as 
a bicycle, a sweater, a clock, etc., gives us little indication of 
what these properties are. Here, we might agree with Locke that 
only things with a real essence can have the criterial or nominal 
essence properties of a kind or sort, though they do not have these 
criterial properties essentially (de re) - while disagreeing with his 
claim that only members of a sort which has a nominal essence can 
have a real essence (see Locke, III.6.6) . The latter claim is 
false if there are things with real essences which we do not 
describe, and perhaps do not even know exist. We can also agree 
with Locke that members of a sort with a nominal essence needn't 
have the same real essence - while rejecting the claim that these 
are the only sorts (see III.6.36) . [The claims rejected depend on 
Locke's doctrine that knowledge is of ideas and we have no ideas of 
real essences: a doctrine of empiricist epistemology which has
unacceptable scepticist implications (see Copi, p.295) .]
I began this section by arguing that artifacts were material 
objects which lacked natures, and that they needn't be artificially 
produced or have a specific manner of origin. I end it by 
concluding that even when a specific manner of origin is criterial 
for an artifact, that manner of origin needn't be essential to it. 
For it only follows from the criteria that the manner of origin 
is essential if being that artifact is essential (i.e.
( □ (r) (Fx 3 Ox) & 0 Fa) o Ooa) . But as we've seen, it needn't be 
true that fa d Ofa when f is not a substance concept* In the next 
section I shall consider an opposing view.
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4 TEÎE NECESSITY OF ORIGIN
In his published lecture "Identity and Necessity" Saul Kripke 
considers the lectern he is speaking from and asks
What are its essential properties? What properties, 
apart from trivial ones like self-identity, are such 
that this object has to have them if it exists at all, 
are such that if an object did not have it, it would 
not be this object?
and then goes on to suggest that the material out of which tiie 
lectern is initially constructed is essential to it;
Supposing this lectern is in fact made of wood, could 
this very lectern have been made from the very beginning 
of its existence from ice, say frozen from water from 
the Thames? One has a considerable feeling that it 
could not, though in fact one certainly could have made 
a lectern of water from the Thames, frozen into ice by 
some process, and put it right there in place of this 
thing, If one had done so, one would have made, of course, 
a different object. It would not have been this very 
lectern, and so one would not have a case in which this 
very lectern here was made of ice, or was made from 
water from the Thames, The question of whether it could 
afterward, say in a minute from now, turn into ice is 
something else. So, it would seem, if an example like 
this is correct - and this is what advocates of essentialism 
have held - that this lectern could not have been made 
from ice, that is in any counter-factual situation 
of which we could say that this lectern existed at all, 
we would have to say that it was not made from water from 
the Thames frozen into ice . . . .  We can talk about 
this very object, and whether it could have certain 
properties which it does not in fact have. For example, 
it could have been in another room from the room it in 
fact is in, even at this very time, but it could not have 
been made from water frozen into ice.
(Kripke(1), p. 152)
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Though much of the argument here is suggested rather than
stated, Kripke appears to find support for the intuition that
If lectern A is actually made of wood then it is essentially 
made of wood
from the conviction that
A lectern not made of wood would not be identical with 
lectern A.
[Note: "made of wood" means "initially constituted of wood".]
The latter belief is well-founded, as it follows from Leibniz's Law
that anything which does not have community of properties with
lectern A is not identical with it. But Kripke then appears to
move from this (at "So . . .") to the stronger claim that
A lectern not made of wood could not be identical with 
lectern A.
This claim is stronger because a modal qualifier has been introduced 
which rules out the possibility of a lectern not made of wood being 
identical with A - i.e. Kripke appears to derive 
~0[(ax) (x = a & ~W(x))] 
or its equivalent
□ [ (x) (Mifx o X ^ a)2
from
(x) i'^x 3 X y  a) .
But it does not follow from
Anything not made of wood is not identical with this lectern
that
In any counter-factual situation, anything not made of wood 
is not idehtical with this lectern
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for
P 3 Dp
is not a theorem of modal logic. If there is an implicit or hidden 
premise which licenses the introduction of the modal qualifier, it 
cannot be the premise that lecterns are necessarily made of wood, 
for Kripke allows that a lectern can be made of ice. Nor can it be 
the premise that lecterns must always be made of what they are 
initially made of (which Kripke ' s use of "made from the very 
beginning" might suggest), for he does not rule out the lectern's 
turning into ice ("the question . . .  is something else").
Kripke goes on to say
. . . but what I am saying is, given that it is in fact 
not made of ice, in fact is made of wood, one cannot 
imagine that under certain circumstances it could have
been made of ice. So we have to say that thou^ we
cannot know a priori whether this table was made of 
ice or not, given that it is not made of ice, it is 
necessarily not made of ice. In other words, if P 
is the statement that the lectern is not made of ice, 
one knows by a priori philosophical analysis some 
conditional of the form "if P, then necessarily P".
If the table is not made of ice, it is necessarily not 
made of ice.
(Ibid, p.153)
Here, any suggestion that the necessity of original constitution of 
wood is implicit in the concept lectern or table is definitely 
rejected ("we cannot know a priori whether this table was miade of ice 
or not") . Further, Kripke only cites the currently observable 
properties of the lectern as evidence for the judgement that it was
initially made of wood. We are left with little more than the bare
assertion that if the table is not initially constituted of ice, it 
is necessarily not initially constituted of ice, and the suggestion
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that one may know this a priori. Perhaps there is some theory 
which fills the gap between "A is f" and "A is necessarily f" - as I 
have argued that the theory of individuation and identity fills the 
gap when f is a substance concept - but, here, Kripke does not 
supply it. All we are given here is a definition of essential 
properties (quoted at the start of this section) and the intuition 
or conviction that initial constitution is such a property.
[Kripke qualifies his definition of essential properties (first 
quotation) by making an exception for the property of existence;
". . .on the definition given, existence would be trivially 
essential. We should regard existence as essential only if the 
object necessarily exists. Perhaps there are other recherche 
properties, involving existence, for which the definition is 
similarly objectionable" (ibid, p. 151 fn 11) . But the extent of 
the exceptions required to meet this difficulty would it seems leave 
us with no essential properties. For if Kripke ' s test for the 
exceptional commits us to
A essentially exists o Necessarily, A exists 
than it should also commit us to
A essentially is a man o Necessarily, A is a man 
and, generally, to "Necessarily, A is f" for any property f which 
is essential to A. But any sentence of the form "A is f" is 
equivalent to "(ax) (x = A & fx) ", hence to "(ax) (x = A) & (ag)fg", 
so whatever the predicate "f" is, it will follow from "A is 
essentially f” that "Nfecessarily, A exists" and "Necessarily, there 
are fs". In so far as either of these consequences of the test are
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false, the antecedent of the test is false. (If the necessity of 
"Necessarily, A is f" is only weak necessity, so that the sentence 
is true iff "A is f" is true in every world at which "A" has a 
reference, then "A is essentially f" would still be trivially true, 
when "f" is "exists". But Kripke claims that it can be false.)
If we reject the test, because attributions of essential properties 
do not entail de dicto necessities (see Ch.II above), then we can 
accept that "A essentially exists" is true whatever "A" names, while 
denying the truth of "Necessarily, A exists" when A is not a number
(i.e. a necessary existent). The property of essentially existing,
then, is no stranger than the property of being essentially self­
identical - whatever exists has it.]
In the "Naming and Necessity" lectures, Kripke returns to the 
question of the essentiality of original composition, and does there 
offer something like an argument for the principle "If a material 
object had its origin in a certain hunk of matter, it could not have 
had its origin in any other matter";
Let "B" be a name (rigid designator) of a table, let "A" 
name the piece of wood from which it actually came. Let 
"C" name another piece of wood. Then s\:ç)pose B were 
made from A, as in the actual world, but also another 
table D were simultaneously made from C . . . . Now in
this situation B D; hence, even if D were made by
itself, and no table were made from A, D would not be B.
(Kripke(2), p.114 fn 56)
As it stands, the argument is incomplete. Presumably, the reader 
is to add; "So if D is necessarily not identical with B , then D is 
necessarily not , made of the wOod of B", Similar arguments could 
be used to prove that D could not be made of the matter of any
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object with which it is not identical, so that it can only be made 
of what it in fact is made of. But if the argument as I've 
completed it is valid, then it seems that any property which is 
unique to D - any property D has which can only be had by one thing 
of the same kind at a time - could be proved to be essential to D. 
For instance, being in space p at time t can only be had by one 
table at a time. So if D has that property, and 0 (B ^ D), then B
cannot have it. But if only D can have that property, then D, it
may seem, necessarily has that property. Kripke says in the text, 
however, that another table could have been put in the very place at 
the very time that this one is there, so it is not necessary that a 
table has the spatio-temporal location it does have. There must, 
then, be something special about the property being made of . . . . 
What is special about it seems only to be that in a counter-factual
situation in which no table is made of A and D is made by itself,
D is assumed to be made of C - the wood it is actually made of. D,
it seems, is made of C in any counter-factual situation, or made of
C in so far as it exists at all. Hence, the necessity of D's being 
made of C enters the argument as an assumption, and the conclusion 
- that D necessarily is not made of A - only follows given this 
assumption. That is, if the core of argument may be par phrased as
1) At any time , one and only one table can be made of
one and only one piece of wood,.
2) D is made of C at t
3) Necessarily, D B ,
4) D is not made of A (the wood of B) at t
then (4) may only be fortified by the necessity operator if (2) is.
125
Hence, the argument only succeeds if it assumes what it sets out to 
prove: that a material object is necessarily made of what it in 
fact is made of. [There may, of course, be other interpretations 
of this proof: of. Wiggins(3), p.217, n 4.32 (Wiggins also rejects
it) .]
The belief that a material must be initially made of what it in 
fact is made of may be only an intuition which some find compelling. 
It may, however, appear to be derivable from other intuitions which 
are even more conpelling. One such rationale (which is suggested 
by. Kripke's appeal to the necessity of identity) starts with the 
conviction that if D is made of C then anything not made of C is not 
D. Furthermore, the sentence which expresses this conviction may 
be qualified by 0 (for it is an instance of Leibniz's Law) so that 
its logical form is
□ Cc(d) 3 (x) (~c(x) 3 X ^  d)] .
But by the equivalence "QP = "~0^P" this formula is equivalent to 
'^ O'^ Cc(d) 3 (x)(~C(d) 3 X  ^ d)] 
which (as "~(P=>Q) = (P ~Q)" is a tautology) entails 
~OCc(d) 3 (x) (~C(d) 3 X  = d)]
i.e.
It cannot be that if D is made of C then anything not made 
of G is D.
The latter might more comfortably be expressed as
If D is made of C then anything not made of C cannot be D 
which is true, providing the "cannot be" is understood to have large 
scope - i.e. it qualifies the main conditional of the sentence.
But given the notorious ambiguity of English sentences employing
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modal words, this sentence might also (and more naturally) be 
interpreted with a smaller scope for "cannot be" :
C(d) 3 ~OC(x) (~C(x) 3 r = d)]
As this formula entails
C(d) 3 □[ (x) ('-C(x) 3 X-y d) ] 
which accords with one form of Kripke's definition of an essential 
property (Kripke(l) , p. 152 fn 12) , it follows from that definition 
that D is essentially made of C. But the small scope interpretation 
of the modal operator involves an invalid inference: one may not
shift the modal qualifier of a conditional to the consequent of the
conditional and then detach that qualified conditional by modus
ponens. One cannot, thus, derive essential properties from 
distinctive properties "^a Leibniz's Law.
Intuitions about the essentiality of the original composition 
of material objects are, I think, obscure and unreliable. If these 
intuitions do not preclude an object's changing its composition in 
the future - if not "in a minute from now", then perhaps by a 
gradual replacement of wooden parts, as in Hobbes's discussion of 
Theseus's ship (Hobbes, p.136) - then they do not preclude its 
having had a different composition in tiie past; the lectern could, 
it seems, have been initially constituted of ice, but subsequently 
turned into wood. But if a lectern which is constituted of wood at
time t could be constituted of ice at time t + n, then it is not
necessarily constituted at t + n of what it is actually constituted 
at that time. Similarly, a lectern constituted of wood at time t 
could have been constituted of ice at the earlier time t - n, so it
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is not necessarily constituted at t - n of what it is actually 
constituted at that time. Kripke, however, says
. . . given that it [this lectern] is in fact not made of 
ice, in fact is made of wood, one ccinnot imagine that 
under certain circumstances it could have been made of ice.
(Kripke(1), p.153)
And this implies that
A is constituted of wood at t o 
A is essentially constituted of wood at t
is true in the special case where t is the time at which A came into
being. But if we do not believe that an object must continue to
have the composition it did have when it came into being, then we
need a reason to believe that it must ever have had that composition.
Why should we accept that retrospective counter-factual speculation
about the object has this restriction?
In a footnote to the Naming and Necessity lectures, Kripke
does offer reasons for believing that the original constitution of
a thing is essential to it, and in doing so suggests that there are
restrictions on retrospective counter-factual speculations which do
not apply to prospective counter-factual speculations:
Thus it is ordinarily impossible to imagine the table 
made from any substance other than the one of which it 
is actually maide without going back through the entire 
history of the miiverse, a mind-boggling feat . . . .
Ordinarily when we ask intuitively whether something 
might have happened to a given object, we ask whether 
the universe could have gone on as it actually did up to 
a certain time, but diverge in its history from that time 
forward so that the vicissitudes of that object would 
have been different from that time forth. Perhaps this 
feature should be erected into a general principle about 
essence. Note that the time in which the divergence 
from actual history occurs can be some time before the 
object itself is actually created. For example, I
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might have been deformed if the fertilized egg from which 
I originated had been damaged in certain ways even though 
I presumably did not yet exist at that time.
(Kripke(2), p.115 fn 57)
The general principle about essence suggested here might be phrased:
An object is necessarily 0 at time t if at no earlier time 
was it physically possible for it to become not-0 at t.
Ihen, if the history of a wooden lectern is traced back to the time
of its construction out of wood, there is no earlier time at which
it was physically possible for it to have had a different
constitution - so it is trivially true that the lectern essentially
was created out of wood. One might search further back into history
for a time when the wood could have been made of something else, but
- ordinarily - such questions do not interest us. But if Kripke
means to suggest that only counter-factual speculations about the
future are coherent, then what is to be made of
I would have made that lectern of teak, but the plank was 
warped
which suggests that the lectern could have been made of teak? Here, 
what is conceived is the history of another piece of wood converging 
upon the history of the actual lectern. Presumably, Kripke would 
say that a teak lectern could not be identical with this mahogany 
one; they are not identical because they have different properties, 
so - by the necessity of non-identity - they could not be identical. 
Hence, the convergence of non-identicals is impossible. [This seems 
to me to be the position Kripke would take - though there has been 
considerable "reading betweeh the lines" of his lectures in arriving 
at it.] . :
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Given the principle of essence suggested, and given that 
persisting material objects have a continuous history (substances 
and things composed of them have determinate spatio-temporal careers, 
even if their quantum constituents may not have) , then it might be 
thought that anything which is identical with this lectern has to 
have a shared history with it - i.e. in any possible world in which 
this lectern exists, its history is linked to the history of the 
actual lectern. Then if there is no historical coincidence of the 
actual and possible lectern, their identity can only be secured by 
their being made of the same matter - i.e. there must be a common 
history for the wood. Hence, in any possible world in which the 
lectern exists it is made of that wood, so it is made of that wood 
essentially. [Note that it is not a consequence of this approach 
to counter-factual speculation that all the properties of a thing at 
its origin are essential. For if the historical coincidence of the 
actual and possible lecterns can be before the time of origin, and 
it is physically possible for the common historical wood to have
been transported to another place and for the lectern to have been
V
made at an earlier or later time, then even the time and place of 
the lectern's origin are not essential to it.] Retrospective 
counter-factual speculation is restricted, then, by the 
inconceivability oï a thing having different historical antecedents 
from the one it actually had and being that very same thing. But 
here I think we must be precise about just what is inconceivable.
It is inconceivable that identicals have different histories, just 
as it is inconceivable that identical tables are made of different
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pieces of wood. This limitation on the conceivable is articulated 
by Leibniz's Law; for if identicals necessarily have community of 
properties, then it follows that it is impossible that they do not 
have the same history and the same constitution - whatever these may 
happen to be. But it is not a consequence of Leibniz's Law that 
material objects necessarily have the history and the constitution 
that they happen actually to have. The necessary spatio-temporal 
coincidence of identicals is not a "trans-world" criterion of 
identity: we do not decide that a lectern in a possible world is
identical with this one because it is historically continuous with 
it, but rather we postulate that a possible world contains this 
lectern. Or as Kripke puts it, "Possible worlds are stipulated, 
not discovered by powerful telescopes" (Kripke(2) , p. 144) : they are
constructions we make for ourselves to facilitate our counter-factual 
speculations about actual cbjects. If A is identical with B, then 
in any possible world in which there is B, B in that world coincides 
historically with A in that world. To conceive of B in that world 
coinciding with A in our world is to negate the very counter-factual 
supposition the possible world is meant to elucidate. We cannot 
conceive of things beipg different while they remain the same 
- counter-factual situations do not e # s t  simultaneously. The 
apparently weaker requirement that B in a possible world must have 
some his tori qal links (if not complete coincidence) with A in the 
actual world to be/Identical with it, is not a consequence of 
Leibniz-’s Law - though, it may be a consequence of a more stringent 
constraint on cQnoeivability. Such a constraint is. inplicit-in, the
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theory of essentialism: if any part of the history of a thing is
essential to it, then there is no possible world in which the thing
is without that part of its history. But, as yet, there appears
to be no good reason to believe that any part of a thing's history
is essential to it: it is not implicit in a substance's nature to
have any history in particular.
In the same footnote in which Kripke suggests the general
principle restricting possible world speculation to worlds
historically or causally dependent on the actual world, he offers
a cautionary note which could be turned against that principle:
. . . one should not confuse the type of essence involved 
in the question "What properties must an object retain if 
it is not to cease to exist, and what properties of the 
object can change while the object endures?", which is a 
temporal question, with the question "What (timeless) 
properties could the object not have failed to have, 
and what properties could it have lacked while still 
(timelessly) existing?", which concerns necessity and not 
time and which is our topic here.
Clearly, any properties an object has which involves reference to
times which have passed are temporally essential, in that an object
cannot fail to retain them: for what has already happened cannot
now be altered. Such properties are not genuinely essential to
ordinary material abjects, for if an object need not have existed at
t, then it cannot be necessarily 0-at-t (though if it is necessarily
0, it will be so at every time it exists) . Properties of this kind,
however, are iinihteresting examples of the temporally essential.
What is more interesting is a property such as being made of wood or
being made of wood C which an object might have to retain so long as
it existed, even though it need not have been made of that material.
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If, for example, material objects were conpositionally invariant, 
so that they continued to be constituted of the material they were 
created from on pain of extinction, then being made of wood would be 
a temporally essential property of any lectern which was made of wood. 
Similarly, being made of aluminium would be temporally essential to 
a lectern made of aluminium. But here the temporally essential 
property depends on conpositional invariance being genuinely essential 
to the lectern: it is a property without which the lectern could not
have come into existence. Hence, if our ordinary counter-factual 
speculations are as Kripke suggests, and we identify properties of 
objects which do not change however history diverges from the actual, 
what we identify are invariant properties - i.e. properties which are 
temporally essential because an object which has them continues to 
have them, whatever its subsequent history. Temporal essential 
properties m i ^ t  also be genuine essential properties - for what is 
essential is a fortiori invariant - but the distinction between the 
properties is one the question "What might have happened to this 
object?" does not address. The other question "What properties 
could this object not have failed to have?" goes beyond 
considerations of historical inevitability.
When we ask of an Individüal material object "What properties 
must it have had to come into existence?" all we can answer with any 
confidence is that it has the properties all material objects have 
(e.g. self-identity, some spatio-tempor^ location, etc.), and the 
properties entailed by what it is: the properties necessary to
things of that kind. So long as the laws of nature are not
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violated - and most pertinently, here, laws governing the existence 
of lecterns (which are minimal - see last section) - and so long as 
any criteria of lectern-ness are honoured, then it seems we are free 
to consider possible worlds or counter-factual situations in which 
this lectern has neither origin, composition, nor any spatio-temporal 
position it actually has. These appear to be contingent properties, 
which the lectern has as a consequence of its contingent coming into 
existence* If these contingent properties are temporally essential 
or invariant, then our justification for believing them to be so 
must be something more than the evidence that the lectern always had 
these properties - i.e. we need a reason to believe that the lectern 
always will have these properties. If we know that a property 0 of 
a lectern is one it cannot fail to retain, thqn we know that the 
lectern is necessarily always 0 if it is ever 0. But this is to 
know that the lectern has the conditional property being once 0i, 
always 0 essentially, and this knowledge can it seems only come from 
a true theory of lecterns, or of material cbjects generally. If we 
know that lecterns are essentially constitutionally invariant, then 
we know that history cannot change so as to alter the composition of 
this particular wooden lectern, and that this conposition is 
tenporally essential. [Though this is a property a lectern does 
not have, if it can turn to ice.] It would seem, then, that we 
cannot engage in the fotm of counter-factual speculation Kripke 
describes unless We already know somè genuine essential properties 
- i.e. it is our knowledge of what is necessary for things of a kind 
which constrains our speculations about what is historically possible 
for a thing of that kind.
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The properties an object must have because of its particular 
history - i.e. the properties it has in virtue of its individuality 
- seem then to be only tenporally essential (trivially necessary 
properties like self-identity excepted) ; while the properties it 
must have because of its kind (least controversially, its substance- 
kind) are genuinely essential. Perhaps we are most often interested 
in the temporally essential properties of things, because of the 
importance causal theories have for us; in considering how the 
properties of a thing might be changed, we engage in prospective 
counter-f actual speculation. But this is not the only sort of 
counter-factual speculation we can coherently engage in: "What was
the origin of the universe?" requires consideration of histories 
converging on the actual, and "Could I have conpleted the London 
Mcirathon?" requires consideration of physical capacities rather 
than historical contingencies. More pertinently, the process of 
articulating the causal laws which govern a thing may involve 
speculation about how it would behave in various circumstances 
encountered by things like it, even though it is not historically 
possible for it to be in those circumstances. For example, the 
judgement that I would have been cremated had I been in Ponpei when 
Vesuvius erupted in 79 A.D. is not rendered incoherent by the 
historical impossibilii^ of ny having been there at the time. All 
that is requited to make the judgement convincing is that I be the 
same kind of thing as the men who were cremated there. If coherent 
counter-facttai speculation was constrained in the way Kripke 
suggests, then such generalizations aboht the capacities and causal
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characteristics of things of a kind could not be true: for if it
is never historically possible for one thing to be identical with 
another thing, then we cannot coherently conceive of one thing 
having the historical properties of the other. But the judgement 
that A would have had the same properties B had in the same 
situation is implicit in the judgement that A and B are the same 
kind of thing.
I have argued that Kripke does not offer compelling reasons for 
us to believe that
A is f 3 A is essentially f 
is true, when "A" names a lectern and "f" is the predicate "is made 
of wood". But it is central to my thesis that there are compelling 
reasons for believing this when A is a substance and f is its 
substance concept. Some of these reasons are recapitulated in the 
following argument:
1) Consideration of the way we individuate, identify 
and reidentify substances indicates that if 
substances A and B are identical, then there is 
some substance concept f such that A and B are the 
same f, and that A and B fall under that substance 
concept throu^out their existence. Hence, in so 
far as A exists at all - i.e. is identical with 
something - it is f
(ax) (x = A) 3 fA
2) In any conceivable circumstance in which substance 
A exists it will fall under its substance concept, 
so the formula at (1) may be fortified by the 
necessity operator
□C(a:x) (x = A) 3 fA]
3) The formula at (2) is an instance of one of Kripke's 
formulations of his definition of essential 
properties (Kripke(1) , p.152 fn 12) . So it follows
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from (2) and that definition that 
A is essentially f.
This argument establishes that every substance is essentially of the
substance-kind it is of. Furthermore, if an artifact is sufficiently
substance-like for the considerations at (1) and (2) to apply - e.g.
if the conventions which figure in our understanding of the
persistence conditions for lecterns do not allow for a lectern
continuing to exist though no longer being a lectern (i.e. if
"lectern" is a genuine individuating sortal-predicate (see Ch.III.3
above) ) - then "A is essentially f" will also be true when "A" names
a lectern and "f" is its artifact-kind predicate.
One objection which mi^t be made to the argument at (1) - (3)
is that the truth conditions of (2) are not fully determinate - for
we can conceive of a circumstance or possible world in which "A" does
not name anything. If "(3x)x = A" (or "A exists") is not false but
without a truth-value in this circumstance, then the truth-conditions
of (2) are not fully defined. If the objection is valid, then
Kripke’s formulation of the definition of essential properties is
equally objectionable. Kripke, presumably, would take "0" in (3) to
indicate "weak necessity";
We can count statements as [weakly] necessary if whenever 
the cbjects mentioned in them exist, the statement would 
be true.
(Kripke(1), p. 137)
But this interpretation of "□" would make the antecedent superfluous 
in "□((ax)x =: A 3 fA) ": it would have the same truth-conditions as
"□ (fA) ". Also, in the paragraph preceeding the one in which the
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definition is introduced, Kripke says
What do we mean by calling a statement necessary? We 
simply mean that the statement in question, first, is 
true, and, second, that it could not have been otherwise.
(Ibid, p.150)
which suggests that in the definition indicates unqualified
necessity. The "weak necessity" solution is, moreover,
unsatisfactory, because it makes the truth-values of essentialist
claims depend on the truth-values of statements. But the truth
or falsity of such claims, I maintain, is not a function of any
particular forms of words. Doubts about the preservation of truth-
values when identicals are substituted in modal contexts are enough
to make definitions of essential properties in terms of de dicta
necessary statements suspect. [For suppose at (3) "A" names the
number nine and "f" is the predicate "is greater than seven". Then,
given that A = the number of the planets, we may substitute the
definite description for "A" in Kripke's definition to get
The number of the planets (i.e. 9) is essentially greater 
than 7 = def 0[(ax) (x = the number of the planets) o 
the number of the planets > 7]
But the statement embedded in □[. . .] is not true in all possible
worlds, for it is not true in a world with only six planets.
Furthermore, all the objects mentioned in the statement do exist in
that world (all the terms denote) so the statement is not even weakly
necessary. It follows that 9: is hot essentially greater than 7,
though we can be certain tliat it is (see Cartwright(2) , pp. 127-33;
Wiggins (4) , Section 6) . It is doubtful that restricting the
definition to material objects is enough to avoid such problems.]
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Rather than introduce complex and arbitrary restrictions on the 
intersubstitutability of identicals in order to preserve the 
definition in the form Kripke gives it, we might be better advised 
to evade the objection by presenting a version of (1) -(3) which is 
free of any suggestion of dependence on de dlcto necessities.
The argument at (1) - (3) may be extended and modified as 
follows;
1') . . . If A is f if it is identical with something,
then it is f if it is identical with B
A = B 3 fA
Applying the rule EG to this formula, quantifying 
over "A", yields
(ax) (x = B 3 fx)
2') We may read (1*) as
There is something such that it is f if 
identical with B.
Let A be that something. Then A has the property 
such that it is f if identical with B
CAx(x = B 3 fx) ], <A>
This is a property A must have throughout its 
existence, whatever the circumstances, so the 
expression for that property may be fortified by 
the necessity operator
CpXx(x = B 3 fx) ], <A>
or
A is essentially (f if identical with B)
3') If the de re version of modal axiom A6 offered in 
Ch.II.l above is valid, then
a) A is essentially (identical with B = f) =
(A is essentially identical with B 3
A is essentially f)
Then if Wiggins's de re version of Kripke's proof 
of the necessity of identity is valid (Wiggins (5) , 
pp.109-11), and '
b) A -B = A essentially - B 
we may derive from (3*a) and (3'b)
A is essentially f
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In this version of the argument (which is an elucidation of the 
notion of an essential property rather than a proof) no appeal is 
made to any prior notion of the necessity of sentences. As the 
terms which occur within the scope of the necessity qualifiers are 
embedded in predicates, quantifying over these terms does not have 
counter-intuitive consequences - e.g. "A is essentially identical 
with something" (i.e. "(ax)A is essentially identical with x") says 
or implies nothing about necessary existants. Nor can substitution 
of identicals turn a true sentence into a false one. For if 
substitution in "A is essentially identical with Socrates" results 
in "A is essentially identical with the teacher of Plato", then the 
logical form of the latter (eschewing a full analysis) is 
"(ax) (x is uniquely a teacher of Plato & A is essentially identical 
with x) ". [Identicals are objects, not designations.]
In some cases, a true claim of the form 
A is essentially f 
may have as a consequence some true sentence or statement of the form 
□ [(ax) (x = A) 3 fx]
This will be so when "□" indicates ordinary, strong necessity and 
"A" names a number. It will also be so when "□" indicates weak 
necessity, and "A" is a proper name. But unless everything which 
has an essential properly has a proper name, it will not always be 
so. Suppose "A" is the definite description "the lectern in place 
p at time t". , Then even if it were true that that lectern is 
essentially constituted of wood initially, it would be manifestly
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not true that the statement
If the lectern in place p at time t exists, then the 
lectern in place p at time t is constituted of wood 
initially
is necessary, or even weakly necessaiy. For even in the restricted 
range of possible worlds in which all the objects mentioned in the 
statement do exist, there is a world in which the object in p at t 
is a lectern initially constituted of ice. Hence, the statement is 
false in that world (it has a true antecedent and a false 
consequent). The statement cannot be weakly necessary unless the 
definite description is a rigid designator - i.e. unless it picks 
out the same object in every world in which it picks out some object. 
As it stands, Kripke's definition of "weakly necessary" does not 
impose this restriction on designators.
Rather than attempt to define the notion of essential properties 
in terms of some other modality (e.g. strong or weak de dicto 
necessity) we should, perhaps, be satisfied with an elucidation of 
that notion. We may take Kripke's intuition that the essential 
properties of this object "are such that this object has to have them 
if it exists at all" to imply that if A is essentially f, then it 
follows from its very existence that it is f 
(ax.) (x = A) 3 fA
and that it must be f, cannot help but be f, or is f in any of its 
counter-factual situations 
(ax) (X = A) 3 (C]f)A 
As the elucidation of "A is essentially f" links one notion - that of 
de ze or predicate necessitation - to the further notion of existence, 
it is not trivial.
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5 NECESSITY AND BIOLOGICAL ORIGIN
Elsewhere in Naming and Necessity Kripke remarks on the
difficulty in imagining the Queen b o m  of different parents :
How could a person originating from different parents, 
from a totally different sperm and egg be this very 
woman? One can imagine, given this woman, that various 
things in her life could have changed: that she should
have become a pauper; that her royal blood should have 
been unknown, and so on. One is given, let's say, a 
previous history of the world up to a certain time, and 
from that time it diverges considerably from the actual 
course. This seems to be possible. And so it's 
possible that even though she were b o m  of these parents 
she never became queen. Even though she were b o m  of 
these parents, like Mark Twain's character she was 
switched off with another girl. But what is harder to 
imagine is her being b o m  of different parents. It 
seems to me that anything coming from a different origin 
would not be this object.
(Kripke(2), p.113)
What Kripke suggests here is that the biological origins of a human 
being are essential to the human being. Perhaps in the case of 
biological organisms there are special reasons to hold their origin 
to be essential to them even though the reasons for holding origin 
to be essential to things in general and to artifacts in particular 
are mistaken or obscure. In this section, I shall consider Colin 
McGinn's attenpt to articulate such reasons (McGinn).
McGinn argues that although a person's time and place of origin 
are contingent, his having had the parents he had is necessary.
Ihe argument rests on considerations of the spatio-temporal 
continuity which exists between a person, the zygote or fertilized 
egg from which he develops, and the persons who contribute the sperm
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and egg which make \jp the ^gote. McGinn's thesis is that the 
connection between a person and his parents is necessary because each 
of the links in the connection are necessary. First, the relation 
between the person and the zygote is necessary because this relation 
is one of identity; the zygote and the person are tenporal phases 
in the history of a single individual. Next, the relation of 
biological fusion which exists between the zygote and its constituent 
sperm and egg is necessary. And, finally, the biological relation 
between the sperm or between the egg and the person who produces it 
- the relation of biological fission - is necessary. McGinn takes 
biological fusion and fission to be special cases of an equivalence 
relation, d-continuity, which is reflexive, symmetrical and 
transitive, which is peculiar to biological entities, and which holds 
necessarily if it holds at all. The evidence for the existence of 
such an equivalence relation is held to he intuitive.
I don't think that McGinn's argument succeeds in establishing 
the necessity of parental origin because, first, the conclusion does 
not follow from the premises, and second, some of the premises are 
false. For even if it is accepted intuitively that biological 
fusion and fission preserve the identity - or even just the spatio- 
tenporal continuity - of genetic material, it does not follow that a 
person necessarily has the parents he does have. A further premise 
is required to the effect lhat a person necessarily has his actual 
genetic material. _ If the relation between a person and the cells 
of his body is one of .constitution rather than identity, then any 
genetic defence of the thesis that a person necessarily has the
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parents he has will run into problems similar to those encountered 
in considering the necessity of the lectern's conposition. For 
even if a person cannot change the genetic constitution his body 
has, it might still be possible that he came into existence with a 
differently constituted body. But even the weaker conclusion that 
a person's body necessarily has its actual genetic source is unsound, 
because not all the links in the genetic chain connecting the 
person's body and bodies of his parents are necessary.
The relation between a humsui body and the zygote it develops 
from cannot always be a relation of identity, for a zygote can be 
a temporal phase in the life of more than one human being. If the 
zygote develops into an embryo which divides so that identical twins 
result, then if each twin were identical with,the zygote, each would
- by the transitivity of identity - be identical with the other.
But this is absurd, as the twins are distinct. In the case of 
twinning neither twin is identical to the zygote though it might 
have the hypothetical d-continuity relation to the zygote. But
d-continuity is a transitive relation, so each twin is d-continuous 
with the other. The difficulty with this is that d.-continuity is 
also held to be necessary, so that the twins are necessarily 
d-continuous. But if twin A is necessarily d-continuous with twin 
B, then it is not possible for A of B to exist without the other
- i.e. there is no possible wofld in which twinning did not occur 
and only A or B developed from the zygote. This result is not 
intuitively compeTiihg.
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The fragility of the intuitive grounds for taking d-continuity 
to be a necessary relation also becomes apparent when the 
person/parent chain is considered at the other end - viz. the links 
between the sperm and the egg and the persons (or human bodies) who 
produce them. If the d-continuity relation is necessary then the 
sperm which fertilized the egg which developed into Queen Elizabeth II 
had to come from the body of King George VI if it did come from that 
body. A sperm with that genetic signature, it might seem, could 
only have come from a man whose body cells had the same genetic 
signature; that sperm could no more have come from a different man 
than a fingerprint of George VI could have been made by a different 
man. But is it not conceivable that different men could produce the 
same fingerprint? Though it is a useful and apparently (or 
allegedly) exceptionless generalization that no two human beings have 
the same fingerprints, it does not seem to be strictly necessary that 
this is the case. It remains to be proven that it is contrary to 
the laws of nature, rather than just statistically unlikely, that two 
men have indistinguishable fingerprints. [Presumably, identical 
twins can have indistinguishable fingerprints. Biologists I have 
questioned agree to this, though I have not been able to obtain 
confirmation from the FBI.] It would also seem, then, that the 
sperm cells of identical twins might be indistinguishable. For if 
identical twins are ^-continuous, then their respective sperm cells 
are d-continnous and the Sperms could have the same genetic 
signature. It is possible, -then, that a sperm with the same genetic
signature as thé spefm involved in the conception of the Queen could
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have come from George Vi's identical twin (if he had one) . If it 
is objected that a sperm from George's twin could not be identical 
with the one which conceived the Queen, but at most an exact replica, 
then something more than the relation of d-continuity is required to 
support that objection. If a man is d-continuous with his twin, but 
not necessarily so (for the twin need not have existed) , then there 
is no reason to believe that he is necessarily d-continuous with his 
actual sperm - or that the actual sperm is necessarily d-continuous 
with him. The very sperm which did conceive the Queen could, it 
seems, have been d-continuous with some man other than George. But 
if that can be so, then the very sperm which did conceive the Queen 
need not have had its source in King George. [If identity is not 
supervenient on other properties, such as source of origin, then we 
do not have to establish a ri^t or entitlement to regard a sperm 
originating in another man as this very sperm. To insist on such an 
entitlement is, implicitly, to appeal to Leibniz's principle of the 
Identity of Indiscemibles - which I argued above (Ch.1.2) is false 
(see also Kripke(2), pp.42-53, on "Transworld Identification"; 
cf. Wiggins(3), p. 161 fn 22).]
A set of considerations even more damaging to the thesis of the 
necessity of parental origin arises from one theory about the origins 
of the human race - namely, that all human beings have a common 
ancestor. For if we are all descended from one man (some unknown 
primate, if not the Adam of the Bible) , then we are all d-continuous 
with him, beçatse-.d-çpntinuity is a transitive relation. But by 
the same transitivity we are all d-continuous with each other, and
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hence all d-continuous with the Queen. The Queen’s d-continuity 
with George VI, then, is not unique: she has the same relation of
d-continuity with any number of men who are historically capable of 
being her father. Then the alleged necessity of the d-continuity 
relation is irrelevant if the relation does not have unique terms 
(i.e. if the relation is not one-one) . But even the least 
controversial of the objections considered above indicates that the 
relation is many-many : for each identical twin is d-continuous with
the father and the uncle who are identical twins.
Perhaps the fundamental flaw in McGinn’s argument is that it 
rests on the same confused intuitions about tenporal and necessary 
properties which appear to underly Kripke’s remarks about the 
lectern. It may be that a person must retain the genetic 
constitution he was b o m  with, so long as he lives (though advances 
in transplant surgery might make even this untrue) . If this is so, 
then having a specific genetic constitution is a temporally essential 
property. Ohe "must" involved qualifies a conditional property of 
the "once 0, always 0" sort, and not the detached consequent of the 
conditional, so it cannot be deduced from the necessary invariance 
of a person’s genetic constitution that he could not have existed 
without that genetic constitution. Something other than 
considerations of d-continuity is required to make the genuine 
necessity of a particular genetic constitution credible, and this is 
not to be found in the kind-based essentialism I have discussed.
X have argued that the indubitable essential properties of a 
natural-kind thing are the properties it has in virtue of its
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law-governed nature. In the case of the Queen, this nature is a 
human nature: the nature manifested by creatures whose cells are of
a genetic type peculiar to the human species - or so we are committed 
to hold by current genetic theory. Consequently, the Queen is 
essentially constituted of cells of this type, and this is an 
essential property she shares with every other human being. It 
is also known that there is differentiation of genetic structures 
within a species type, and that not all human beings have the same 
genetic signature. It is conceivable, then, that the cells of the 
Queen are uniquely differentiated from the cells of any other human 
being. What is less coherently conceivable or credible is that 
these cells are necessarily unique, or necessarily hers. It can 
hardly be in the nature of the Queen to have these cells uniquely 
when that nature is a human nature. Her nature no more necessitates 
her having these particular cells than it necessitates her being in 
Buckingham Palace at this time: having this unique genetic
constitution is no more in the Queen’s nature than is having this 
unique history.
If the distinctive essential properties of an object are only 
the properties it has in virtue of its kind, then nothing has unique 
non-relational properties essentially unless it is uniquely of a 
kind, and necessarily uniquely of a kind (the lasjt dodo had unique 
essential properties, but they were not essentially unique because 
it was not necessarily the only dodo). Considerations of the 
individuation of objects support the thesis that objects are 
essentially of a kind/ but nothing supports the thesis tiiat there
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are objects uniquely of a kind, or with an individual essence: the
distinctive features of individual objects of a kind (e.g. spatio- 
tenporal location) are the contingent features. Being a child of 
George VT is a property the Queen has, not in virtue of her nature 
but in virtue of a contingent instantiation of that nature. The 
instantiation of that nature in a specific batch of genetic material 
is in practice enough to establish the actual paternity of that 
instantiation. But as it is not in virtue of being human that the 
Queen is of that material, there is no good reason to believe that 
she is necessarily of that material, or is necessarily a child of 
King George VI.
149
6 ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE
So far in this dissertation, I have argued that the properties 
individual material objects have in virtue of the kind they are 
are essential to them (with some reservations for artifact-kinds) .
Some arguments for considering certain other properties of 
individuals to be essential have also been examined, and found 
wanting. If the theory of essentialism expounded here is a 
complete theory - i.e. one which accounts for all the significant 
essential properties of material objects - then it must be 
established that these non-kind based properties cannot be essential. 
[By "significant essential properties" I except properties all 
material cbjects have essentially, such as self-identity, excistence, 
subjection to the laws of physics, etc., and I also except 
'trivially* essential properties generated from reflexcive equivalence 
relations, such as being identical with A, being the same size as A, 
etc., which are essential to A.] In many cases, the non-essentiality 
of a property can be established empirically by demonstrating that 
the bearer of the property survives its loss: e.g. changing the
colour of a piece of gold by removing its impurities. But when the 
property in question is temporally essential, so that its bearer 
cannot survive its loss, an empirical demonstration that it is not 
genuinely essential is not available. In these cases an a priori 
demonstration is required, such as an argument indicating that the 
belief in the essentiality of the property is not compatible with 
other beliefs we are bound to retain. For a large class of
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properties which appear to be tenporally essential - and which 
includes the properties that were considered to be essential to a 
thing in virtue of its origin - there is such an argument.
In the preceeding section of this chapter, I remarked on a 
counter-intuitive consequence of holding twin A to be necessarily 
d-continuous (or genetically like) twin B. If twin A is essentially 
d.-continuous with twin B, then A cannot exist without having the 
relational property being d-continuous with B, Further, A cannot 
have that property unless B exists. It follows that the existence 
of A depends upon the existence of B: there is no possible world in
which A exists and B does not. But this conclusion is counter­
intuitive : for we can surely conceive of A not having been a twin,
and we can even conceive of a possible world in which there is only 
A. More generally, the conclusion is incompatible with our 
conviction that A is an independent entity - a substance which 
exists in its own right. If this feature of our conception of 
substances is to be honoured, then d-continuity with B cannot be 
essential to A. But this conclusion does not depend on anything 
peculiar to the d-continuity relation, for a similar conclusion may 
be drawn whatever the relation substituted for d-continuity. If an 
object has any relational property essentially, then it will depend 
for its existence on the existence of the embedded term. And if 
there is more than one embedded term — i.e. if the relational 
property depends on an noplace relation — then the bearer of the 
property will dapchd for its existence on the existence of all the 
embedded terms, _ Hence, if substances are independent existents
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— i.e. if it is possible for them to exist alone - then no relational 
properties can be essential to a substance unless the substance 
itself is the embedded term (that an object depends for its existence 
on its own existence is trivially true, hence reflexive relational 
properties may be essential). ["A is essentially non-identical with
B" may be true, then, when represented by "□ ^ (A,B) " .but false when 
represented by "□ with-B (A) ", for A is not non-identical-with-B 
where B does not exist.]
Earlier, I argued that the reasons offered for considering the 
property being a child of George VI to be essential to the Queen were 
not sound. The existential considerations which rule out essential 
relational properties confirm this judgement. More, they show why 
the Queen cannot have this property essentially: for if the Queen
is essentially the child of George VI, then she could not exist if 
he did not, and this consequence is not conpatible with the Queen 
being an independent entity. Similarly, table D cannot be made 
of wood C essentially without depending for its existence on the 
existence of C. But here I think we must pause - for can we really 
conceive of a table existing without the wood of which it is made?
Unlike Leibniz's monads, the material-object substances 
considered here have parts and constituents. Furthermore, they 
have parts and constituents necessarily: it is inconceiv^le that a
substance m i ^ t  exist without them. - So if the ancient principle 
of the independence of substances is applicable to material objects, 
then it must be interpreted or qualified so that it does not preclude 
a substance depending for its existencjs on something which is not
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identical with it. Also, the principle ought not to preclude a 
substance depending on other substances of specific kinds. For 
if it is true that water is essentially constituted of oxygen and 
hydrogen atoms, then it follows from the existence of water that 
there are oxygen atoms: water depends for its existence on there
being oxygen. These reservations about substance independence are 
catered for if a substance is held to exist independently of entities 
which are not only distinct but separate from itself. But though 
this amendment continues to preclude the Queen's being the child of 
George VI essentially, it does not preclude her being constituted 
of the specific cells and atoms she is constituted of essentially.
Nor does it rule out table D being constituted of wood C essentially. 
But if a material object is a substance or substance-like thing 
rather than an aggregate or set of things, then we can conceive of 
it existing independently of any of its parts or constituents in 
particular - i.e. as substances can survive replacement of parts and 
constituents, has B as a part or has c as a constituent is not an 
essential property of a substance. What we cannot conceive is a 
substance existing independently of something or some kind of thing 
not being a part or constituent. Hence, has some f as a part or has 
gs as constituents must be an allowable essential property (what the 
kinds f and g stand for will depend on the kind of the substance 
having the properly — for a table there may be many alternatives) .
The independence of substances should be understood, then, to exclude 
a substance's depending for its existence on the existence of any 
individual in particular, and to exclude its existence depending on
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there being kinds of things which are not conponents - i.e. a 
substance exists independently of everything other than there being 
things of the conponent kinds. Consequently, only compositional 
relational properties which do not have specific individuals as their 
embedded terms - e.g. has (some) oxygen as a constituent - can be 
essential to a substance. Such relational properties needn't be 
essential to all material objects which have them, however, for the 
exception to the independence principle is only permissive. A 
substance can be essentially constituted of oxygen, but whether it 
actually is or not is another question.
If tables are sufficiently substance-like for the independence 
principle to apply to them, then table D cannot be made of (or 
initially constituted of) wood C essentially - though it could be 
made of wood essentially. No support for the latter property's 
essentiality is to be had from the kind-based theory of essentialism 
though, for tables can be made of many materials. If there are some 
other particular grounds for holding this table's wooden constitution 
to be essential, or essential at time of origin, then the table could 
have been made with teak legs rather than pine ones, though not with 
plastic or metal ones. If this consequence is incredible, so is the 
theory of individual essences it presumably follows from.
The independence of substances principle, as interpreted here, 
allows for a possible world in, which a substance exists by itself, 
with no relations with anything other than itself and its components. 
If this is coherently conceivable (and it seems to be) , and if the 
lone substance we conceive of is i^e Queen, then it is not only
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being a child of George VI which cannot be essential to her: being
the child of someone is also inessential. For if it were essential, 
then it would make the existence of the Queen dependent on the 
existence of some other person (one cannot be one's own child) . Yet
it is apparently a truism that all men have parents. If a thing is 
a child of someone in virtue of being human, then that property is 
essential to it by the kind-based theory of essentialism. Here, the 
existential constraints on the attribution of essential properties 
and kind-based essentialism appear to conflict. But closer 
examination and clarification of the kind-based theory will, I 
believe, show this conflict to be only apparent.
For kind-based essentialism, a property is essential to an 
object if the object has it in virtue of its nature - where the 
nature of the object is defined by the set of natural laws governing 
its conditions of existence and development. Though such laws 
cover the circumstances in which an object continues to exist - and 
implicitly, the circumstances in which it ceases to exist - it is 
not at all clear that they cover the circumstances in which it 
begins to exist. Even if an object must come into existence in 
accordance with natural laws, it does not have a nature until it 
does exist, so these laws are not encompassed by that nature. 
Consequently, it may well be in the nature of a human being to die 
if deprived of oxygen, but not in its nature to be generated by 
sexual reproduction. Further, the natural law which surely does 
link human genesis to sexual reproduction doesn't exclude other 
conditions for that genesis. Just as natural laws link a variety
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of conditions to the demise of a man, there may be natural laws 
which link conditions distinct from those of sexual reproduction to 
the origin of a man, Though such alternative conditions may never 
be realized, they may still be possible. It may be possible, for 
example, for men to be synthesized or cloned (the genesis of 
identical twins seems to occur at the splitting of the embryo rather 
than at its conception) . So even if it is universally true that 
men are children of someone, it may not be necessarily true. If it
is true, it is not in virtue of a man's nature that it is. Hence,
it is not a consequence of kind-based essentialism that the Queen is 
essentially the child of someone.
If there is an alternative or extension to the theory of kind- 
based essentialism I have argued for, it would it seems have to be a 
theory of individual essences. Such a theory would, presumably, 
hold certain properties to be essential to individual objects by 
definition. That is, if a complete definition of an individual 
included the attribution of a certain property to it, then that 
individual would have the property essentially. No object lacking 
the property could be that individual, for it would not satisfy the 
definition. But any attempt to so define individuals presupposes 
the truth of Leibniz's principle of the Identity of Indiscemibles, 
and this principle is false (see Ch.1.2 above) . There are no 
complete definitions of individuals, so there are no properties 
which are essential in virtue of such definitions. Even if an 
individual can be uniquely identified by its position in space and 
time (and its kind) such identifying descriptions are not necessarily
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true of the individual (spatio-temporal positions cannot be 
necessary, for they depend on relational properties which cannot be 
necessary) so they yield no essential properties. But if no unique 
description of an individual is necessary, then there are no 
individual essences. Hence, kind-based essentialism appears to 
have no alternative or extension.
In Part One of this dissertation, I have attempted to 
demonstrate that kind-based essentialism is a consistent and adequate 
theoretical framework for the clarification and evaluation of 
essentialist claims. I have also argued that some of these claims 
are true. In Part Two, this framework is used in considering which 
essentialist claims about persons are true.
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PART TWO
H U M A N  N A T U R E
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PREAMBLE
It is a commonplace of political and moral discourse to find 
a proposal about what men ought to do rejected as unreasonable or 
impractical on the grounds that it is incompatible with human 
nature. Socialist and libertarian aspirations, for example, are 
said by conservatives to be naïve and unrealizable because they 
presuppose a degree of altruism and co-operativeness in men which is 
at odds with man's natural selfishness and competitiveness. Such 
objections are often dismissed by defenders of the radical proposal 
with the claim that there is no human nature: it is institutions,
ideologies, and generally some form of "social conditioning" which 
inhibits human progress rather than man's natural limitations.
The claims of both sides in such debates are I think extreme, 
and are rarely argued for. As a starting point for finding 
arguments in support of those rival claims about human possibilities 
we might consider it a point of agreement between the protagonists 
that what men ought to do is constrained by what they can do, and 
that what they can do is constrained by both nature and convention. 
The dispute then is over the existence and scope of the specifically 
human natural constraints on men's actions, and over the character 
and source of the conventional constraints. If there is a human 
nature, what limits does it place on our policies and intentions?
Are institutions and ideologies consequences of arbitrary decisions.
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or are they inevitable manifestations of human nature in specific 
historical circumstances - or some combination of these factors?
If a man is a substance of the natural-kind human/ then he is 
essentially a human being and will have essentially whatever 
properties are implicit in his human nature. In so far as these 
essential properties limit the options available to men, they have 
political and moral implications - e.g. if it is an essential 
property of men to have a life span of not more than one hundred or 
so years, then they cannot seriously plan or promise to do something 
in two hundred years' time. There is not likely to be serious 
disagreement between conservatives and progressives about the 
existence of some natural constraints on men's projects. So as a 
first step in resolving disagreements about whether or not men's 
projects are constrained by their selfishness and competitiveness, 
we should consider whether these psychological traits are essential 
to men or just typical of men, or perhaps even just typical in 
specific historical circumstances. The onus would appear to be on 
the pessimist to show that the natural laws which govern the 
existence and development of men are such that they cannot but be 
selfish and competitive, because the disposition to act in a self- 
regarding way is essential to men. To refute this claim the 
progressive or optimist need only show that the evidence is 
inadequate - he needn't show that no dispositions are essential.
That some dispositions are essential is compatible with the 
progressive's position, and may even be required by it. For if 
human behaviour and attitudes change when social conditions change.
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and this is due to a causal link between conditions and behaviour, 
then any natural laws which govern this causal link would seem to 
describe dispositions of men which may be essential to them. For 
example, if men were essentially disposed to preserve their own lives, 
then in conditions of scarcity of the resources for survival they 
might be characteristically selfish and competitive, while in 
conditions of abundance they might be altruistic and co-operative.
Or they might not. In any case, men's essential properties are not 
known a priori: the task of articulating the natural laws which
govern men's existence and development, and which determine their 
essential and causally characteristic properties, belongs to 
empirical science.
One approach to giving an account of the essential properties 
of men would be to elucidate our apparently intuitive grasp of what 
it is for this man to be the same as that one. A specification of 
the criterion of identity for men would constitute at least a partial 
contribution to a theory of human nature. Much of the recent 
philosophical work in this area has focused on the problem of 
personal identity, so the question arises. Is this the same or a 
different problem from the one that concerns us here? Person seems 
to be a richer concept than man or human-being, involving such 
issues as self-consciousness and legal and moral rights and 
obligations, which perhaps needn't be essential to considerations of 
the nature of the biological species human. If persons are not the 
same as human beings, then there should be distinguishable criteria 
of identity associated with the concepts under which they fall.
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Whether or not there is such a distinction, and whether or not such 
a distinction has moral implications, are the major concerns of Part 
Two of this work.
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CHAPTER IV
PERSONAL IDENTITY
1 PERSONS AND CŒSCIOUSNESS
Locke's theory of personal identity is a classic example of the
attempt to distinguish the concept of a person froim the concept of a
man. For Locke, a person is
a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and 
reflection, and can consider itself, as itself, the same 
thinking thing in different times and places; which it 
does only by that consciousness which is inseparable 
from thinking . . . .
(Locke, II.27.9)
To emphasize that recollection of one's own history, or the
continuity of one's consciousness, is criterial for personal
identity - i.e. it is sufficient as well as necessary for the
existence and persistence of a person - Locke goes on to say
For since consciousness always accompanies thinking, 
and it is that which makes everyone to be what he calls 
self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other 
thinking things; in this alone consists personal 
identity, i.e. the sameness of a rational being; and 
as far as this consciousness can reach backwards, to 
any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity 
of that person; it is the same self now, it was then; 
and it is by the same self with this present one, which 
now reflects on it, that the action was done.
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As, for Locke, continuity of consciousness alone is sufficient
for personal identity, a person needn't be a man or any other sort
of material object. The same person can be "annexed" to a
succession of different material objects, and can survive an
indefinite spatial and temporal gap between them: e.g. a man living
now could be the same person as Socrates -
For it being the same consciousness that makes a man be 
himself to himself, personal identity depends on that 
only, whether it be annexed solely to one individual 
substance, or can be continued in a succession of 
several substances. For as far as any intelligent 
being can repeat the idea of any past action with the 
same consciousness it had of it at first, and with the 
same consciousness it has of any present action; so 
far it is the same personal self.
(11.27.10)
Furthermore, different persons can alternate in the same man -
But if it be possible for the same man to have distinct 
incommunicable consciousness at different times, it is 
past doubt the same man would, at different times, make 
different persons . . . .
(11.27.20)
There are, however, major obstacles to accepting Locke's claim that 
continuity of consciousness alone is the criterion of personal 
identity, and these emerge when the formal properties of the 
identity relation are considered.
As identity is an equivalence relation, which is reflexive, 
symmetrical and transitive, the continuity of consciousness relation 
must also have these formal properties to be sufficient for the 
identity of persons. It is a consequence of the reflexivity 
requirement that a person cannot survive total amnesia: a person
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who has no recollection of events before the onset of amnesia has no 
continuity of consciousness with the victim of amnesia, so is not 
the same person as the victim. This is a consequence Locke accepts. 
Symmetry and transitivity, however, have consequences which cannot 
be accepted because they are contradictory. If a single conscious­
ness can persist in a succession of men, each of whom "can repeat 
the idea of any past action with the same consciousness it had of it 
at first, and with the same consciousness it has of any present 
action", then it seems different men could simultaneously perpetuate 
a single consciousness. For example, the apparently distinct 
persons Socrates I and Socrates II might each have the right sort of 
recollection of the actions of the original Socrates to have 
continuity of consciousness, and hence identity with Socrates. But 
by the transitivity of identity, Socrates I and Socrates II are then 
identical with each other. This difficulty cannot be surmounted by 
considering Socrates to be a "clone-person" or concrete-universal, 
which persists in different places at the same time, unless the 
various manifestations of Socrates are conscious of one another's 
present doings. If Socrates I is not aware of the actions of 
Socrates II, so that they are not identical by the reflexivity 
requirement, then they cannot without contradiction be held to be 
identical by transitivity. A similar contradiction arises if a 
single person continues the consciousness of two persons: Socrates
and Plato, say, are not conscious of each other's activities, so 
they are no more the same person than are the pre- and post-amnesia 
persons. Yet if Aristotle has the appropriate recollection of the
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activities of each of them, then he is identical with each. Hence, 
by transitivity, Socrates and Plato are the same person. Unless 
such splits and merges of consciousnesses are ruled out, then 
continuity of consciousness isn't sufficient for the identity of 
persons. [See also Ch.I.3 ^ove on splitting and merging.]
To rule out splits and merges of consciousnesses, a distinction 
could be drawn between real and apparent recollections or memories 
of past events. Locke appears to base such a distinction on the 
relative vividness of ideas of the past; the true recollection of 
one's past actions has the same richness and immediacy as one's 
awareness of one's present actions. But if a person is so inpressed 
by an account of the eruption of Vesuvius in 79AD that it is as if he 
had been there, while his recollection of something he did when 
aged nine has the vagueness of an experience he may only have read 
about, then the vividness criterion might give him a greater claim' 
to identity with Pliny than to identity with the boy he was. If 
the boyhood event is the remembered one because it was directly 
experienced, while the eruption of Vesuvius is only imagined because 
it was not, then memory is one faculty among others which make a 
person a subject of experience : persons must be capable of
perceiving, feeling, thinking and doing the things they remember.
But perceiving and doing can also be apparent as well as real, and 
here it seems only the physical participation of the perceiver and 
agent is adequate to distinguish real perceptions and actions from 
imaginary ones. No distinction can be drawn between real and 
apparent experiences unless the subject of experience is physically
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embodied, and placed so that he is causally related to the objects
of perception and the consequences of action. Similarly, the
rememberer must be causally involved in the ejqjeriences he really
remembers. So for real continuity of consciousness, there must also
be physical continuity; I have a continuity of consciousness with
the boy who witnessed President Truman's journey to address the
United Nations in 1948 because I stood in the crowd and saw him pass.
If memory cannot be considered in isolation from the capacities and
activities of physical objects which are conscious, then to define
and elucidate consciousness continuity may, as Wiggins believes, be
to start upon no smaller task than the description of 
a persisting material entity essentially endowed with 
the biological potentiality for the exercise of all the 
faculties and capacities conceptually constitutive of 
personhood - sentience, desire, belief, motion, memory 
and the various other elements which are involved in 
the particular mode of activity that marks the extension 
of the concept of person.
(Wiggins(3), P.160)
If the consciousnesses of persons are necessarily "annexed" 
to men - so that a person is a self-conscious man - then persons 
cannot split and merge if men cannot. And if man is a genuine 
individuative concept - i.e. if the question "Same man?" always has 
a determinate answer - then the splitting of men is similarly ruled 
out by the formal properties of the identity relation (see Ch.I.3 
above) . These properties are such that identity is indivisible; 
only one or none of the dividends can be identical with an entity 
which divides, and none are when the division is symmetrical. If
an amoeba or a man divides symmetrically, so that each of the
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dividends has as much claim to identity with the splitter as the 
other, then neither dividend can be identical with the splitter.
The symmetrical division of a man must then mark the end of that 
man, though his matter and mental processes may persist in the 
dividends. And as these dividends would only come into existence 
when the splitting occurs, they could not have genuine memories of 
the experiences of the splitter, for they could not have had those 
experiences. So the end of a man by fission is also the end of any 
person embodied in that man. But if a person can only remember the 
experiences of the man he is embodied in -i.e. if his consciousness 
is only genuinely continuous with a consciousness embodied in the 
same man - then a person cannot span the existence of several men 
successively, even when these men are spatially and temporally 
contiguous and there is a physical basis for a causal link between 
them (e.g. by Lamarkian inheritance or brain transplants) . The 
consciousness of man B cannot have real continuity with the 
consciousness of man A unless man B is man A. Persons, then, 
cannot persist unless the men they are embodied in persist. So 
even in the absence of a rival candidate for identity with a person, 
apparent continuity of consciousness is not sufficient for identity. 
For if that continuity is genuinely established by memory, then 
there must be an appropriate causal link between the consciousness, 
and that link is via the same man who is conscious. Furthermore, 
if identity is a necessary relation - i.e. if "A is identical with 
B" inç>lies "A is essentially identical with B" (see Ch.III.4 above)
- then its holding between terms cannot be contingent upon the
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non-existence of rivals to those terms. It cannot, for exanple, be 
the case that Socrates I would be identical with Socrates but for 
the existence of Socrates II. If they are identical, they must be 
identical independently of the existence of any other entities (see 
Wiggins's "Only A and B rule", ibid, pp.96,105).
The conceptual inpossibility of Locke's "same person / different 
man" thesis does not in itself indicate that person and man are 
coextensive concepts, for it does not rule out Locke's "same man / 
different person" thesis. If we cannot coherently conceive of a 
consciousness persisting detached from a man, we can perhaps still 
coherently conceive of a man persisting when detached from his 
consciousness. If there is an adequate criterion of identity for 
animals of the species man which does not depend upon any 
considerations of the psychological - i.e. if what it is to be a man 
and the same man can be elucidated solely in physical/biological 
terms - then continuity of consciousness is not a necessary condition 
for the persistence of a man. The judgement "same man", then, might 
be as free of considerations of memory as is the judgement "same 
elephant" or "same earth-worm". Then if consciousness and the 
continuity provided by memory is necessary for the persistence of 
persons, it is conceivable that a man becomes a person when he 
acquires a continuous consciousness and ceases to be one if he loses 
it. And if such a man goes on to acquire a new consciousness with 
fresh memories - e.g. if his recollections extend back no further 
than to the incidence of amnesia — then he becomes a person again, 
and this is a distinct person from the one who preceded amnesia.
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(that one no longer exists) . Similarly, schizophrenic phenomena as
extreme as in the Jekyll and Hyde tale might involve the alternation
of distinct persons in the same man. But if these ways of
describing alterations in a man's consciousness are coherently
conceivable, then persons must be something other than self-conscious
men, for it is hardly conceivable that A and B could be the same man
and not the same man who is self-conscious (more will be said of this
problem later in this chapter). Another line of objection to the
"same man / different persons" proposal relates to the implausibility
of there being a consciousness-free account of what a man is.
That a purely physical criterion of identity for men must be
inadequate is dramatically suggested by thought experiments involving
brain-transfers, of which Shoemaker's is a locus classicus.
Shoemaker supposes that human brains could be temporarily removed
from bodies for medical attention, and considers the possibility of
Brown's and Robinson's brains being inadvertently swapped. One
patient it is supposed dies, but the other - with Brown's brain and
Robinson's body (viz. Brownson) - regains consciousness and that
consciousness appears to be Brown's. Brownson recognizes Brown's
family, recalls Brown's past, has Brown's character traits, etc.,
and has no apparent continuity of consciousness with Robinson.
Shoemaker concludes:
What would we say if such a thing happened? There is 
little question that many of us would be inclined, and 
rather strongly inclined, to say that while Brownson 
has Robinson's body he is actually Brown. But if we 
did say this we certainly would not be using bodily 
identity as our criterion of identity. To be sure, we 
are supposing Brownson to have part of Brown ' s body,
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namely his brain. But it would be absurd to suggest 
that brain identity is our criterion of personal identity.
(Shoemaker, p.24) •
Here there is division of a man but, unlike the amoeba-like 
splitting already considered, there is asymmetry: Brownson and the
patient who did not survive the brain swap do not have equal claims 
to identity with Brown. So the formal properties of identity do 
not oblige us to say that neither patient is identical with Brown, 
though they do oblige us to say that only one is. But the thesis 
that Brownson is Brown doesn't inç>ly the rejection of a physical 
criterion of identity for persons and the assent to the discredited 
pure "continuity of consciousness" criterion, though it does imply 
the rejection of a narrow interpretation of the physical criterion: 
Brown is not where the bulk of his physical properties persist, but 
where the essential nucleus of his body is. And the brain, it might 
be thought, is that nucleus because Brown's continued life and 
consciousness depend upon it. Anyone strongly inclined to say 
Brownson is Brown might well view the replacement of Brown's body by 
Robinson's as the ultimate development in techniques of transplant 
surgery which can already replace Brown's heart, kidneys, and other 
vital organs. Though it may be absurd to treat brain identity as 
the criterion of personal identity - if a criterion includes both 
necessary and sufficient conditions - it is surely reasonable to 
consider "same man" to.be at least a necessary condition for "same 
person", and "same brain" to be a necessary condition for "same man". 
But if brain identity is even necessary for man identity, then it 
seems that an adequate theory of identity for men cannot be isolated
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from considerations of consciousness: to be the same man a creature
must have the same capacity to be the same person. Then even if 
Brown's body with Robinson's brain had survived, the amalgam would 
not be an equal candidate for identity with Brown, because it would 
not be the same man as Brown. And if men could be cloned, a 
cutting of Brown would not be identical with him: however many
cuttings of Brown were taken. Brown would persist in the stock 
because that is where the brain which continues Brown's consciousness 
is. But although there are good reasons to say Brownson is Brown 
- i.e. it is not just an arbitrary decision to say this - these 
reasons do not guarantee the truth of the claim. What is also 
required is a sufficient condition for the truth of "Brownson is 
Brown", and there are good reasons to think that there cannot be one.
One reason emerges if the Shoemaker example is extended to 
cover the possibility of brain splits. As there is evidence that 
the hemispheres of the human brain can function autonomously, it 
would seem possible to separate the hemispheres and have the function 
and consciousness of the brain continue in each of the halves. Then 
if each half of Brown's brain was transplanted into two other men's 
bodies, each of the amalgams would have as much claim to identity with 
Brown as Brownson had. For if each amalgam had apparent continuity 
of consciousness with Brown, and if continuity of consciousness 
indicates the relevant bodily part which is essential for the 
preservation of Brown's identity, then each hemisphere has as good a 
claim as the other to be the identifying nucleus of Brown. Here, 
the division of Brown is symmetrical, so neither recipient of a
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hemisphere can be identical with Brown: whatever the relation is
that these recipients have to Brown (they may be his descendants of 
a sort or his successors (see Parfit)) it cannot be the relation of 
identity. [Parfit's query "How could a double success be a 
failure?" is as inappropriate here as it would be for the bewildered 
school boy who halves 2 and gets 2. Success at preserving a man's 
thoughts can be failure to preserve the man.] The symmetrical 
division and transplanting of a man's brain no more amounts to the 
doubling of the man than does the amoeba-like division of the entire 
man. But if neither recipient of half of Brown's brain is identical 
with Brown, then neither would be identical with him if he was the 
sole recipient of a hemisphere - i.e. if the other half was discarded 
rather than transplanted. For (as noted above) the necessity of 
identity precludes a man's identity with Brown being contingent ipon 
the absence of a rival candidate. The same conclusion is reached 
if we consider the transplanting of only one half of Brown's brain 
to Robinson's body, while the other half remains in situ. Here 
there can be little doubt that Brown's b o ^  with half of Brown's 
brain is identical with Brown, for the condition of Brown is the 
same as it would be if one hemisphere of his brain were destroyed in 
an accident or spontaneously atrophied. Brown just carries on with 
the hemisphere remaining, with no loss of memory or any other 
function of consciousness. But Robinson's body with half Brown's 
brain cannot also be identical with Brown, so it is not identical 
with him, and - by the necessity of non-identity (see Ch.III.4 above) 
- cannot be identical with him. Hence, even if half-brained Brown
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did not exist, Robinson's body with half of Brown's brain could not 
be Brown. But the only reason for introducing the possibility of 
brain transplants into the discussion of personal identity at all 
was that it seemed to allow for a man's consciousness persisting in 
a different body: no grounds independent of capacity for conscious­
ness have been offered for considering brain-identity to be 
relevant to personal identity. So if the survival of half of 
Brown's brain in a human body is never enough for identity with 
Brown, then the survival of Brown's capacity for consciousness in a 
human body can never be enough. This is so because Brown's capacity 
for consciousness is multiply instantiable : more than one individual
at a time can have that capacity. But if to be or have a human body 
with Brown's capacity for consciousness is not to be the same man or 
person as Brown, then the transplanting of both halves of Brown's 
brain into another human body does not amount to the preservation of 
Brown : Robinson's body with all of Brown's brain has exactly the
same identity relevant properties as has that body with half Brown's 
brain. All that the transplanting of Brown's brain intact can 
ensure is that there is only one successor who is a candidate for 
identity with Brown - but a sole candidate need not be a successful 
candidate. If Brown's body with half of Brown's brain continues to 
be Brown, then the continuance of Brown's consciousness in his body 
is a sufficient condition for the persisting identity of Brown.
The fate of the other half of his brain, and the possible 
perpetuation of his mental processes in another man's body, can have 
no bearing on the question of Brown's identity. If the remaining
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half of the brain Brown has is removed, so that Brown's consciousness 
ceases to persevere in his body, then Brown comes to an end: he is
dead, and Brownson cannot undo that death by becoming Brown. If a 
man cannot survive without his brain, or enough of it to maintain 
the consciousness which distinguishes his living body from a corpse, 
then the removal of the brain itself terminates the man - whether 
the brain is transplanted intact, in halves, is suspended in vitro, 
or is destroyed.
Shoemaker's thought experiment and its variants indicate that a 
man is not identical with his body, with his brain, or with the sum 
or aggregate of the two - for any of these can survive division, 
though a man cannot. A man remains intact so long as he lives, 
however much of his body or brain is destroyed, removed, or 
replaced. The limitations on body and brain loss and replacement 
seem only to be that enough remains to sustain the man's life and to 
integrate replacement tissue into that life. Replacement bodily 
parts (brain included) must become parts of his bo<^, cind contribute 
to the continued, uninterrupted life of that body. What is enough 
cannot, I think, be settled a priori. It depends on what it is to 
be a man, and the same man, and this is an enpirical question 
- though empirical theories are constrained or regulated by logical/ 
conceptual considerations. One such conceptual limitation on the 
replacement of bodily parts may be exceeded if what we take to be 
Brown fathers Robinson's children (i.e. Robinson's genetic 
offspring). A creature which is psychologically Brown but 
genetically Robinson is, perhaps, not even a man, because that mix
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of properties may not be compatible with a human nature. Such a 
creature might best be considered to be an artifact, which has 
biological components. However, the gradual replacement of Brown's 
brain tissue by Robinson's could it seems result in Brown persisting 
with only brain tissue which used to be Robinson's, so long as it is 
Brown's psychology and not Robinson's which is preserved. Here, 
the integration of the brain tissue into Brown's life does perpetuate 
Brown's consciousness, and the end product is still Brown's brain, 
though it is constituted of Robinson's matter. The genetic 
constitution of the brain does not appear to have significant 
consequences which would clash with an identity judgement grounded in; 
psychological considerations. Furthermore, it is far from obvious 
that a technique of brain tissue transfer which preserved a man's 
consciousness would necessarily preserve his memory. If, as 
Williams suggests, a man's dread of future torture is hardly likely 
to be lessened by the assurance that his memory will first be 
artificially supplanted by that of another man (Williams(1) ), then 
it is to be presumed that such a man anticipates the pain as being
his pain — whatever the attitude he will take at the time to the past,
and whatever the origin of the brain tissue involved in that
attitude. If a man's concern for himself and his future is a
concern for his living body, then he expects to persist as himself 
so long (at least) as that body lives. And if his concerns and 
expectations are legitimate, then it may be enough for his 
consciousness to continue that his body continues to live. No 
doubt Brownson will be convinced that he is Brown — though it is
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Robinson's body he is alive in - but the patient who has Jones's 
body and half Brown's brain has the same conviction. But the 
correct application of the concepts identical, man and same man are 
not decided by the strength of any individual's convictions.
If a man is not an aggregate but is a substance, then the 
continuous history of an object under the concept man is sufficient 
for it to be the same man. The continuous possession of a specific 
bodily part or of specific constituent matter is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for the persistence of the same man. What is 
necessary and sufficient for man-identity is that the constituents 
of a man - whatever they may be - are continuously organized by the 
same principle of unity, or are governed by the same nature. And 
that nature is a human nature : the nature of a member of the human
natural-kind. To have such a nature - i.e. to be such an animal 
- is to have at least the capability for self-awareness and self­
reflection which a brain provides. Memory, it has been argued, can 
only be a part of this capability: there must be capabilities for
other psychological activities (e.g. perceiving, thinking, wanting, 
imagining, intending, etc.) if there is to be anything to remember, 
for continuity of consciousness is vacuous if consciousness has no 
content. For there to be a continuous thread of reflection linking 
states of consciousness there must be a continuous physical history 
of a creature who is conscious, and who numbers a capacity to 
remember the past and a capacity to anticipate the future among his 
other physical capacities. If men have such capacities by their 
nature, then men are essentially capable of being persons. And if
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men are individuated by their natures, then these capacities will 
figure in a complete theory of what it is to be the men we pick out. 
Even if the appearance of men is sufficiently distinguished from 
that of other creatures for psychological capacities to be usually 
superfluous in the identification of men, there can still be cases 
in which appearances are not enough. The capacity for personhood 
might be indispensable for deciding whether a creature is a man 
rather than an atypical ape, a member of a previously unknown 
species of primate, or some concoction from the laboratory of a 
Dr. Frankenstein. Less fancifully, psychological capacities may 
determine whether the occupant of a womb or life-support system is 
a living man. Such issues - and the still unrefuted Lockean claim 
that the same man needn't be the same person - will be considered 
next.
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2 PERSONS AND SUBSTANCES
If the same man need not always be the same person, and need not 
be a person at all, then there is at least one property which persons 
must have but men can lack. And if self-awareness and self­
reflection are as crucial for personhood as Locke maintains, then to 
exhibit consciousness rather than to merely have the capacity to do 
so is to have that property. A person, then, is a self-conscious 
man, and a man who has not acquired or has lost the property of being 
self-conscious does not count as a person (presumably, continuity of 
memory, character, etc., indicate that lapses of consciousness - as 
in sleep - are only apparent) . An opposing view is that the 
capacity for self-consciousness is itself sufficient for personhood. 
This is the position taken by Wiggins, who offers the following 
emendation of Locke's definition of a person
a person is any animal the physical makeup of whose 
species constitutes the species typical members thinking, 
intelligent beings, with reason and reflection, and 
typically enables them to consider themselves as 
themselves, the same thinking things in different times 
and places . . . .
(Wiggins(3) , p.188)
According to this emended criterion, all human beings are persons. 
Further, all creatures which are human-like in the appropriate 
respects are persons too - i.e. if our interpretation of the behaviour 
of dolphins, say, were to indicate that they were typically thinking, 
intelligent, self-conscious, . . ., etc., then it would follow
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from Wiggins's definition that all dolphins are persons. Rather 
than a person being a kind of man, a man might be a kind of person.
Many would consider Wiggins's definition to be too permissive 
— even when the possible inclusion of non-human animals under the 
concept person is ignored (How do we recognize the self-conscious 
behaviour of a dolphin?) - because it is not compatible with 
convictions that only some human beings are persons. A reluctance 
to count more than one person in the place occupied by a pregnant 
woman suggests that we do not consider a human being to be a person 
before it is born. Similarly, a reluctance to indefinitely sustain 
the merely biological survival of victims of severe brain damage 
(e.g. Karen Quinlan) suggests that we do not consider human beings 
who have lost the capacity for consciousness to be persons. Many 
would hold that a person must actually have the psychological 
characteristics which are typical of his species, and even these may 
be insufficient for personhood in the absence of the social and moral 
attitudes and dispositions which are typical of human beings who live 
communally. The belief that dangerous psychopaths should be treated 
and rendered harmless rather than punished often rests on a 
conviction that they are something less than full-fledged persons. 
These reservations about the extension of the concept person could 
be allayed by adding to Wiggins's definition some sufficiency 
condition which would exclude from personhood those human and human­
like creatures who do not realize their biological potential to 
exhibit the typical psychological or social characteristics of their 
species. This further specification might be such that a human
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being at the foetal stage would not qualify as a person though it 
could become one, and such that Karen Quinlan would not qualify as a 
person though she used to be one.
The advantages such a narrower, extrabiological definition of 
"person" would have for arguments defending abortion and euthanasia 
are obvious, and we may be justified in suspecting that such 
definitions are motivated by considerations of e3q>ediency rather 
than a desire for accuracy. Any misgivings we may have about 
restrictions on the extension of the concept person being a matter 
for legislation becomes extreme when we recall the Nazis' treatment 
of "Untermensch". It would be reassuring if what it is to be a 
person was a matter for discovery rather than invention. If 
persons constitute a natural-kind, then the legislated or 
conventional component of definitions of "person" would be eliminated 
or kept to a minimum. So before considering further modifications 
to Locke's definition of "person", certain logical .and conceptual 
constraints on the formulation of such definitions will be examined.
One constraint is that person is a sortal concept under which 
objects may be counted, and under which at least part of the history 
of an object may be traced. [Sortal concepts needn't determine a 
principle of enumeration for their compilants, though it is a 
sufficient condition for a concept to be sortal that it does provide 
such a principle. See Wiggins's discussion of the Pope's crown, 
ibid, p.72-4.] An adequate definition of "person" must allow, 
then, for there being definite answers to such questions as "How many 
persons are now in this room?" and "Is Cicero the same person as
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Further, person is either an ultimate sortal under which 
an object's history can be traced so long as it exists, or it is a 
restriction on an ultimate sortal. Clearly, the sortal status of 
person is not consistent with Locke's "same man / different person" 
thesis. For if A is the same man as B, and A and B are each 
persons, then B is the person A is - i.e. they are the same person. 
This is a consequence of Leibniz's Law, which attributes community of 
properties to identicals: as B is identical with A, B has every
property A has - including the property of being person X (how could 
B fail to be the person A is when B is A?) . Putative counter- 
exanples which suggest that identity is relative to a sortal concept
- such as "A is the same official as B, but not the same man" or 
"Jekyll is the same man as Hyde, but not the same person"
- invariably exploit ambiguities of logical form or reference. For 
example, "A is the same official as B" may be true when interpreted 
as "A holds the same office as B", though it is false when 
interpreted as an identity statement, while "Jekyll is not the same 
person as Hyde" may be true if the names refer to personalities or 
characters of men, though they referred to men at the start of the 
exanple (see Wiggins, ibid, pp.176,19,36 for fuller discussion). If;
A and B are identical under the concept man, then they are identical
under any sortal concept they satisfy - while if they are persons 
but not identical under person then they are not identical under man 
or any other sortal concept (see Ch.1.3 above) .
The falsity of the "same man /different person" thesis has
consequences for judgements about victims of brain damage. If;
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victims such as Karen Quinlan are considered not to be persons 
because they do not exhibit the psychological or social 
characteristics which are held to be essential for personhood, then 
it is a further question whether these victims continue to be human 
beings. Suppose some une3q>ected development of an undamaged portion 
of Karen's brain enables her to survive without the aid of life- 
support machinery. Sijppose, further, that the recovery is so 
successful that she again exhibits the typical psychological and 
social characteristics of persons - though the person emerging from 
the process has no recollection of the time preceding the coma, or 
any similarity in character to the pre-coma person. If we call the 
pre-coma person "KQl" and the post-coma person "KQ2", then it might 
seem that KQl and KQ2 are different persons. But if they are not 
the same person, then they are not the same woman, nor the same 
human being, animal, organism or thing. As they are not identical 
persons, they are not identical any things. And as KQ2 is not the 
same human being as KQl, then it would seem that in ceasing to be a 
person KQl ceased to be a human being, animal, organism, etc. - i.e. 
in ceasing to be a person, KQl ceased to be. What was sustained by 
the lif e-support machinery seems merely to be the remains of KQl, 
which the machinery preserved from decomposition. Though the 
persons KQl and KQ2 are linked by the common matter they are 
instantiated in, this matter does not in itself have any claims to 
our moral consideration (at least not to moral prohibitions on the 
taking of human life) so the switching off of the life-support 
machinery would have had little moral significance. But to take
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this view of the relation between KQl and KQ2 involves a radical 
modification to our conceptions of how persons could come to be: it
is to suppose that persons could be spontaneously generated in living 
human tissue.
Alternatively, if we reject the spontaneous generation of 
persons, then we must consider the occupant of the life-support 
system to be a human being - i.e. a creature which is capable of 
exhibiting the characteristics of persons. That human being is the 
same human being KQ2 is, and also the same human being KQl is. But 
if KQl and KQ2 are the same human being, then they are the same 
person: KQ2 is the person KQl is. It cannot be immediately
concluded, however, that the human being who is in the coma is a 
person and the same person as KQl and KQ2. For if person is merely 
a restriction on the ultimate sortal or substance concept human- 
being, then a human being who is a person could cease to be a person 
for a time and then resume being a person: a human being needn't be
a person continuously any more than he need be a schoolteacher or 
postman continuously. Fred, say, who delivered my letters this 
morning, is the same postman who delivered the post in 1962, even 
though he spent 20 intervening years sheep-farming in Australia: 
he is the same man, who delivers the post. If a man who was a 
postman and could be one again does not have the same entitlements 
as a man who is a postman - e.g. he is not entitled to draw a salary 
from the Post Office - then human beings per se needn't have the 
same moral entitlements as persons. That is, if a person is a kind 
of human being, then "pulling the plug" on a human being who is
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sustained by machinery is not morally indistinguishable from 
depriving a person of oxygen and nourishment. But if person is 
itself an ultimate sortal or substance concept - i.e. a concept under 
which a compliant object's history can be traced so long as it 
exists - then KQl and KQ2 are continuously persons, and the same 
person. That is, there is no time between the genesis of KQl and 
the demise of KQ2 during which that individual is not a person:
Karen Quinlan was a person even when she was in the coma, and 
exhibited none of the normal psychological and social characteristics 
of persons. If she was ever a person, then she is that same person 
throughout the duration of her existence.
In so far as person is a sortal concept - whether it is an 
ultimate sortal or a restricted sortal - then any creature, however 
debilitated, which is capable of continuing to be or becoming again 
the person it was is a human being. If the brain damage a human 
being suffers is so severe that it is impossible for it to be the 
same person again, then what is sustained by the life-support 
machinery is no longer a human being: the person /human being whose
brain was so damaged is dead, though much of its tissue is 
biologically alive (much as spare part surgery uses living tissue 
from dead men) . [if transplant surgery were capable of bringing 
into being a person by uniting that tissue with brain-tissue from 
another dead person, then what would be achieved seems to be the 
creation or manufacture of a person /human being out of the remains 
of persons who are dead. But as mooted in the last section, some 
of the properties of those manufactured persons may be so atypical
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that it is dubious whether they are genuine human beings at all 
- e.g. the ability to father the offspring of men who are dead may 
be a property which is too grotesque to be accommodated by the law- 
governed nature of a human being.] If person is a restriction on 
the substance concept man or human^being, then a human being who 
ceases to be capable of being a person ceases to be a human being.
But human-being is a substance concept, so in ceasing to be that 
substance an object ceases to be.
To object that what ceases to be a human being may yet persist 
as an animal or organism is to suggest that human-being is not 
itself a substance concept, but only a restriction on the substance 
concept animal or organism. But this suggestion has already been 
rejected in Ch.1.3 because of the lack of specificity of animal and 
organism. If the object which was a human being persists as an 
animal, then it is the animal that human being was - an animal whose 
conditions of persistence are determined by the particular animal- 
kind it is: human being. To survive ceasing to be a human being,
an animal would have to continue as another kind of animal, which is 
conceptually impossible: the criterion of identity for animals which
are human doesn't allow for their transformation into animals of 
another species. [Evolution of species only requires that the 
offspring be of another species.] But an animal cannot be of no 
kind, so in ceasing to be a human being an animal ceases to be - i.e. 
an animal which is human remains human so long as it exists. So 
long as a person who suffers brain damage continues to live, he 
continues to be a human being, so continues to be capable of being
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a person.
Given the plasticity of brain tissue - its ability to assume 
the functions of neighbouring brain tissue which is damaged - the 
point short of total destruction of the brain at which the capacity 
to be a person is irrevocably lost and human life ends is not known 
with certainty. [There are survivors of hydrocephalus, with very 
little brain tissue, who have all the typical characteristics of 
persons.] So long as whatever brain tissue there is is physically 
capable of resuming the function of consciousness, then it would 
seem that human life persists. If a man's brain is inactive or 
dormant to the extent that many of its functions are relegated to 
electronic devices which monitor life-support machineiry, then either 
the main still lives or the reactivation of the brain is the coming 
into being of a new man. If the second alternative is incredible, 
then the death of the brain is what distinguishes a human body with 
living parts from a living human body.
The similarities between a human being who depends for his 
continued existence on an external life-support system and a human 
foetus which is sustained by the womb are obvious. If Karen 
Quinlan continues to be a living human being so long as she is 
biologically capable of exhibiting typical characteristics of 
persons, then her reliance on an external life-support system is 
irrelevant to the question of her humanity. But then the foetus's 
dependence on the mother must be irrelevant too, and its biological 
capability for exhibiting personal characteristics would seem to 
give it as good a claim to being a human being as Karen Quinlan's.
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One cannot consistently hold that a foetus cannot be a human being 
until the umbilical cord is severed, while holding that Karen Quinlan 
is a human being. But there are differences between Karen Quinlan 
and the foetus which complicate the issue. One difference is that 
there was a time at which Karen Quinlan did exhibit the 
characteristics of persons, so there is some justification for 
believing that she continues to be capable of exhibiting these 
characteristics - even if the capacities are currently dormant.
The foetus, however, has not exhibited these characteristics before, 
so we are perhaps only justified in believing that it will come to 
have appropriate capacities if its normal development is not 
inhibited. A foetus may only be a potential human being until, say, 
it develops a brain which equips it with the physical capacity for 
consciousness, etc.
Given the crucial importance brain survival has in distinguishing 
a living human being from a mere collection of living human tissue in 
the case of coma-victims, the emergence of a brain in the development 
of the foetus might be regarded as the emergence of a human being.
But how, then, is the foetus to be regarded before this development? 
There are only three possibilities: 1) the foetus is part of the
mother's body, 2) the foetus is a mere collection of human tissue, 
distinct from but sustained by the mother's body, or 3) the foetus is 
a distinct organism from the mother. One reason for rejecting the 
first possibility, is that the foetus is genetically unlike the 
tissue of which the mother is constituted. This is not a conclusive 
objection, though, because a transplanted heart or kidney is also
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genetically unlike its host, yet is part of the host. But hearts 
and kidneys - whatever their origin - are identified by the function 
they serve in the life of the host: they do not develop into
autonomous organisms which can reproduce themselves. A foetus, 
however, does so develop. In fact, the conditions of persistence 
and development of the foetus are governed by natural laws which 
define the nature of a single organism. This nature distinguishes 
the foetus from a mere organ or bodily part of the mother, and it 
also distinguishes it from a mere collection of human tissue which 
is distinct from though sustained by the mother. The foetus is a 
single organism, whose future history will diverge from that of the 
mother (if it survives) and whose past history can be traced back 
- in most cases - to its origin in the union of a sperm and gamete. 
As the foetus before the emergence of a brain is the same creature 
as the subsequent brain endowed foetus, and as the brain endowed 
foetus is a human being, then the foetus at its earlier stage of 
development is also a human being. It cannot be an animal of some 
other species, which changes into a human being. Nor can it be an 
animal of no species. So it must be, and must always have been, a 
human being. [It is conceivable that the matter which constitutes 
the foetus formerly constituted a different kind of creature. But 
the former creature would not, then, have been identical with this 
foetus. What would be conceived of, here, is the spontaneous 
generation of the foetus out of the remains of the former creature. 
But we know human foetuses do not originate in this way.] So long 
as the foetus exists as a distinct organism, its laws of persistence
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and development are those of a creature with a human nature, and 
these laws prevail from the beginning of the zygote. As the zygote 
develops into an embryo, a foetus, and ultimately into an adult 
human being in accordance with natural laws which are definitive of 
a creature with a human nature, the case for judging the zygote to 
be a phase in the life of a human being appears unassailable. [The 
classification of creatures into species by their law-governed 
natures renders the question "Which came first, the chicken or the 
egg?" absurd, for the fertilized egg is a phase in the life of the 
chicken.]
But it might be objected against the claim that the zygote is a 
human being that two human beings sometimes develop from a single 
zygote - i.e. the phenomenon of identical or monozygotic twins. If 
the embryo which develops from a zygote divides symmetrically, then 
the life which informs and organizes one parcel of matter continues 
to inform two parcels of matter. But human-being, it has been 
argued, is a unitary substance concept, not a clone concept. As it 
is not in the nature of human beings to survive splitting 
(symmetrical division), then it might be concluded that the zygote 
does not have a human nature, so is not a human being. But such a 
conclusion would be invalidly drawn (see the discussion of biological 
fission in Ch. 1.3 and also Ch.III.5) . As we can count human 
beings in the zygote phase, human-being does function as a substance 
concept, even though it might also function as a clone concept. So 
even if it is true that the results of an embryo split belong to the 
same human being clone family, it is not true that either result is
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the same human being as (is identical with) the original zygote. 
Hence, the logic of substance concepts requires us to conclude that 
the symmetrical division of a human embryo is the demise of that 
embryo, and the generation of two new embryos. When this process 
occurs, the life of each of the foetuses which result can be traced 
back, not to conception or the fusion of sperm and ovum, but only to 
embryo division. The phenomenon of monozygotic twins is not 
evidence that zygotes are not human beings. It is, however, 
evidence that human beings needn't come into existence by conception 
and needn't go out of existence by dying. Sometimes they begin 
or end by biological fission. [Note: when an organism divides
asymmetrically, so that one of the results does have a better claim 
to identity with the original organism than the other has, the 
survival of the original is not ruled out by the conceptual 
constraints on substance identities. An organism can survive the 
loss of some of its matter, and its survival is not cancelled out by 
the subsequent development of a creature like itself in that deducted 
matter. The biological fission which occurs in parthenogenesis is 
clearly distinguished from amoeba—like splitting by the absence of 
symmetry. ]
Consideration of the circumstances of coma-victims has indicated 
that we cannot consistently apply the substance concept human being 
to an individual sustained by life-support machinery, and not apply 
it to an embryo sustained by the umbilical cord. If dependence on 
external means of sustenance does not in itself rule out the correct 
application of the concept, then human beings are not essentially
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self-sustaining. In applying a similar pattern of argument to the 
circumstances of the foetus, we may conclude that the absence of a 
brain does not in itself rule out the correct application of human- 
being to coma-victims; human beings are not essentially brain- 
endowed. At most, the possession of a brain would seem to be 
essential to human beings who have attained a certain level of 
maturity. It would seem to be true that a human being who has a 
brain cannot survive the loss of it. Having a brain, then, would 
be a temporally essential property of human beings, but not a 
strictly essential property (see Ch.III.4). What does appear to 
be strictly essential (and what we have scientific grounds for 
believing) is that creatures with the biological make-i:p of members 
of the human species have the capacity to develop brains, and this 
capacity is realized in the normal development of these creatures.
A creature who does not have it in its nature to develop a brain is 
not human. In so far as the laws which govern the conditions of 
persistence and development of a creature define a human nature, 
that creature is a human being - whatever the state of its brain.
Cl presume that these laws cover the exceptional circumstances under 
which brain-development in a human embryo is abnormal or retarded, 
while a human being whose brain is so damaged that he ceases to be 
governed by these laws ceases to be a living human being — though 
his constituent cells may continue to live.]
If we are to view the history of a human embryo as the 
development of a single living being rather than as a succession of 
distinct living beings in a single parcel of matter, then we need a
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conception of what it is to be a human being which takes into account 
the very different characteristics the embryo exhibits in the course 
of its development. The law-governed nature criterion of membership 
in the human species does accord with the evidence that initially the 
embryo takes in nutriment and grows but lacks the capacity for 
sensation, then has this capacity but lacks the capacity for thinking. 
If instead we take the capacity for thinking to be essential to 
human beings, and the capacity for sensation to be essential to 
animals - as Aristotle appears to do in De Anima, II.2-3 - then the 
zygote is not the same animal as the foetus and the foetus is not the 
same human being as the infant, so the embryo is not over time the 
same substance. It is not adequate, I think, to say it is 
continuously the same living thing, because that living thing is 
initially a single cell which is succeeded by two cells, then four, 
eight, sixteen, etc. If these cells are considered to be 
constituents of a single organism rather than of a mere collection of 
organisms, then there must be a principle of individuation for this 
organism which collects and organizes the cells and determines the 
organism's characteristic functioning and development. Even when 
there is only the initial zygote cell, it has the potential for 
continuing as a single organism though with many constituent cells, 
and for developing new characteristics. But to have this potential 
is to be governed by a set of natural laws which determine the 
development of a human being, and that is to have a human nature.
Such an organism doesn't change its nature from that of a mere 
living thing to that Of an animal, and then to that of a human being
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- rather, it had that nature from its beginning, so was always a 
human being. What that human being lacked in its early stages of 
development was typical characteristics of mature animals, and of 
mature human beings. No definitions in terms of these characteristics 
alone can be adequate, for they exclude the atypical and immature 
members of the classes they seek to define. An undeveloped human 
being is a potentially mature one; it is not a creature of some other 
animal species, or of no animal species, which is potentially human 
(cf. Aristotle, De Anima, II.5).
If attenpts to define species in terms of manifest physical and 
psychological properties fail because these properties are only 
characteristics of mature or typical species members, attempts 
at definitions in terms of genetic relations to paradigms have a 
similar fate. The biologist's "mates in the wild with . . . "  
criterion of species membership may well collect the typical adults 
of a species, but it excludes the immature and atypical species 
members who do not mate. Similarly, the "is the offspring of . . ." 
criterion excludes members of the human species who might originate 
by parthenogenesis, cloning or the laboratory synthesis of a human 
zygote. On the other hand, the "has the same chromosome or DNA 
structure as . . ." criterion is satisfied by things which are not 
human beings at all but only parts of human- beings - e.g. fingers or 
toes - but not satisfied by mongo loi d idiots. Furthermore, genetic 
relation criteria of human species membership are only operable given 
the prior identification of the paradigm term of the relation. If 
this term is itself a human being, then the relational property is as •
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useless for classification ab initio as is the relational property 
is identical with some human being. While if the term is something 
other than a human being, then in addition to the regress problems 
attending its identification by genetic relations there are the 
objections to considering as an essential property a relational 
property which has a contingent existent as its embedded term (see 
Ch.III.6) . Like physical and psychological properties, genetic 
relational properties which are only typical of the human- species, 
are at best temporally essential properties of human beings. What 
may well be genuinely essential is having the disposition to exhibit 
these properties under specific conditions - i.e. such a disposition 
may be in a human being's nature, so that a natural law defining 
that disposition partially defines that nature.
The physical, psychological and genetic characteristics an 
organism exhibits under various environmental conditions, and at 
various stages of its development, may be external manifestations of 
its inner constitution or real essence. Note that nothing in the 
real-essence approach to species identification advocated here 
guarantees that the set of laws we may believe to define the nature 
of a species is complete. If creatures we take to be members of 
the same species are discovered to have further significantly 
different dispositions, we might even have to revise our beliefs and 
admit the existence of two or more species. The dissimilar genetic 
relations discovered in finches, for example, were significant enough 
to require different species of these creatures to be distinguished, 
so that the set of finches is now believed to be a family of similar
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species. Similar revisions of conceptions of the extensions of 
natural-kind terms have occurred in the non-biological sciences, as 
in the discovery that the apparent natural-kind jade was constituted 
of members of the distinct kinds jadeite and nephrite. Such 
revisions may be expected to be frequent in biology because of the 
evolution of new species by variation in established species. The 
point at which such variations become significant for distinguishing 
species is disputable. For present purposes, species are adequately 
distinguished when there is an adequate criterion of identity 
associated with the species concept. Fortunately, human beings are 
sufficiently distinguished from other animals by properties which are 
more obvious than those exhibited in genetic relations to make these 
relations superfluous for the resolution of human being identity 
questions. But were isolated creatures to be discovered who were 
physically and psychologically like human beings, then evidence that 
they were incapable of breeding with human beings might be enough to 
establish that they were of a different species. And (as suggested 
earlier) genetic relations might be significant for establishing 
which human being, if any, an extreme exanple of transplant surgery 
is identical with (e.g. Who and What is Brownson if his children are 
not his father's genetic grandchildren?).
It would be consistent with Wiggins's definition cited at the 
start of this section to consider those animal species which have the 
biological potential for exhibiting the typical characteristics of 
persons to constitute the person family. Then any human being could 
not help but be a person - for human beings would be a subset of the
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set of persons — though there need not be only one real essence or 
nature of persons: all dolphins, all chimpanzees, etc., might be
persons too. But if there is no unique real essence of persons, 
then it seems we would need one of the many varieties of nominal 
essence definitions to identify the relevant species. The set of 
persons might be defined by enumerating the species it includes - so 
that what a person is would be to some extent a matter of convention 
or legislation. Alternatively, "person" might be defined by a list 
of capacities, the possession of all or enough of which would qualify 
a species for inclusion in the person species-family. Unlike the 
open-ended list Wiggins begins, this list would specify necessary and 
sufficient conditions for personhood. If the list is merely a 
selection from the capacities of persons as we know them, then this 
definition also depends on convention or legislation. But if some 
conventional element is unavoidable in a definition of "person", then 
the alternative view considered at the start of this section - viz. 
that persons are a subset of human beings - might be preferable.
Even if there were a family of species which were human-like, the 
set of persons might only be the union of a subset of each of these 
species : e.g. the set of (human beings who are 0) & (chimpanzees
who are 0) & (dolphins who are 0) & . . . . As no good reason
has yet been considered here for rejecting the thesis that person 
(like postman) is a qualification of one or more substance concepts, 
the possession of 0 together with membership in one of a list of 
species might be necessary and sufficient for personhood. Being 0, 
then, would be essential to persons but not essential to human beings.
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so that a human being could become a person and cease to be one, and 
could be that person intermittently. Further consideration must be 
given to what the essence of persons could be.
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3 THE ESSENCE OF PERSONS
The task to be dealt with here is the formulation of a 
definition of "person" in the form of a description, the satisfaction 
of which is both necessary and sufficient for an object to count as a 
person - i.e. to be a person an object must have all, some or enough 
of the properties expressed in the description. But it might be 
objected against such an enterprise that it can only succeed in 
establishing a technical use of the word "person" which may have 
little relation to the various uses the word has in ordinary English 
discourse. The meaning of "person", or the concept the predicate 
expresses, depends - it may be claimed - on context. For example, 
in a legal context, in which a person is held responsible for his
actions, a child might be considered to be an extension of his
parents rather than a person in his own right. The victim of brain 
damage, however, who has ceased to be a person in a medical context, 
might still be considered to be a person by friends and relatives. 
Similarly, concern for the dead suggests that what in a scientific 
context is only the material remains of a person, may continue to be
a person - though a dead one - in the context of personal
relationships and emotions.
If the gist of the objection was that the predicate "person"
\
expresses different concepts in different contexts (which is 
conceivable, as English is not what Frege called a "logically perfect 
language") then a variety of definitions might be required: e.g. for
medical persons, legal persons, familial persons, etc. But the
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thesis that "person" expresses different concepts in different 
contexts only appears plausible if the difference between the uses 
of the word are en^hasized and their similarities are ignored. It 
seems that in most cases what is considered to be a person in one of 
these contexts is also considered to be a person in the other 
contexts, though there are also cases where the borderline of the 
concept is disputed. If disagreements about the limits of the 
extension of the concept person are genuine disagreements which are 
resolvable, rather than spurious disagreements consequent on 
confusing distinct concepts, then the quest for a single definition 
succeeds if it establishes criteria for consistent application of 
the concept whatever the context. Of course, consistency could 
be achieved by arbitrarily selecting one of the contexts in which 
"person" is used and making the definition which reflects that use 
the authoritative one. But if it is true that person is a sortal 
concept, then we are already committed to giving the context of 
individuation, identification and reidentification of persons a 
dominant status. And if it is also true that the substances 
"person" collects are human beings or similar living creatures, 
then the selection of. a context is narrowed down even further.
No use of "person" which treats a child as part of a person, or 
treats a corpse as a person, could be reflected in a coherent 
definition. That is, no conceptually adequate definition of 
"person" can license the inclusion of anything other than single, 
living, human or human— like beings in the extension of that 
predicate. Honorific, whimsical, or ignorant uses of the word
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"person" hardly qualify as counter-examples to the thesis that there 
is a single well-defined concept (see also Wiggins(8), p.73 fn 51).
As users of the word "person", with very different interests, 
nevertheless exhibit significant agreement in judgements when they 
are asked to count the persons present, the task of articulating 
consistent rules for the application of the single concept person 
employed is not prima facie futile. The onus of proof seems rather 
to be on those who discount this agreement and presume a plurality 
of concepts. From the assumption that there is a single, well- 
defined concept of a person, however, it does not follow that there 
is a single, nominal essence definition. Some obstacles to the 
formulation of such a definition will now be considered.
At the start of the previous section it was proposed that 
persons necessarily exhibit the psychological characteristics which 
Wiggins's neo-Lockean definition takes to be merely typical of 
persons. If these characteristics are readily observable - as 
patterns of behaviour, say - then the extension of "person" would not 
take in human beings who did not exhibit that behaviour. But such 
a behavioural criterion of personhood would, it seems, exclude not 
Only foetuses and coma—victims but also men who are asleep, drugged, 
or even just too preoccupied to exhibit the relevant psychological 
behaviour. If there is no plausible context in which a count of 
the persons present correctly excludes all men who are sleeping, 
then this behavioural definition cannot be adequate. If the 
definition is to take in more than just those persons who happen to 
be awake and active, then the criteria of personhood would have to
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be specified in terms of behavioural potentials rather than 
activities, so that n^n who would behave so if they were awake and 
not otherwise engaged would count as persons. But if persons who 
are sleeping continue to be persons because of their behavioural 
potential, then persons who are comatose may also continue to be 
persons. So long as a man is capable of recovering and exhibiting 
the appropriate behaviour again, then he retains the behavioural 
potential he had before the onset of the coma, so continues to be a 
person. Further, he retains that potential - or enough of it - even 
if recovery does not include the retention of memory and continuity 
of personality, so he continues to be the same person. The man who 
is in a coma is the same person he was before the coma, and the same 
person he will be afterwards, for he is the same man. The 
rehabilitated amnesiac considered in the last section does not, then, 
cease to be a person and became a person again, but is continuously 
the same person. And if a human being who is a foetus - or a 
human being who will die before emerging from a coma - has the 
behavioural potential, then he too is a person.
But if we cannot plausibly consider the criterial 
characteristics of persons to be behavioural rather than dispositional, 
we can still plausibly deny that all human beings are persons. If 
the relevant dispositions are learned rather than innate - i.e. if 
they are acquired skills rather than natural endowments - then to be 
a human being is not necessarily to have those dispositions, so is 
not necessarily to be a person. Not all of men's capacities or 
potentialities are inherent in their nature. Some - like the
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capacities which make men mathematicians, musicians, or speakers 
of English - are, at least partially, acquired through esqjerience. 
Even if these capacities do inhere in some way in a man's physical 
constitution, their loss needn't involve the disintegration of that 
constitution and the loss of his human nature. So brain-damage 
which was nothing like severe enough to bring the persistence of a 
human being into question might still deprive that human being of 
the necessary dispositions for personhood, and these dispositions 
might not be acquired by a human being until he is well out of 
infancy. If only human beings have the physical constitution in 
which these dispositions could inhere, then persons are necessarily 
human beings. Having the physical constitution of a human being, 
though, might not be sufficient for being a person. The fact that 
human beings are typically persons, so typically have the relevant 
behavioural potential - and even the fact that persons are the 
paradigms we use when we define "human being" ostensively - no more 
indicates that human beings have this potential essentially than 
does the fact that tigers are typically striped indicate that they 
are essentially striped (see Putnam on stereotypes and necessary 
properties). If human beings have essentially the physical 
capacities for acquiring the behavioural dispositions of persons, 
then they are essentially capable of being persons - though only 
some human beings may actually realize this potential.
The task of specifying a set of behavioural dispositions which 
identify a subset of human beings who are persons - which would 
amount to a nominal-essence definition of "person" - is fraught with
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difficulties. If the physical constitution of a human being is not 
sufficient grounds for attributing behavioural dispositions to him, 
then it seems that the only grounds there could be for such 
attributions is that the human being at least sometimes exhibits the 
behaviour associated with the disposition. But this behaviour we 
have supposed to be only typical of persons. If the typicality 
qualification covers not merely behaviour which each person may 
exhibit less than all of the time, but behaviour which less than all 
persons may ever exhibit - i.e. if every person need not even 
sometimes exhibit each and every one of the behaviour patterns which 
are typical of persons - then all that can be concluded from this 
typical behaviour is that persons typically have the behavioural 
dispositions. If each behavioural disposition is one a person may 
lack, then no single disposition or combination of them is necessary 
for personhood. "Person" - unlike "mathematician", "musician", or 
"Engiish-speaker" - is perhaps not a one-criterion word; i .e. there 
may be no single property or combination of properties the possession 
of which is both necessary and sufficient to qualify a man as a 
person.
Person, perhaps, should be treated as a cluster-concept: to be
a person is to have enough of the dispositional properties which 
constitute a pool of distinctive person dispositions. A definition 
along these lines might be a very elaborate disjunction of 
dispositional predicates - with some alternative dispositions or 
combinations of dispositions having more significance than others. 
But even if the objectivity of the criteria of sufficiency and
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significance used in selecting dispositions could be defended, such 
a definition could only be provisional unless the pool of 
dispositions was closed. If the list of typical characteristics of 
persons is open-ended and révisable - if it may be extended and 
modified as our knowledge of persons inq>roves - then a definition in 
terms of dispositions selected from the pool is similarly incomplete 
and révisable. Furthermore, if what is typical of persons changes 
as historical circumstances change - i.e. if changes, say, in the 
social circumstances of persons may eliminate some typical 
dispositions and introduce new ones - then however complete our 
knowledge of persons in those circumstances is, what is being 
defined in terms of these dispositions will not be persons per se 
but only a restricted category of persons : e.g. late twentieth
century English persons. And even a definition as restricted as 
this will be unsatisfactory if what is typical of persons of that 
category is typical only of typical persons. If no distinctive 
behavioural disposition in particular is necessary for being a 
person, though typical persons typically have some of them, then it 
is conceivable that there are atypical persons who have none of them. 
However these typical properties are permuted, the result will at 
best be highly probable but not strictly necessary, so not criterial 
for personhood.
The project of articulating a nominal essence definition for 
persons looks curiously like the attenq>ts to articulate similar 
definitions for natural-kind things. As for "gold" and "human 
being", attempts to define the extension of "person" by a description
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fail to establish necessary and sufficient conditions. As for 
"gold" and "human being" it is not enough for a defining description 
to be coherent and consistently applied; it must also be accurate. 
And the accuracy of the description - whether it is true of things 
of the class it purports to define - is established by reference to 
members of the class as given. "Person", at least initially, is 
defined by extension. They are creatures like this, or like us, 
and a description is judged by how well it fits the examples.
[This is true even in a legal context. We consider arbitrary and 
unjust a system of laws which discriminates against human beings who 
do not satisfy a definition of "persons", when that definition 
merely expresses a convention. For categories of persons, though, 
which may be conventionally defined - e.g. ratepayers, electors, and 
even citizens - such discrimination may be acceptable.] Another 
point of similarity between persons and natural-kind things is that 
what is essential to them seems to be not their observsible 
qualities - or even their apparent dispositions and tendencies, 
which may also be circumstantial - but the capacities or 
potentialities which underlie and are manifested by these observable 
properties, and which are built into their physical constitution.
If the only necessary properties a person has are the properties 
which by his nature he could not be without, and if the only nature 
a person has is a human nature, then a person will only have 
necessarily properties which are essential to the human being he is. 
Then there are no necessary properties which could serve to 
distinguish the class of persons from the class of human beings
206
as such.
Like phenomenalistic accounts of substances (e.g. "gold is a 
yellow metal . . . "  etc.) the behavioural conception of persons 
appears to confuse symptoms with criteria: it takes as essential to
personhood properties which are the outward sign or expression of an 
inner nature. The typical behavioural properties of a person are 
synq>tomatic of his personhood; the inner capacities are necessary, 
so could be criterial. A behavioural conception of persons may 
yield an operational definition which is adequate in most cases for 
deciding what a primate is (it is not likely to lead us to confer 
personhood on a creature who is not one) , but inadequate in many 
other cases which fall outside the range of familiarity. And as 
these other cases may involve wider issues than a scientific concern 
for accuracy (consider for instance crude justifications of 
colonialism which deny the rights and obligations of persons to 
human beings whose behaviour is unfamiliar) , the superseding of the 
operational definition by a more scientific real-essence definition 
could be an advance for justice as well as knowledge (a real essence 
definition is not likely to lead us to deny personhood to a creature 
who is one).
If only a real-essence definition is adequate for "persons" 
and if only men can satisfy that definition, then the predicates ; 
"man" (or "human being") and "person" have the same extension.
Though these predicates might have distinct uses - e.g. "person" 
might be more appropriate in a legal or moral context, while human 
being" might be appropriate in a biological context - the distinction
207
would be of no consequence in an extensional context such as
counting, i.e. interchanging the predicates could not alter the
truth-values of sentences in which they occur. But the
coextensiveness of "person" and "human being" does not entail the
reduction of persons to mere biological organisms, or the reduction
of psychological, social or moral properties of persons to physical
properties. If persons were nothing but organisms which satisfied
only physical and biological predicates, then the distinctive
predicates of persons would have to be translatable into physical
predicates: for every psychological predicate, say, there would be
a predicate referring to a physical capacity of a human being and to
a set of initial conditions. Reduction requires not only that it
is always possible to specify entailing conditions for a
psychological property without referring to the psychological and
social circumstances of persons (e.g. that the biological and
physical conditions sufficient for a person to be humiliated are
specifiable), but also that those conditions are entailed by the
psychological property (e.g. that there is only one physical
condition sufficient for humiliation).
The attenç)t to reduce persons to biological organisms is
hardly likely to be any more successful than the attempt to reduce
biological organisms to physical systems. A distinguished
biologist's remarks on the latter enterprise are pertinent here:
If you want to reduce biology to physics and chemistry, 
you must construct bi-conditionals which are in effect 
definitions of biological functors with the help of 
those belonging only to physics and chemistry; you must 
then add these to the postulates of physics and chemistry
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and work out their consequences. Then and only then 
will it be time to go into your laboratories to discover 
whether these consequences are upheld there. From the 
fact that people do not do this, I venture the guess 
that they confuse reducibility of biology to physics and 
chemistry, with the applicability of physics and chemistry 
to biological objects.
(Woodger, p.338, quoted in Wiggins(3) p.148)
In the case at hand, the definition of psychological functors with 
the help of those belonging only to biology is the major obstacle to 
the reduction of persons to biological human beings. If persons in 
very different physical circumstances can have the same psychological 
properties - if that feature is inç)licit in those properties being 
typical - then the reduction of the psychological to the biological 
is not possible. But to abandon the reduction enterprise and 
concede that psychological predicates are of a distinct range from, 
and are not replaceable by, the biological predicates of human beings 
is not to concede that persons and human beings are different 
kinds of things. Nor is it even to concede that human beings are 
something other than biological organisms. Even if our interests 
in human beings as biological organisms precluded consideration of 
the psychological predicates, these predicates could still be true of 
human beings. A comprehensive enough theory of what it is to be a 
human being - i.e. a theory concerned with more than just what is, 
say, medically relevant - might consider human beings to be a kind of 
organism whose members can satisfy a range of predicates wider than 
that satisfied by such similar creatures as apes, and the 
psychological predicates could be included in this range. Human 
beings, however, need not be unique in satisfying these psychological
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predicates.
If there is no psychological difference between human beings 
without a physical difference, but there may be a physical 
difference without a psychological difference - i.e. if the 
psychological properties are consequences of properties which may be 
described using only the vocabulary of a physical or biological 
science, but not the converse - then the psychological properties 
are not equivalent to, or necessarily coextensive with, the physical 
properties but are supervenient on the physical properties. Human 
beings, then, can have the typical psychological properties of 
persons, and they can have these properties because of the kind of 
biological organism they are. But a creature which has these 
typical psychological properties need not have the same physical 
properties or even the same nature as a human being. If the only 
properties which are necessary for personhood are essential 
properties not only of human beings, but of members of other species, 
then members of these species also have the necessary properties of 
persons - though they may also have additional essential properties 
which are not necessary for personhood. If these necessary 
properties are also sufficient for personhood - i.e. if a person 
is a creature with a certain kind of nature - then members of these 
species, together with human beings, would constitute a person 
family. If chimpanzees, say, are physically similar enough to 
men for psychological capacities to be attributed to them (if 
psychological capacities are supervenient on the similar physical 
capacities), and if the psychological capacities are necessary and
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sufficient for personhood, then chimpanzees qualify as persons. But 
as supervenience allows for creatures being psychologically similar 
though physically different, the lack of physical similarity with 
men is not adequate grounds for denying personhood to creatures. 
Dolphins, say, could be psychologically like men though physically 
different, just as human beings can be psychologically similar to 
each other though their physical circumstances differ. And just 
as materials with different structures can have the same nature 
(e.g. water, ice and steam, or isotopes of the same element), 
biological organisms with different physical constitutions could 
have the the same nature - or natures sufficiently similar for them 
to have the necessary capacities of persons. But even if the 
personhood of dolphins is theoretically possible, there may be 
little to justify a belief in that personhood.
The only evidence it seems there could be for a person-nature 
in dolphins is that they have the typical properties of persons 
which are symptomatic of that nature. That is, we can only have 
reason to attribute the kind of nature persons have to dolphins if 
we can attribute psychological properties to them. But if the only 
evidence there is for psychological states and capacities in dolphins 
is their behaviour and ;^ysical circumstances, then this evidence is 
uninterpretable if we do not understand the physiognomy and nature 
of dolphins. If we understand the nature of a creature enough to 
judge its likely inner response to physical conditions, and if we 
understand its physiognomy enough to judge the likely inner state 
its behaviour expresses, then it seems we have all the reason we
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could have for attributing a psychological property to it when the 
conditions and behaviour are evident. We might even be able to 
interpret the behaviour of a creature with an unfamiliar physiognomy: 
if the nature we share with alien human beings is a basis for some 
agreement in judgments - hence, some shared beliefs - then a start 
at least can be made in interpreting the meaning of their behaviour. 
When there is no apparent basis for agreement in judgements - as 
with dolphins, whose nature is not ours - then behaviour is 
uninterpretable, and we can only guess at their psychology. If the 
only typical properties of persons we can have reason to attribute 
to non-human creatures are the physical properties, then only 
creatures physically like men can be reasonably believed to be 
persons.
Perhaps too narrow an approach has been taken here in seeking 
properties which distinguish persons from human beings as such, in 
that consideration has only been given to physical and psychological 
properties which are intrinsic to persons. But Americans are 
distinguished from human beings as such, though they are not 
intrinsically different, so persons might be similarly distinguished 
by extrinsic, relational properties. Persons might also be 
distinguished from human beings as such as frogs are distinguished 
from batrachos and butterflies from lepidoptera, and this distinction 
might best be described in terms of extrinsic properties (e.g. a 
p©rson may be a post-natal human—being) • The distinctive extrinsic 
properties of persons will be considered next.
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4 PERSONS AND SOCIETIES
The proposal to be considered here is that persons as such do 
not have a real essence. Though a person who is human has the real 
essence of a human being, he also has necessarily one or more 
distinctive properties which human beings needn't have, and these 
properties may be extrinsic or in consequence of the external 
circumstances of a human being. If a human being is an American 
because he is a native or citizen of the United States of America, 
or is a Celt because he is a member of a people who speak one of a 
family of Indo-European languages, and if being an American or Celt 
is a sufficient condition for a human being to be a person, then we 
might generalize from these and similar groupings (e.g. Russian, 
Indian, Piet, Teuton) and venture that it is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for a human being to be a person that he belongs 
to some community or collective organization of human beings. If by 
a "community" of human beings we mean something more elaborate than 
mere biological families or food gathering parties which provide for 
nothing more than the survival and propagation of the species - if a 
community must provide at least a rudimentary culture or a. degree of 
civilization and if the acquisition of language is a precondition 
for the development of such an organization - then infants and 
savages might not qualify as persons, and foetuses certainly would 
not qualify. But if the sort of community a person must belong to 
is a collection of civilized men, and civilized men are nothing more 
than persons, tiien the proposed definition of "person is circular.
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For a useful definition, we need an account of what it is to be a 
civilized community, which does not make essential reference to 
persons.
One reason for thinking that tribes, villages, nations, etc., 
are something other than mere collections or aggregates of persons 
is that these organizations have properties which are not the 
properties of sets. The community can persist though its membership 
increases, decreases or is replaced; it has its own history and 
future ; and it may even persist and develop in accordance with laws 
which are not the laws of the individual men who belong to the 
community. Furthermore, communities are things we can identify and 
reidentify, distinguish from other communities, and count - i.e. 
communities satisfy sortal concepts. And if we don't pick 
communities out by their characteristic function, as we do for 
artifacts - if the only clear function or purpose we can attribute to 
a community is se If-perpetuation - then communities' seem to be 
substances, or at least substance-like entities. Then the 
relationship men have to the community they belong to is not that of 
mere membership in a set, but is more like the hydrogen atom's 
relation to the molecule of water it composes, or a cell's relation 
to the organism it constitutes. If being a constituent of a 
substance confers properties on a thing which it does not have in 
isolation, then being a constituent of a community may confer on a 
human being a property he does not have in isolation: namely, the
property of being a person.
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Aristotle's account of the relation between men and the
community they belong to in Politics is pertinent here. Aristotle
claims that men initially unite in families to preserve and
perpetuate themselves, then in villages to secure more than their
basic needs, and finally in "a single complete community, large
enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing . . . originating in the
bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a
good life" (1252b27) . For Aristotle, the political community or
state is a natural development and men are by nature political
animals. He goes on to say:
Further, the state is by nature clearly prior to the 
family and the individual, since the whole is of 
necessity prior to the part; for example, if the whole 
of the body be destroyed, there will be no foot or hand 
except in an equivocal sense, as we might speak of a 
stone hand; for when destroyed the hand will be no 
better then that. But things are defined by their
working and power; and we ought not to say that they
are the same when they no longer have their proper 
quality, but only that they have the same name. The 
proof that the state is a creation of nature and prior 
to the individual is that the individual when isolated, 
is not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like that 
part in relation to the whole. But he who is unable to
live in society, or who has no need because he is
sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god: 
he is no part of a state.
(1254al9-29) .
Here, what the "individual" is when he is part of a community, and 
what he is in name only when circumstances prevent community 
membership, cannot be a man — for men are substances. Men existed 
before there was a state, and may continue to exist when the state 
ceases to be; men do not depend for their existence on the state, 
other men, or any other substances. But to be part of a state is
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for a man to have a relational property which qualifies him for the 
title of Athenian, Spartan, Hellene, etc., depending on the identity 
of the state. To generalize (and to introduce a word Aristotle 
does not use) a man who belongs to some community qualifies for the 
title of "person". A man who is isolated from any community may 
continue to be called a "person", though he actually is not one.
But a creature who does not have the capacity or need for communal 
life is not even a man: it may be a beast or a god, but it does not
have a human nature.
To use a biological analogy, the relation persons have to the 
community or the relation "individuals" have to Aristotle's state, 
is like the relation single-ce lied organisms have to a colonial 
organism such as a volvox. The volvox has a nature of its own, and 
is constituted by organisms which have natures of their own. These 
constituent organisms could exist independently of any volvox, but 
in so far as they are cells of one, their conditions of existence 
are modified and they have properties they would not otherwise have. 
Similarly, the human beings who are constituents of a political 
community could exist independently of it (as they did in families 
and villages before the state existed) but they have different 
conditions of existence and properties in so far as they are persons 
of a community. [Note: Plato's conception of the state is more
like that of a true multi-cellular organism, in which the cells are 
so specialized that they cannot survive independently. The volvox 
analogy needn't be pressed to the extent that the political community 
is considered to be an organism. Aristotle would even deny that a
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state is a substance, because it cannot exist independently of men 
who are substances. This restriction on substances was considered 
and rejected in Chapter III,6 above.]
Though considerations of the distinctive social properties of 
persons undoubtedly enrich our conception of what persons are, they 
do not I think yield any necessary conditions of personhood beyond 
those implicit in a person's human nature. If - like the earlier 
attempt to treat certain behaviour patterns as criterial for 
personhood - we treat participation in a community as criterial, 
then we would have to deny personhood to castaways, anchorites, and 
other recluses. But if it is absurd to deny that Robinson Crusoe 
is a person, then it seems we attribute personhood to him because he 
would participate in a community if he had the opportunity. And if 
it is equally absurd to deny that St. Anthony is a person, then it 
seems we attribute personhood to him because he would participate in 
a community if he had the inclination. But if the capacity for 
communal life without the opportunity or inclination is sufficient 
for personhood in their cases, then it must be sufficient in all 
cases. So if savages have the capacity for communal life (and if 
they can be assimilated into a community, then they must have it) , 
then savages are persons too. If any human- being would participate 
in communal life, given the opportunity and inclination, then any 
human being is a person. Actual participation in a community, like 
patterns of behaviour (and such participation is an elaborate pattern 
of behaviour) , can only be typical of persons or symptomatic of their 
personhood.
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We could say that castaways, anchorites and savages are only 
potential persons rather than persons who are deprived, reclusive or 
uncivilized, but we do not say this. Where a distinction between 
potential persons and actual persons might reasonably be made is 
with human- beings who are not mature enough to have developed the 
capacities of persons. For human beings though, unlike lepidoptera 
and batrachos, there is no process of metamorphosis to mark the 
transition to maturity : men gradually acquire the capacities for
communal life as they grow, without any dramatic change in 
appearance. Human beings clearly participate in communal life to 
some degree when they are sent to school at age 4 or 5, and given 
the opportunity and inclination they might do so even earlier. 
Perhaps a human being may be said to be capable of participation in 
a community when he is able to communicate with members of the 
community who do not belong to his immediate family. Then even if 
the precise point in a human being's development at which he can be 
said to have this capacity is obscure, it seems certain that a human 
foetus does not have it, so no human being can be a person before it 
is born. But perhaps we cannot be quite so certain.
If a human being can have capacities which are not manifested, 
then the capacity for communal life may be inherent in the foetus, 
though it is cultivated after birth. The possession of such a 
capacity may even be part of what distinguishes the nature of a 
human foetus from the nature of an ape foetus. Aristotle suggests 
such a distinction in Politics, when he writes;
Now, that man is more of a political animal than bees or
any other gregarious creature is evident. Nature, as we
218
often say, makes nothing in vain, and man is the only 
animal whom she has endowed with the gift of speech.
And whereas mere voice is but an indication of pleasure 
or pain, and is therefore found in other animals (for 
their nature attains to the perception of pleasure and 
pain and the intimation of them to one another, and no 
further), the power of speech is intended to set forth 
the expedient and inexpedient, and therefore likewise 
the just and unjust. And it is characteristic of man 
that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of just 
and unjust and the like, and the association of living 
beings who have this sense makes a family and a state.
(1253a7-17)
If we follow Aristotle to the extent that we take the capacity for 
community membership to be a natural endowment - however much this 
capacity must be nurtured before it is exercised - then we must 
consider all human beings, foetuses included, to have this capacity. 
And if that capacity is sufficient for personhood, then human 
foetuses are persons - i.e. the foetus is an immature, uncultivated, 
pre-natal person, not just a potential person. But there does not 
appear to be anything manifestly incoherent in the position of one 
who gives nurture a more significant role in the detezrmination of 
personhood than does the naturalistic conception of persons developed 
in this chapter. If a distinction can be drawn between an ability 
for communal life and a mere capacity, then the fact that Robinson 
Crusoe and St. Anthony continue to read, write, pray, and otherwise 
behave much as they did when in society is clear evidence for their 
possession of such an ability, and this is an ability a foetus or 
infant does not have. If such an ability is necessary as well as 
sufficient for personhood, then it does distinguish persons from 
human beings or men as such. For it is clearly an ability men need
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not have. But if such a distinction between men and persons is
conceivable, it is well to ask what the point of the distinction is.
Part of the point of a man/person distinction seems to be
that persons are pre-eminently objects of moral and evaluative
consideration, while members of the human species are not. For
Locke, forensic considerations seem to demand and confirm a
distinction between persons and human beings;
In this personal identity is founded all the right and 
justice of reward and punishment . . . .
. . .  to punish Socrates waking, for what sleeping 
Socrates thought, and waking Socrates was never conscious 
of, would be no more right, than to punish one twin for 
what his brother-twin did, whereof he knew nothing, 
because their outsides were so like, that they could not 
be distinguished . . . .
But yet possibly it will still be objected, suppose I 
wholly lose the memory of some parts of my life, beyond 
a possibility of retrieving them, so that perhaps I shall 
never be conscious of them again; yet am I not the same 
person that did those actions, had those thoughts that I 
once was conscious of, though I have now forgotten them? 
to which I answer, that we must here take notice what the 
word I is applied to; which, in this case, is the man 
only. And the same man being presumed to be the same 
person, I is easily here supposed to stand also for the 
same person. But if it be possible for the same man to 
have distinct incommunicable consciousness at different 
times, it is past doubt the same man would, at different 
times, make different persons; which, we see, is the 
sense of mankind in the solomnest declarations of their 
opinions, human laws not punishing the mad man for the 
sober man ' s actions, nor the sober man for what the mad 
man did, thereby making them two persons . . . .
(Locke, II.2.18-20)
For Locke, the point of the "man/person" distinction is that it 
provides a rationale for not holding one person responsible for the 
actions performed by a different person, when those persons succeed 
each other in the same man. But if the sole point of distinguishing
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persons from men is to avoid injustice when the same man can be 
different persons in succession, then the falsity of Locke's "same 
man /different persons" thesis implies that there is no point.
Our interest in treating persons as responsible agents is 
inimical to the conception of there being a succession of persons 
in a single, persisting human being. We see persons as beings with 
an extended past which they are sometimes held accountable for, and 
with an extending future which they can sometimes influence, and it 
is the life-span of a human being which encompasses that history.
If persons were not men, but character or personality episodes 
of men, then it seems that men would be the objects of moral 
consideration and ephemeral persons would be of little interest.
But it is objects and not episodes which we count when we count 
persons, and it is the distinction of men which makes it possible 
for us to distinguish persons and to avoid counting the same one 
twice.
If we abandon Locke's thesis that continuity of memory 
distinguishes persons from human beings per se, and instead consider 
certain abilities and dispositions which some or most human beings 
have to be criterial for personhood - i.e. if we take the type of 
consciousness which enables a human being to participate in a 
community to be necessary and sufficient for being a person — then 
we would not have different persons in the same man, but we would 
consider infants and foetuses to be not persons at all, but only 
potentially persons. The point of the "man/person" distinction then 
would be that these non—persons are held no more responsible for
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their actions than are tigers, bears, and other non-persons who are 
also not human. The "person /non-person" distinction distinguishes 
responsible and non-responsible creatures, and this distinction does 
not coincide with the "human / non-human" distinction but rather 
distinguishes responsible human beings from all other creatures.
But if the concept of a person is as intimately linked to the 
concept of responsbility as forensic considerations suggest it is, 
then we might expect the application of the two concepts to be 
co-ordinate. As there is no sharp distinction possible between 
responsible and non-responsible human beings - i.e. there is no point 
at which a human being who is not responsible metamorphoses into one 
who is - then we can consider human beings to be responsible to 
varying degrees; the child is more responsible than the infant, but 
not as responsible as the adolescent, who is less responsible than 
the adult. But if the infant is not a person at all, then we'd 
expect the child to be a person to a degree which is less than that 
of the adolescent, who is not as much a person as the adult. That 
is, we'd expect there to be degrees of personhood corresponding to 
degrees of responsibility. If there were such degrees, then the 
man in his mad episodes would not be a different person from the one 
he is in his sane episodes, but the same person though to a lesser 
degree. This distinction would provide a rationale for not 
punishing the same man for his mad actions as a man who was 
consistently responsible would be punished. But our use of the 
word "person" does not, I think, support the thesis that there are 
(i©gxees of personhood. For we can make little sense of a request
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to count those who are not fully persons, though we can comply with 
a request to count the persons who are not fully responsible.
Partial person or incomplete person is not a concept under which we 
can identify and distinguish objects to avoid counting the same one 
twice. A partial, incomplete or potential person is not a person. 
If we don't know what things which are not persons are, then we 
don't know what it is for them to coincide. We use "person" as if : 
it is a substance word, and - like Aristotle {Categories, 3b32-4a9)
- do not admit variations of degree. Persons may be held to be 
responsible in varying degrees just as men may. If it is just to 
withhold the whip from the man who offended when he was mad, then it 
is equally just to withhold the whip from the person who was mad.
The forensic discriminations Locke notes seem to be fully accounted 
for by the varying mental states of the man, but these are also 
varying mental states of the person. Nor is a "man/person" 
distinction required to justify not punishing a person for what he 
does or did when he was an irresponsible child; a person may be 
held less responsible for his actions when he is immature, just as a 
man may be. Such forensic discriminations are not reinforced by 
declaring an immature man to be something other than a person.
If any intrinsic or extrinsic property which can be denied of a
man without contradiction can be similarly denied of a person - i.e.
if there is no physical, psychological, social or other property a
man need not have which a person must have - then there are no
necessary conditions for being & person which are distinct from 
those for being a man. Then to have a human nature is a sufficient
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condition for a creature to be a person, for nothing else is 
necessary. The typical psychological and social properties of 
persons are typical properties of men, and they are contingent 
properties of persons as they are of men.
If we map the nature of a creature by articulating the natural 
laws which link the properties it exhibits at a time to its 
environmental conditions and state of development at that time, then 
we can only obtain a restricted theory of human nature if we consider 
only physical and biological evidence. Such a theory may be useful 
when our interests are purely biological - as in medical research 
- but it may tell us as little about what it is to be a man as 
veterinary medicine tells about what it is to be an ape: i.e. at the
biological level, the similarities between men and apes may be more 
significant than their differences. For a comprehensive theory 
of human nature we must consider the full range of properties men 
exhibit, and especially those they exhibit in their typical 
environmental circumstances. For men, this typical environment is 
in a community of men, and the significant properties are the ones 
men have in the contexts in which they are customarily referred to as 
"persons". To pursue the analogy between human communities and 
colonial organisms a bit further: it is the distinctive properties
an organism exhibits as a cell in a volvox which best reveal its 
nature, while the properties it exhibits in isolation from the 
volvox may be so like the properties of other isolated single cell 
animals that no distinctive nature is discernible. Similarly, the
distinctive properties men exhibit as members of communities would
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seem to be the properties which best reveal what is distinctive 
about human nature, and it is human beings in their typical social 
circumstances which will be considered in the chapters remaining.
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CHAPTER V
HUMAN NATURE, ETHICS AND POLITICS
1 NATURAL DEVELOPMENT AND PERFECTION
The conception of human nature developed in the last chapter is
a conception of the physical nature of those material objects which
comprise the substance-kind man or human being. Human nature
determines or establishes the internal principles of organization,
persistence and change for man-substances, as discussed in
Chapter III, How this conception of human nature relates to
conceptions of human nature which are the concern of moral and
political theory will be considered in this chapter.
The physical conception of nature considered so far in this
work seems to be in accordance with the primary sense of "nature"
iphusis) which Aristotle discusses in Metaphysics A.4 and in
Physics II.1:
The source from which the primary movement in each 
natural object is present in it in virtue of its own 
essence
(1014bl9)
, . . nature is a source or cause of being moved and 
of being at rest in that to which it belongs primarily, 
in virtue of itself
(192b22)
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For Aristotle, things which are substances have natures, and "to have
a nature" is for a thing to have "in itself the source of its own
production" (192b28). For living things (Aristotle's favoured
examples of substances) the nature they have is the source or cause
of their growth and development, and it determines the shape, form or
essence the substances have when they are fully realized. Aristotle
would appear to believe, then, that an acorn has the nature of an oak,
because it contains within itself both the driver of its growth and
the objective or end which governs that growth - where the end is the
fully realized or mature tree.
Though nature as end or teles seems to be in^licit in nature as
phusis, Aristotle sometimes discusses the former separately, as a
secondary or derivative sense of "nature". This sense is evident in
Politics 1.2, when he discusses the origin of the state :
. . .  if the earlier forms of society are natural, so is 
the state, for it is the end of them, and the nature of a 
thing is its end. For what each thing is when fully 
developed, we call its nature, whether we are speaking of 
a man, a horse, or a family. Besides, the final cause 
and end of a thing is the best, and to be self-sufficing 
is the end and the best.
(1252b28)
Here, the nature of a thing is what it realizes when it is fully 
developed, and to realize that nature is to attain the end which is 
the final cause of a thing's development. The significance that 
this teleological sense or conception of nature has for Aristotle's 
political and moral theories is soon made evident, for he goes on to 
say that man's full development is only possible in the state or
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political community:
. . . the state is by nature clearly prior to the family 
and to the individual, since the whole is of necessity 
prior to the part . . . .
The proof that the state is a creation of nature and prior 
to the individual is that the individual, when isolated, 
is not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in 
relation to the whole . . . .
For man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but, when 
separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all 
• • • • But justice is the bond of men in states, for the 
administration of justice, which is the determination of 
what is just, is the principle of order in political society.
(1253al9-39)
The existence of the state, then, is held to be a necessary condition 
for man's self-sufficiency, full development, or perfection. 
[Aristotle's "proof" of this seems incomplete: even if men cannot
be perfected (rather than just "are not") outside the state, it does 
not follow that they can be perfected within it. If men depend on 
the state for their further development, then it seems they are not 
self-sufficing within or without the state, so are never fully 
developed or perfected. Aristotle's "part/whole" analogy does not 
support his contention either. For although we can conceive of the 
whole being prior to the part in the order of definition, we cannot 
conceive of this in the order of existence: i.e. the part can exist
without the whole, but the whole cannot exist without the part.] 
Aristotle appears to hold, then, that there is a relation of 
reciprocity between the natural development of individual men and the 
development of their communities: the coming into being of the state
is not only a conseguence of men fully realizing their human nature, 
but is a necessary condition for that realization. Furthermore, if
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the chief purpose or point of the state is the well-being of the men 
who comprise it, and if their well-being depends upon their full 
natural development, then the state, it seems, fulfils this purpose 
best when it encourages the maximum or optimum development of human 
nature. Hence, normative principles of political organization 
would appear to be derivable from a comprehensive theory of human 
nature. A closer examination of Aristotle's conception of human 
nature and its perfection will require consideration of his moral 
theoiry.
The essentially social character of the realization of human
nature expounded in the Politics complements, and perhaps even
improves upon, the more individualistic account of human nature
presented in the Nichomachean Ethics^ There, Aristotle located
man's eudaemonia (i.e. happiness, success) in the fullest and most
hamranious development and exercise of his distinctive natural
endowments. But the attenpt in the latter work to ground morality
on the distinctive characteristics of man has puzzled some by its
apparently arbitrary selection of some distinctive characteristics
above others. Bernard Williams, for one, objects to Aristotle's
attempt to elicit moral ends and ideals from the distinguishing
marks of man's nature by noting, first, that;
if one approached without preconceptions the question of 
finding characteristics which differentiate men from 
animals, one could as well, on these principles, end up 
with a morality which exhorted men to spend as much time 
as possible in making fire; or developing peculiarly 
human physical characteristics; or having sexual 
intercourse without regard to season; or despoiling 
nature and upsetting the balance of nature ; or killing 
things for fun.
(Williams(2) , p.73)
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Second, he points to the moral ambiguity of distinctive human 
characteristics; we are free to use our natural endowments 
destructively as well as constructively - to practise sadism as well 
as act with justice. And third, Williams notes that the selection 
of the rational as the distinguishing mark of man has a tendency to 
result in a morality of rational self-control at the e:q>ense of the 
eegression of passions and emotions, because distinctive 
characteristics are treated as if they were supreme, Williams also 
notes that reason itself is divided, and that no coherent account 
can be given of how theoretical reason's need for unrestricted 
intellectual freedom is to be reconciled with practical reason's 
task of harmonizing desires, for " . . .  the pure or creative aspects 
of intelligence would seem to be the highest form of those 
[distinguishing] capacities, yet a total commitment to their 
expression is ruled out, and a less than total commitment is not 
represented as something that practical thought can rationally 
arrive at" (p.70) . Williams's conclusion is that "the attempt to 
found morality on a conception of the good man elicited from 
considerations of the distinguishing marks of human nature is likely 
to fail" (p.75) . The Politics, I believe, provides a rationale for 
the selection of distinctive characteristics of human nature, which 
deflects much of Williams's criticism.
Aristotle's doctrine that the state is prior to the individual 
implies that the development of individuals must be compatible with 
the persistence of the state. The constraining role which the 
needs of the state have on the development of individuals is stressed
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future. But if a man's external circumstances, and the beliefs he 
has about these circumstances, confer contingent properties on the 
man, then his responding to the communal impulse and his manifesting 
his communal capacities are things he does contingently. A man in 
atypical circumstances, or with atypical beliefs, may develop in 
such a way that he does not satisfy his communal need. If the 
satisfaction of that need is not a condition of his full development, 
then there seems to be no reason to say of such a man that his 
development is incomplete or imperfect, rather than just atypical.
But the satisfaction of that need cannot be a condition of his full 
development, if in that full development he is a fully realized 
substance. For a substance does not depend for its existence on 
the existence of substances separate from itself (see Ch.Ill,6 
above), and the satisfaction of the communal need is impossible 
without the existence of other men.
Aristotle's teleological conception of human nature, its 
development, and perfection is not, then, in^licit in the phusis 
conception, but is an extension or addition to the phusis conception. 
The internal principles of organization, persistence and change 
which govern substances of the kind man cannot be such as to 
necessitate men organizing with other men at any stage of their 
development, if these principles are essential to men. Nor can the 
existence of a community be a condition for the further operation of 
these principles, if they are internal principles. That a man 
becomes a child, an adolescent, and an adult during his natural life­
span does, however, seem to be determined by internal principles of
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in Book VIII.1 of Politics, when Aristotle says
Neither must we suppose that any one of the citizens
belongs to himself, for they all belong to the state,
and the care of each part is inseparable from the care
of the whole.
(1337a27)
A concern for the well-being of the state should be a governing 
consideration, then, when an individual is unable to reconcile the 
conflicting demands of practical and theoretical reason. If 
unfettered intellectual freedom threatens the survival of the state, 
then it is the needs of the state which must prevail. And if there
are alternative patterns of human development, then the one which is
most conducive to the perpetuation of the state is to be preferred.
[Threats to the survival of the state are not always to be avoided, 
for there are social organizations which harm rather than benefit 
their members and which should be supplanted. Aristotle admits 
that there are bad or perverted states which encourage revolution 
(Bk.III .7, Bk.V) and holds that it is in the ideal state that men 
perfect their natures.] A state which exists as a consequence of 
and condition for men realizing their fully developed natures guides 
and restricts men in the development and exercise of their 
distinctive faculties and capacities. There are some distinctively 
human characteristics, such as Williams mentions, the cultivation of 
which would seem to threaten the survival of any state. Despoiling 
the environment and the practice of sadism can hardly encourage even 
man's survival and perpetuation, much less his living the good life. 
The development of such destructive capacities, or the e3q>ression of
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other distinctive characteristics in a destructive way, is clearly
not conducive to the survival of a good state - i.e. "a state
governed with regard to the common interests of the citizens in
accordance with strict principles of justice" (1279al7). For
Aristotle, one of the purposes of the good state is the moral
development and perfection of its members, so the moral ends and
ideals elicited from considerations of the distinguishing marks of
human nature must also be conducive to the existence of such a state.
Good states are ruled by good men (see Bk.II.4) and a man and his
state cannot be good if his morality is based on distinctive human
characteristics which are antisocial. And if there are human
characteristics which are essential for the existence of a state
though not distinctive of men - such as the friendship, sympathy and
fellow-feeling implicit in the will to live together (see 1280b38)
- then only the distinctive characteristics of men which are
compatible with these can be developed by good men. So the
constraints political considerations place on the selection of
morally significant distinctive human characteristics rule out many
of the alternative patterns of development suggested by Williams.
What remains doubtful, though, is that the social constraints
on possible moralities are so restrictive as to exclude any
alternatives. Williams makes this point as follows :
. . . While there are very definite limitations on what 
could be comprehensively regarded as a system of human 
morality, there is no direct route from considerations 
of human nature to a unique morality and a unique moral 
ideal. It would be simpler if there were fewer things, 
and fewer distinctively human things, that men can be; 
or if the characters, dispositions, social arrangements
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and states of affairs which men can comprehensively set 
value on were all, in full development, consistent with 
one another. But they are not, and there is good reason 
why they are not: good reason which itself emerges from 
considerations of human nature.
(Ibid, p.76)
If the possibilities for human development are as diverse as Williams
suggests, then even if the characteristics of particular kinds of
state - i.e. Aristocracies, Oligarchies, Democracies, etc. - further
constrained what could count as a moral system for members of states
of that sort, there might still be alternative moral systems, based
on different distinctive characteristics of man, which are each
compatible with the persistence of that sort of state though the
moral systems are not compatible with each other. But if
incompatible moralities can coexist in a single state, then the
constitution of the state cannot determine which of these alternative
moralities is correct or best, or which distinctive characteristics
of men ought to be developed. Even less can the characteristics of
one state guide us in deciding the relative merits of moralities
associated with states of different sorts. We would first have to
know which sort of state was best, if we wanted to use the
characteristics of that sort of state as the criterion of the best
morality. But this is to reverse Aristotle's procedure, which uses
the characteristics of the good man as the criterion for the good
state. For Aristotle, good citizens need not be good men:
. . . the virtue of the citizen must therefore be 
relative to the constitution of which he is a member.
If, then, there are many forms of government, it is 
evident that there is not one single virtue of the good 
citizen which is perfect virtue. But we say that the
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good man is he who has one single virtue which is perfect 
virtue. Hence it is evident that the good citizen need 
not of necessity possess the virtue which makes a good 
man. The same question may also be approached by 
another road, from a consideration of the best 
constitution. If the state cannot be entirely composed 
of good men, and yet each citizen is expected to do his 
business well, and must therefore have virtue, still, in 
as much as all the citizens cannot be alike, the virtue 
of the citizen and of the good man cannot coincide. All 
must have the virtue of the good citizen - thus, and thus 
only, can the state be perfect; but they will not have 
the virtue of a good man, unless we assume that in the 
good state all the citizens must be good.
(12 76b 30)
However, only states which are ruled by good men and produce good men 
are good;
And a citizen is one who shares in governing and being 
governed. He differs under different forms of 
government, but in the best state he is one who is able 
and willing to be governed and to govern with a view to 
the life of virtue.
(1283b44)
If there is no direct route from consideration of human nature to the 
constitution of the best state for men, then there is no further 
route back from considerations of the ideal state to a unique 
morality. Rather, judgements about the best state for men 
presuppose a conception of goodness which is not derived from 
considerations of man * s nature alone.
If Williams is right in claiming that the distinctive 
characteristics of man cannot be consistently developed, then even 
the thesis that fully developed men are members of some state is 
dubious. For it seems no more natural for men to develop their 
social and political capacities than it does for them to develop
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their skill at making fires or killing things for fun. The fact 
that the former characteristics are more conducive to communal life 
and that communal life is advantageous for survival is not enough to 
show that men must develop these socially beneficial capacities, 
because the advantages of communal life may be consequences of 
contingent environmental factors. Given a natural abundance of the 
necessities of life and an absence of natural enemies, men might 
have survived just as well without political communities.. Men it 
seems need not even develop their capacities to live in families.
For even if families are essential for their survival and 
propagation, in so far as suicide and celibacy are possibilities 
for men, men need not wish to survive and propagate themselves; so 
they cannot be constrained or determined by their natures to develop 
the capacities for survival and propagation. As men typically do 
develop these capacities, it is clearly in accordance with their 
nature to do so - but it is also in accordance or compatible with 
their nature not to do so. So it cannot be in a man's nature, or 
in consequence of laws of nature instantiated in their real essence, 
that they unite in families. Neither, then, can it be a 
consequence of or condition for the full development of a man's 
nature that he lives in a political community.
In claiming that "man is by nature a political animal", 
Aristotle I believe makes a stronger claim than that it is merely 
natural or in accordance with a man's nature to live in a political
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community. For he goes on to say
And he who by nature and not by mere accident is without 
a state, is either a bad man or above humanity . . . .
(1253a2)
As "a bad man" here translates the Greek phaulos, which is more 
accurately translated "worthless" or just "bad", the sense seems to 
be that a creature who does not have it in his nature to belong to a 
state is inferior or superior to a man. This interpretation is 
supported by
But he who is unable to live in society, or has no need 
because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a 
beast or a god: he is no part of a state. A social
instinct is implanted in all men by nature . . . .
(1253a28)
A creature who does not have it in his nature to be part of a state 
is not a man, for he does not have a human nature. But that is to 
say that a social instinct is essential to men, or a man has both 
the capacity and need for communal life as de re necessities. As 
essential capacities needn't be exercised, and essential needs 
needn't be satisfied, the conclusion cannot be drawn, though, that 
fully developed or perfected men must belong to a state. All that 
follows is that a fully developed man has a fully developed social 
instinct. And as a need for communal life can coexist with a need 
for solitude - i.e. the needs may be compatible though they are not 
mutually satisfiable - a man needn't even seek communal life.
Whether or not a man responds to his communal needs may depend on 
factors which are outside the scope of his nature, such as the state 
of the world or his beliefs about the state of the world and its
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development which operate independently of the existence of other 
men. So being an adult, becoming an adult, and even having the end 
or purpose of being an adult are properties a man can have 
essentially. With regard to the end or telos of human nature, all 
we seem entitled to claim is that the final form of a man is being 
an adult - i.e. a human being with mature, fully developed faculties, 
capacities, and needs. In so far as the existence of a community 
is a condition for the full development of men, the development 
considered is not of men per se, but of good men. Men are perfected 
or complete when they are good, or lead "the good life", and this may 
only be possible in communities. But the conception of perfection 
or completeness of men presupposes or is inseparable from a 
conception of goodness which cannot be derived from consideration of 
man's substance nature alone.
Aristotle's conception of man's perfection depends upon a prior 
understanding of what a good man is, while the conception of man's 
natural development does not. The non-coincidence of these two 
conceptions of human nature might be overlooked if it were thought 
that the distinctive characteristics of men were essential rather 
than just typical, or if it were thought that the characteristic 
capacities and needs must at some stage be realized. But if these 
are not even consistently realizable, then there can be no complete 
realization, and there can be no man with completely realized 
capacities and needs. Though considerations of human nature may 
set limitations on what can be comprehensively regarded as a system 
of ethical or political principles, no unique system can be derived 
from such considerations.
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2 NATURAL DEVELOPMENT AND EMANCIPATION
In considering Aristotle's conceptions of man, society and 
morality in the last chapter, a confusion was noted in Aristotle's 
identifying the natural perfection a man may be said to have when 
he is a fully developed adult possessing the full range of 
capacities belonging to his species and the moral perfection he has 
when he lives the good life, which presupposes his participation in 
a political community. A similar conception of the relationship 
between human nature and political life pervades the early work of 
Karl Marx:
Political emancipation is the reduction of man, on the 
one hand to a member of civil society, an egoistic and 
independent individual, on the other hand to a citizen, 
a moral person. The actual individual man must take 
the abstract citizen back into himself and, as an 
individual man in his empirical life, in his individual 
work and individual relationships become a species- 
being; man must recognize his own forces as social 
forces, organize them and thus no longer separate social 
forces from himself in the form of political forces.
Only when this has been achieved will human emancipation 
be completed.
{On the Jewish Question, Marx(l) , p. 108)
. . . productive life is species-life. It is life
producing life. The whole character of a species, its 
generic character, is contained in its manner of vital 
activity and free conscious activity is the species 
characteristic of man. Life appears merely as a means 
: to life.
. . . Conscious vital activity differentiates man 
immediately from animal vital activity. It is this 
and this alone that makes man a species-being. He 
is only a conscious being, that is his own life is an 
object to him, precisely because he is a species-being.
This is the only reason for his activity being free 
activity . . . .
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Thus it is in the working over of the objective world 
that man first really affirms himself as a species-being.
This production is his active species-life. Through it 
nature appears as his work and his reality. The object 
of work is therefore the objectification of the species- 
life of man; for he duplicates himself not only 
intellectually, in his mind, but also actively in reality 
and thus can look at his image in a world he has created. 
Therefore when alienated labour tears from man the object 
of his production, it also tears from him his species 
life.
{Alienated Labour, Marx(l) , pp.139-40)
For Marx as for Aristotle, man fully realizes his human nature
in the political community. Marx, however, is more specific than
Aristotle is about the character of this realization: men manifest
their human natures in their productive activity - i.e. their work
- and the political community is the necessary context of that work.
Marx like Aristotle also identifies natural with moral perfection,
but where Aristotle sees eudaemonia as the condition of the good man,
Marx sees human freedom or emancipation - which would enable men to
work like creative artists - as the highest good. In modifying his
material and social environment so that it responds to his real
needs, man fulfils himself and establishes the ideal human society:
. . . Thirdly, there is communism as the positive 
abolition of private property and thus of human self- 
alienation and therefore the real reappropriation of the 
human essence by and for man . . .  Communism as completed 
naturalism is humanism and as completed humanism is 
naturalism. It is a genuine solution of the antagonism 
between man and nature and man and man. It is the true 
solution of the struggle between existence and essence, 
between objectification and self-affirmation, between 
freedom and necessity, between individual and species.
It is the solution to the riddle of history and knows 
itself to be this solution.
{Private Property and Communism, Marx(l) , p. 148)
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Marx's communism corresponds to the ideal state of Aristotle 
in that in it the good citizen and the good man - i.e. the man who 
fully realizes his human potential - coincide: the ends of the 
state and the ends of individual men are the same. In the ideal 
political community, men become truly human.
Although Aristotle and Marx have very similar views about the 
relationship between individual human beings and the political 
community, their approaches to portraying the ideal society in which 
human beings flourish are very different. Aristotle considers the 
actual constitutions of existing states and examines their relative 
merits : the yardstick he uses in deciding which constitution is
best is a prior conception of the good man. The ideal state for 
Aristotle is an aristocracy of merit in which the good men rule.
But the size of this aristocracy varies according to circumstances : 
if all citizens are good men then they take turns at ruling, while 
if one man is pre-eminently good then he is to be King. Marx's 
characterization of the ideal political community is indirect in 
that communism is marked by the absence of certain oppressive 
features of existing societies. The oppressive features of all 
previously existing societies, and of capitalist society in 
particular, produces men who are estranged or alienated in a variety 
of ways. Men are alienated from nature - both their own human 
nature and nature in general - because they must toil in order to 
survive : nature appears as an enemy to be subdued. ffen are
alienated from the products of their work, because things and 
institutions dominate their lives rather than serve their needs.
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îfen are alienated from each other because they are competitors for 
the limited resources of survival. And men are alienated from 
society because the state suppresses individual liberty in order to 
preserve the inequalities of wealth and privilege embodied in the 
class structure of society. In the ideal, communist society these 
forms of alienation are absent. Nature becomes the arena and 
provides the material for man's creative activity. Men work to 
produce goods to satisfy their human needs. Other men are not 
adversaries but allies who extend one's creative powers. And 
society enables the collective power of men to be directed at 
satisfying their individual needs.
Although Marx does not offer any detailed, worked out 
conception of human goodness which could be used as a criterion for 
evaluating social progress, his implicit judgement that it is better 
for men to be emancipated rather than alienated clearly rests upon 
certain moral assunptions. The moral assumptions which underlie 
Marx's theories are often obscured by his deterministic conception 
of social progress: communism is historically inevitable rather
than a consequence of anyone's conscious moral decision, and the 
characteristic behaviour of men in communist society is a natural, 
spontaneous consequence of their circumstances rather than the 
realization of a moral ideal. In pre-communist societies, the 
moral values which are applied in resolving conflicts of interest 
tend to preserve the existing class structure with its inequalities 
of wealth and privilege, and thus perpetuate men's alienated status. 
For Marx, the moralities of present and past societies at best
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define the rights and obligations pertaining to social roles rather 
than to men per se, and at worst constitute part of the ideological 
defences of the power of the ruling class. In communist society, 
men have common interests and wants and agree naturally and 
spontaneously in their actions. There are no conflicts of interest 
to be resolved, so morality is descriptive of the habitual behaviour 
of men who have been emancipated from the divisive pressures of 
class societies. Marx believes that the historical inevitability 
of communism will free men from the need to defend themselves 
against a hostile nature, the enmity of other men, the repression of 
the state, and the domination of their own productions, and so will 
free men to express their own nature in the absence of external 
compulsion. But Marx also believes that communism is not only to 
be favourably anticipated but actively worked for, and this belief 
inplies that the free, natural man is a morally good man. If, as 
Marx appears to suggest, the emancipation of man is a goal we are 
morally bound to achieve, and if the achievement of this goal 
requires the overthrow of the ruling class, then this moral 
obligation is one that cannot be identified as part of the defensive 
ideology of the ruling class.
It would seem that Bernard Williams ' s criticisms of Aristotle ’ s 
version of ethical naturalism, which were considered in the previous 
section, could be directed equally well against Marxist Humanism. 
There is little in the way of argument in Marx's writings to support 
the conviction that all the capacities which constitute human nature 
are — when unfettered by the contingencies of class societies — even
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consistently developable, much less morally desirable. Marx in 
fact would be in a much weaker position than Aristotle is if he 
attempted to derive a conception of human goodness or human 
emancipation from consideration of human nature, because the only 
data available on which an account of human nature could be based is, 
for Marx, corrupted by the contingencies of social history: the
wants, habits, and attitudes of men at any time are a product of 
their social role and so are not indicative of their essential human 
nature. Marx, however, eschews any attempt to give an account of 
human nature : what emancipated man will be like will emerge only
after the achievement of communism. Marx then is not oblivious to 
the sort of criticism Williams directs against Aristotle's conception 
of human nature. His own defences against such an attack would be 
that under communism the things men would wish to be, and the things 
they would set value on, are consistently realizable - i.e. it is 
only in pre-communist societies that men want inconsistent ends.
But such a defence would also eliminate any empirical basis for 
Marx's theory of social development and human progress. For if we 
can't know what human nature is before the advent of communism, then 
we can't know what human emancipation is nor can we know what it is 
for men to be alienated. Consequently, there can be no evidence in 
support of the claim that history progresses in such a way as to 
reduce and eliminate alienation.
Marx does, however, sketch out ib a general way at least some of 
the characteristics men will have when they are able to realize their 
human natures : they will live in harmony with nature, society.
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and with each other, and they will work to satisfy human needs 
- including the need for creative self-expression. But this view 
of what free men would be like doesn't come from any objective study 
of human nature - rather, it comes from a prior moral conception 
that it is good for men to live in that way. The doctrine of 
alienation describes the condition of men who cannot live the good 
life; alienated life is considered unnatural, or contrary to human 
nature; and the natural life for men is in turn identified with the 
good life, thus assimilating Marx's moral assung>tions to natural 
science. In construing history as a process aiming at the fullest 
natural development of men, Marx appears to attribute the motive 
force of social development to biological drives rather than to the 
desire to realize a moral ideal. But a fully developed man is not, 
for Marx, just a biologically mature one, but one with social 
characteristics which Marx - and liberal, anti-authoritarian 
thinkers in general - approve of. Moral idealism is replaced by 
biology in Marx's theory of history only by equating naturally 
perfected man to morally perfected man.
Marx's blurring of the line between moral distinctions and 
natural distinctions in his early writings, seems to stem from a 
conception of rationality which was firmly entrenched in German 
philosophical thought at Marx's time. This tradition holds that 
man is essentially a rational being; rational beings are 
essentially free, in the sense that they are self-determined; 
therefore, man is by nature self-determined, and anything that 
interferes with that freedom corrupts or diminishes human nature.
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In so far, then, as a man's activities are determined by forces 
external to himself, he is prevented from manifesting his own nature 
and is alienated from his essential self. Marx's vision of how 
unalienated men will live together under communism resembles the 
conception of a "kingdom of ends" which Kant presents in his 
Groundwork of the Mietaphysics of Morals. Having argued that moral 
actions are actions in which the agent's will is autonomous, in that 
it conforms only to laws made by itself and universally binding on 
rational beings, Kant goes on to discuss the characteristics of a 
community of moral agents:
The concept of every rational being as one who must regard 
himself as making universal law by all the maxims of his 
will, and must seek to judge himself and his actions from 
this point of view, leads to a closely connected and very 
fruitful concept - namely that of a kingdom of ends.
I understand by a "kingdom" a systematic union of 
different rational beings under common laws. Now since 
laws determine ends as regards their universal validity, 
we shall be able - if we abstract from the personal 
differences between rational beings, and also from all the ■ 
content of their private ends - to conceive a whole of all 
ends in systematic conjunction (a whole both of rational 
beings as ends in themselves and also of the personal ends 
which each may set before himself) ; that is, we shall be 
able to conceive a kingdom of ends which is possible in 
accordance with the above principles.
For rational beings all stand under the law that each of 
them should treat himself and all others, never merely as 
a means, but always at the same time as an end in himself.
But by so doing there arises a systematic union of 
rational beings under common objective laws - that is, a 
kingdom. Since these laws are directed precisely to the 
relation of such beings to one another as ends and means, 
this kingdom can be called a kingdom of ends (which is 
admittedly only an Ideal).
(Paton, p.95)
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For Kant, the conception of a rational being is what remains in 
thought when the personal characteristics and interests of particular 
men are ignored. For Marx, rational beings are what actual men 
become when the abolition of private property and the class system 
does away with the personal characteristics and interests which 
divide them. When communism liberates men from personal want, and 
hence from the conflicting interests which set men against each 
other, then men will manifest their essential, rational natures.
They will see other men not as adversaries, but as beings like 
themselves with whom they have no essential grounds for conflict, 
and so men will live together in co-operation and harmony.
Marx saw the challenge posed by the German Idealist tradition 
in philosophy to be that of transferring a thought process by which 
a concept of universal, rational man was abstracted from many 
concepts of particular men into a physical, historical process in 
which universal, rational man developed from particular men. One 
of the assumptions underlying this project is that if a concept is 
at a higher level of generality than another concept, then instances 
of the more general concept are at a higher level of development ,
- i.e. they have more perfection, more reality - than instances of 
the subordinate concept. For example, the concept of universal, 
rational man is at a higher level of generality than the concepts of 
Tom, Dick and Harry, so universal, rational men are at a higher 
level of development than Tom, Dick and Harry. A further 
assumption is that nature is a process in which things develop from 
lower to higher stages of reality and perfection. History, then.
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is a natural process in which TOm, Dick and Hariry develop into 
rational men. It is upon these metaphysical assunptions, rather 
than on any explicitly moral ones, that Marx's conceptions of human 
freedom and historical progress rest.
Marx and many of his philosophical contemporaries working in 
the aftermath of Hegel seemed to be preoccupied with the idea that 
certain theories about the nature of God could help to explain the 
nature of man - i.e. theology was to be converted into anthropology. 
Though Marx's polemical writings ruthlessly attack the activities of 
these contemporaries, and though he rejects the idealist tradition 
in favour of materialism, some of the confused logical and 
metaphysical doctrines of that tradition seem to underlie and 
vitiate much of his own work. The doctrine that there is a 
metaphysical hierarchy of perfection and reality corresponding to 
the logical hierarchy of concepts, is one of the more absurd 
assumptions of Marx's account of alienation. It is as absurd to 
say that a "pure" instance of the concept rational man is more real, 
more perfect than Tom, Dick and Harry as it is to say that a red 
thing is less real than a thing which is coloured, but no colour in 
particular. As a thing which is red is necessarily at the same 
time coloured, then Tom, Dick and Harry are necessarily universal, 
rational men if they are men at all. An historical process which 
relieved men of the personal characteristics and interests which 
differentiated them from other men could have as its outcome not 
many undifferentiated "pure" instances of human nature but one 
particular man - i.e. if there were no personal differentia, at the
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very least in the form of differences in spatio-temporal position, 
then all men would be identical. A material object can't have just 
the essential properties of its species or kind and no other 
properties, for if it did then it would exist in space and time but 
at no place or time in particular, it would have a shape and weight 
but none in particular, etc. Clearly, if rationality is an 
essential property of men, then Tom, Dick and Harry are not 
developing toward rationality - they are rational. A thing which 
lacks the essential properties of a man is not an inferior man, but 
no man at all.
The assumptions that nature proceeds in such a way as to 
eliminate diversity among members of a species and to favour the 
essential characteristics of the species above the accidental ones 
also appears to have little empirical foundation, for there is at 
least as much evidence that nature favours increased diversity as 
that it favours uniformity. Variation between and within species 
is essential to Darwin's theory of evolution, which Marx accepted 
and praised. To claim that rational men in communist society are 
at a higher stage of natural development than their evolutionary and 
historical ancestors is to make a value judgement which is not 
supported by mere observation of natural processes.
The Kantian conception of rationality, which Marx appears to 
accept without critical examination at least as a model of the 
behaviour of fully developed men, is one Kant spent a lifetime trying 
to elucidate and defend. But Kant's efforts — for all their 
imaginative brilliance - succeed only in establishing a philosophical
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"white elephant", which has no application to considerations of even
the ideal behaviour of any conceivable agent. The inapplicability
of this conception of rationality to men or any other physically
embodied agent is evident in the third and final chapter of the
Groundwork, in which a metaphysical investigation of the concept of
freedom is undertaken. Kant's resolution there of the conflicting
theses that men belong to a physical world which is governed by
causal laws, and that men are free to act in opposition to these
laws, is to propose that men have a dual nature : man is at once a
physical being, and is also a member of a rational, intelligible
world in which causal laws do not hold and his will is determined by
reason alone. But this "resolution" is only achieved at the cost
of sacrificing Leibniz's Law of Identity, for it requires that a free
member of the intelligible world and a determined member of the
physical world be identical, although they have contrary properties.
On the other hand, the application of this conception of rationality
to the behaviour of a disembodied agent - a pure intelligence or
will - is barred by the absence in such an agent of the wants,
purposes and concerns which could motivate any conceivable behaviour.
Wiggins memorably remarks on the efforts to describe such an agent:
It might have been expected that the outcome would be 
the transformation of the bareness of our conception 
of an inpersonal intelligence into the conception of 
an impersonal intelligence of great bareness.
(Wiggins(7), p.363)
Even if it were conceivable that such a being could care about 
anything enough to act, why should we care about what it would find 
compelling?
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The patent mysticism of Kant's view that there is an 
intelligible non-physical world of which we can have no knowledge 
other than that it exists is something Marx tries to avoid by 
identifying the intelligible world with a communist society in which 
men conform in their rational behaviour because poverty and want 
have been eradicated. But even if it were true that the abolition 
of private property and the class system would unleash productive 
forces which would eliminate the grounds for disagreement about the 
equitable distribution of limited resources (a view which seems 
excessively optimistic, given the earth's finite resources of oil, 
coal, and other fuels) there is little reason to believe that an era 
of rational co-operation and harmony will ensue. It may well be 
that when poverty is abolished other, currently peripheral, wants 
will become predominant, and these will produce conflicts of 
interest no less disruptive than the ones we have now. It would 
seem that the mere fact that men are distinct and cannot occupy the 
same place at the same time ensures that they cannot have the same 
possessions and circumstances, so that the numerical non-identity of 
men is in itself a basis for potential conflict. It would also 
seem that communism could do little to alter the fact thât men are 
alienated from their allegedly essential, self-determined natures 
- inasmuch as men are part of a physical world, they are subject to its 
causal laws. A world in which social oppression has been eliminated 
remains a world in which men are constrained by natural necessity.
This has to be so, for if the set of causal laws which govern the 
existence and development of a creature with a man's nature ceased
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to hold, there could be no men. Any coherent conception of human 
nature must acknowledge - not deny - man's essential determination 
by causal laws (see Ch.III.2 above). Kant's conception of a 
purely rational, self-determined being, who acts in the world 
without being acted upon, cannot be a conception of a human being 
or any other natural creature. Causal determination is not a 
source of human alienation because the freedom which this alienation 
is opposed to cannot exist - self-determination is a physical 
in$)Ossibility for a man. In translating the Kantian opposition 
between necessity and freedom into social terms, Marx appears to be 
reducing a conceptual or metaphysical contradiction to a natural 
antagonism which history can only resolve in one way. But as men 
are as much subject to causal laws under communism as they are under 
capitalism, there is no reason to think that the emancipation of man 
under communism is any more natural, or represents a higher form of 
natural development, than does the oppression of men under 
capitalism.
Marx's assun^tion that the natural development of creatures 
is from a lower to a higher degree of self-determination is not a 
hypothesis that could be confirmed by scientific observation.
Freedom and alienation are not natural categories but moral ones; 
the superiority or advantage a free man has over a slave is a moral 
superiority or advantage, not a natural one. And if communist 
society is more advanced than slave, feudal, or capitalist 
societies, then the advance is judged by moral or political criteria, 
not natural criteria. In an effort to make his theories of human
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nature and social development objective and scientific, Marx
refrains from explicit moral judgements, but his moral preconceptions
surface repeatedly in his un-empirical conception of nature. My
judgement of the early political theory of Marx is in substantial
agreement with that expressed by Eugene Kamenka in Marxism and
Ethics, and to summarize I can't do better than quote from that work;
Alienation . . .  is not a logical concept or a category 
on which a theory of ethics can be founded without further 
examination and analysis; in Marx and recent neo-Marxists 
it is a moral advocative term deriving its force from 
moral assun$>tions it does not seriously examine and from 
the disparity between existing social conditions and some 
of the hopes and expectations born of the optimism of the 
scientific and industrial revolutions. This is not to 
say, of course, that any given society must be accepted as 
it is; it is to deny that logic and the nature of man 
prove it ought to be different. Let us admit frankly that 
moral and social reforms are political activities, 
springing from and utilizing existing (strictly historical) 
expectations, traditions and moral attitudes with their 
allied frustrations and dissatisfactions. To be morally 
adult is to be able to take a stand without demanding that 
history and logic be rewritten to support it, without 
demanding that the nature of the universe guarantee our 
"rightness" and/or our prospects of success.
(Kamenka, p.30)
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3 HISTORICAL DETERMINISM AND PROGRESS
Neither Aristotle nor Marx, I have argued, succeeds in deriving 
a theory of moral or political progress from considerations of human 
nature. If mature human beings can go on to develop in a variety 
of ways, and nothing in the nature of man provides a criterion for 
selecting one of these ways as the most preferable, or as the goal 
of human progress, then no such theory is true. There remains a 
sense, though, in which men might be constrained by nature to develop 
some characteristics above others, and that is if the way things are 
in the world makes a specific pattern of development inevitable for 
creatures with a human nature. Given that men are organized in 
communities in a physical world, the laws which define the nature 
of men may be such that the conditions of social life have necessary 
consequences for men's subsequent development, and these recursive 
consequences might make the emergence of specific moral and 
political systems historically inevitable. The thesis that human 
progress is historically determined becomes increasingly evident 
in Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, and is 
developed and e^^ounded in The German Ideology and subsequent works. 
That thesis, and the conception of human nature associated with it, 
will be considered here with reference to these works.
In his later philosophical writings, Marx abandons his earlier 
humanism for a materialist doctrine which explains social development 
in causal rather than teleological terms. For the later Marx, 
communism is not a social system which marks the flowering of human
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nature and the emergence of a "truly human ethic", but is the system 
which comes about when further technological progress is inpeded 
by the institutions of capitalism. When private ownership of the 
means of production stands in the way of the employment of those 
means for the eradication of poverty and for the satisfaction of 
human needs, a revolution will ensue which will result in the 
collective control of the means of production, the abolition of the 
class system, and ultimately the establishment of the egalitarian 
social relationships of communist society. Communism is the 
consequence neither of moral demands, nor of the realization of 
an essential but alienated human nature, but is the historically 
inevitable outcome of technological development.
There are passages in Ihe German Ideology which suggest that 
Marx rejected not only the thesis that human nature is the source 
of moralitiy and social change, but also the thesis that men have a 
common human nature. For it is a recurring theme in that work 
that there is no "man in general" and no "human essence" but only 
individuals whose capacities, attitudes and needs are determined by 
their roles in specific societies which have structures primarily 
determined by technology:
This sum of productive forces, capital funds and social 
forms of intercourse, which every individual and 
generation finds in existence as something given, is the 
real basis of what the philosophers have conceived as 
"substance" and "essence of man" . . . .
(Marx and Engels, p.59)
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And in the Theses on Feuerbach:
. . . the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each 
single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of 
the social relations.
(Ibid, p.122)
Marx also appears to believe there is no morality in general — no 
universal, human morality - but only specific moralities which are 
part of the ideologies which prevail in specific, historical 
societies, and which serve the ruling classes of those societies:
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the 
ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material 
force of a society is at the same time its ruling 
intellectual force . . . .
If now in considering the course of history we detach the 
ideas of the ruling class from the ruling class itself 
and attribute to them an independent existence, if we 
confine ourselves to saying that these or those ideas were 
dominant at a given time, without bothering ourselves about 
the conditions of production and the producers of these 
ideas, if we ignore the individuals and world conditions 
which are the source of the ideas, we can say, for 
instance, that during the time that the aristocracy was 
dominant, the concepts honour, loyalty, etc., were 
dominant, during the dominance of the bourgeoisie the
concepts freedom, equality, etc......... For each new class
which puts itself in the place of one ruling before it, is 
compelled, merely in order to carry through its aim, to 
represent its interest as the common interest of all the 
members of society, that is, expressed in ideal form: it
has to give its ideas the form of universality, and 
represent them as the only, rational, universally valid 
ones.
(Ibid, p.64f)
Such passages have encouraged both disciples and critics of Marx 
to hold that he denied that there was a common human nature and a 
common human morality for men_ of all classes and generations. But 
a careful reading of the text indicates that although Marx had 
little interest iri the nature and morality of human beings as such
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- because he no longer considered these to be of much theoretical 
significance - he did not go so far as to deny their existence.
What he does reject is the universality of certain philosophical 
definitions or theories of human nature (e.g. Feuerbach’s): his
point is that these theories are true only in specific historical 
and social contexts. Rather than go through a tedious textual 
exegesis to defend this interpretation of Marx, I would prefer to 
indicate why some of the beliefs inaccurately attributed to Marx 
are inconsistent with his theories, and why even the less extreme 
beliefs he did have about the variability of human nature and 
morality are inadequate for his theoretical purposes.
Though Marx does not refer to his own earlier work in the 
text, it would seem that his critique of humanism is directed as 
much against his own earlier theories as against the theories of 
Feuerbach and his more idealist contemporaries. In locating the 
motive force of social change in historical determinism rather than 
in a frustrated human nature, Marx is I think attempting to remove 
any vestige of covert moralism from a theory which purports to be 
scientific and value-free. Where humanists consider man's nature, 
or men's conceptions of that nature, to be the source of moral 
demands which change society, Marx considers these conceptions 
and moralities to be products of social circumstances which are 
themselves a product of forces of production or technology. 
Technology determines the division of labour in a society; the 
division of labour determines the class structure in a society; and 
the ideas of the dominant class - specifically, ideas about what
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constitutes the general interests of society as opposed to personal 
interests - constitute the prevailing morality of society. 
Consequently (Marx appears to believe), when social classes are 
abolished, the opposition between general and personal interests 
disappears because these interests coincide, so morality is also 
abolished. In such a classless, communist society - a community of 
men - men's conception of themselves will also be free of parochial 
class bias and distortion, so that a true theory of what it is to be 
human will be attainable.
But there are aspects of Marx's critique of humanism, and of 
humanistic ethics, which are unconvincing. For even if historical 
determinism does explain the origin and specific character of the 
morality of a given society, it doesn't follow that the moralities of 
different societies have nothing in common. Nor does it follow from 
morality representing the interests of the dominant class in a 
society that there are no interests common to all classes. Some 
believed coincidence of interests of the members of a society would 
seem to be a condition for there to be a society, and it is a matter 
for empirical investigation to discover the reality and degree of 
this coincidence of interest. If the interests of a class determine 
a system of values, and if members of all classes have an interest in 
preserving and perpetuating themselves as social beings, then this 
universal interest might account for some values being peculiarly 
moral. On the other hand, it may be that universally shared moral 
values account for there being common interests. But either way, 
Marx's assimilation or relegation of moralities to ideologies
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obscures rather than clarifies the nature of moral values.
Marx's mistake here I think is to take the origin of moralities 
in ruling class ideologies as evidence for a logical entaiIment 
between moralities and ideologies — i.e. the proposition
(1) Every morality originates in (or is part of) 
a ruling class ideology
is taken to be evidence for - or perhaps just reinterpreted as -
(2) If a morality exists then a ruling class 
ideology must exist
from which it follows that there can be no morality if there is no
ruling class ideology, or morality must be absent in a classless
society. But (2) is not inplied by (1) : it is not the case that
if A is part of B then A cannot exist if B does not. A's dependence
on B for its existence would be implied, though, if A was necessarily
or essentially part of B. The disappearance of morality in a
classless society, that is, follows from (1) fortified by a
necessity modifier, i.e.
(1') Necessarily, every morality originates in (or 
is part of) a ruling class ideology.
But there are good reasons for doubting the truth of (1*) , and any
conclusions drawn from it. For if (2) follows from (1*), then an
exactly parallel argument can be constructed which derives from the
premise that men's natures are necessarily determined by the
structure of class society, the conclusion that when class society
has been abolished there can be no human nature, hence, no men. But
if the abolition of class society marks the advent of the truly
human man, then by parity of reason it marks the advent of a truly
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human morality. As the discussion of Marxist Humanism in the 
preceding section of this chapter indicated, such a morality would 
lack the institutionalized form of its predecessors. It would 
constitute part of a description of what men are rather than a set of 
rules specifying what men ought to be, and it would be a standard 
against which the objective content of previous moralities could be 
judged. It is against such a standard that the degree of alienation 
or estrangement of earlier men who were slaves, serfs, or 
proletarians, masters, lords, or bourgeois, could be measured.
In The German Ideology, however, alienation or estrangement is 
not a measure of the degree to which historical men fail to realize 
their absolute human nature, but a measure of the degree to which 
men are prevented by outmoded social forms from becoming what they 
are capable of being in a given society at a given time. The newly 
freed slave isn't alienated by his serfdom, but the serf is alienated 
when the conditions exist for him to be a proletarian. Nor is the 
proletarian alienated from his absolute human nature - i.e. the 
overthrow of capitalism isn't the emancipation of the truly human man 
which is latent in the proletarian - rather the type of individual 
the proletarian becomes after the revolution is called "human" 
because he is free to enjoy the opportunities technology offers him 
to develop his potentials. It is only by imposing or "foisting" the 
average individual of the later historical stage on to the earlier 
stage, or by imposing the consciousness of a later age on to the 
individuals of an early age, that the earlier individuals can be seen 
as absolutely alienated from their essential "humanity . There is
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not a common criterion of humanity which men of all historical 
periods satisfy, rather:
The positive expression "human" corresponds to the 
definite conditions predominant at a certain stage of 
production and to the way of satisfying needs determined 
by them, just as the negative expression "inhuman" 
corresponds to the attenpt, within the existing mode of 
production, to negate these predominant conditions and 
the way of satisfying needs prevailing under them, an 
attempt that each stage of production daily engenders 
afresh,
(Marx and Engels, p.116)
When "human" is used in moral discourse (when it is contrasted with
"inhuman") the necessary and sufficient conditions for being human
do not remain constant throughout history, but are continually
modified as social conditions change.
It is this special, socially restricted sense of "human" which
is required to interpret Marx's remark in his critique of Proudhon:
. . . all history is nothing but a continuous 
transformation of human nature.
(Marx(2) , p.128)
Interpreted literally, this remark suggests that men of one generation 
may be related to men of other generations by nothing more than a 
"family resemblance" - i.e. the proletarian has some characteristics 
in common with the serf, and the serf has some characteristics in 
common with the slave, but the proletarian and the slave need have 
nothing in common: there is no common nature or real essence which 
makes them all men. Men, it seems, need not even be members of the 
same biological species. But this interpretation does not accord 
with Marx's stated intention to deal with human societies — i.e.
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collective bodies of individual who are biologically wen. This is 
made explicit in the early pages of The German Ideology where he 
says:
The first premise of all human history is, of course, 
the existence of living human individuals. Thus the 
first fact to be established is the physical 
organization of these individuals and their consequent 
relation to the rest of nature. Of course, we cannot 
here go either into the actual physical nature of man, 
or into the natural conditions in which man finds 
himself - geological, oreohydrographical, climatic and 
so on. The writing of history must always set out 
from these natural bases and their modification in the 
course of history through the action of men.
(Marx and Engels, p.42)
Having established that his subject matter is hvman individuals
- i.e. individuals with a human biological nature - Marx goes on to
say of men: ^
They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from 
animals as soon as they produce their means of 
subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their 
physical organization.
And,
. . .  as individuals express their life, so they are.
What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, 
both with what they produce and with how they produce.
The nature of individuals thus depends on the material 
conditions determining their production.
(Ibid, p.42)
which suggests that the existence of biological human-beings is 
prior to their having a human essence, and that men in some sense 
create or at least complete their own natures : in. their activity,
men extend their natures, or add to what they are biologically given. 
What is common in the natures of men - the biological conponent - is
262
merely the basis of their socially significant natures.
But the thesis that men even partially create their own nature 
iS/ I think, confused. For what is it that is engaged in this 
creative activity? It can only be men -i.e. creatures with a 
human nature - so what they are creating for themselves cannot be 
what they are (i.e. substance) but only how they are (i.e. qualities, 
etc.). If a man's biological nature endows him with various 
capacities and needs, then in exercising or satisfying some of these 
in his activity he realizes an aspect of his nature, and his 
material circumstances may delimit the aspects he can realize. In 
so far, then, as a man exercises his nature in the world, he may be 
said to attribute to himself a character, or to become a man of some 
social type. If a man was inactive to the point of inertness, then 
no aspect of his nature would be realized, and no character would be 
articulated. But inertness is not possible for a man, whose nature 
is defined by causal laws: some activity in response to material
circumstances is necessary. But whatever the circumstances and the 
consequent activity, the nature of a man is not modified or extended 
- for the nature a man has is essential to him. A transformation 
of a man's nature would be his transformation into another substance, 
which is impossible (see Ch.1.3) . All that a man's activity 
can succeed in "creating" is a character or personality.
If Marx is not just confused in the passages quoted, then he is 
using the words "man", "human", and "nature" equivocally.
Sometimes "man" and "human—being" stand for concepts under which 
animals of a certain kind are individuated, identified, and
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distinguished from other animals, in virtue of their having a nature 
governed by physical laws. But at other times these are terms 
associated with description of what is characteristic of men in 
social contexts : what they are like in virtue of their common
circumstances. The second sense of these terms is more restricted 
than the first, for their extension is at most that subclass of 
biological men who are functioning members of societies. In 
denying that there is an invariant human nature, Marx seems to move 
from the truism that there is no single identifying description of 
social man which is true of all men at all times - i.e. no nominal 
essence of "man" - to the conclusion that there is no real essence 
of man. But I think all he means to say is that if it is social 
circumstances which give men a character and a social role, then it 
follows that there is no invariant human character and that social 
men as such do not have a nature or real essence. But it does not 
follow that men do not have an invariant human nature. Men must 
have a nature to exist at all, and it is only because they do have a 
nature that they can have characters as consequences of their 
environmental circumstances, The absence of a single identifying 
description, true of all men at all times, may suggest only that 
"man" is a natural kind word which is defined by a real essence and
not by a nominal essence.
A percipient reading of The German Ideology and other works of 
that period — one which did not take literally the extreme relativism 
about human nature and morality expressed in the often exaggerated 
rhetoric of the polemical writings - would take Marx as holding, not
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that there is no human nature and. no objective morality, but that
the set of needs associated with man's essential nature, and the
moral demands for the satisfaction of those needs, are of such a
level of generality when considered apart from the specific social
contexts in which they are expressed as to make them of little
interest to the social theorist. The significant disagreement
between the earlier, humanist theories of Marx and the theories of
The German Ideology is not over the existence of human nature in the
strict natural kind sense, but over that nature's being sufficient
to determine the social and ethical properties of man. Where the
early Marx and his Marxist Humanist successors claim that there are
needs which are essential to men, from which an absolute human ethic
follows,the later Marx suggests that these essential human needs
are purely biological, and that the role they play in the development
of specific moralities is so conditioned by the contingent factors
which shape human social existence as to make them barely
recognizable as natural. This interpretation of Marx's later views
is implicit in Leon Trotsky's essay Ends and Means in Morality:
But do not elementary moral precepts exist, worked out in 
the development of mankind as a whole and indispensible 
for the existence of every collective body? Undoubtedly 
such precepts exist but the extent of their action is 
extremely limited and unstable. Norms "obligatory upon 
all" become the less forceful the sharper the character 
assumed by the class struggle. The highest form of the 
class struggle is civil war, which explodes into midair 
all moral ties between hostile classes . . . .  The 
so-called "generally recognized" moral precepts in 
essence preserve an algebraic, that is, an indeterminate 
character. They merely express the fact that man, in his 
individual conduct, is bound by certain common norms that 
flow from his being a member of society. The highest 
generalization of these norms is the "categorical
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inperative" of Kant. But in spite of the fact that it 
occupies a high position in the philosophic Olympus, this 
imperative does not embody anything categoric because it 
embodies nothing concrete. It is a shell without content 
. . . . This vacuity in the norms obligatory upon all 
arises from the fact that in all decisive questions people 
feel their class membership considerably more profoundly 
and more directly than their membership in "society".
(Trotsky, pp.336-37)
That people do feel their class membership more strongly than
their membership in society (or than their race, religion,
nationality, etc.) is a "fact" even the most doctrinaire of Marxists 
must now have good reason to doubt. Given the decline of 
revolutionary socialism as a serious political force in virtually 
all the industrialized countries, it would seem that militant class-
consciousness is a rapidly vanishing phenomenon - contrary to what
Marx's historical materialism would lead us to expect. One 
plausible (and familiar) explanation of this decline is that modem 
conditions of production do not require the ruthless exploitation of 
working people which characterizes the early days of the industrial 
revolution, and which produced the poverty, brutality and injustice 
that fueled revolutionary demands. And that they do not do so 
suggests that the moral outrage which goaded revolutionaries - and 
also drove reformers such as Lord Shaftsbury, who was responsible 
for the legislation prohibiting the employment of children in the 
mills and collieries - forced the modification of the conditions of 
capitalist production. Moral demands seemed to be at least one of 
the factors — along with militant trade unionism and technological 
innovation - which have altered methods of production, and altered
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them in a way which confounded revolutionary expectations. But to 
concede this much is to reject Marx's apparent (or at least alleged) 
contention that the economic base of a society - the methods of 
production and the social relationships they entail — is determined 
solely by technological development, and that the ideological super­
structure of the society - which includes the moral attitudes and 
aspirations of people - exists as a mere epiphenomenon. If moral 
attitudes help to shape the economic structure of a society, than an 
account of the causal development of economic structures must include 
these attitudes among the causal factors. If history is looked at 
objectively - i.e. if one does not just ignore facts which do not 
fit into a preferred theory of social development - then there seem
to be ample grounds for agreeing with critics, such as Kamenka and
Plamenatz who claim that the line between the economic base of a 
society and its ideological superstructure cannot be drawn in the 
way Marx's theory of revolution requires (see Kamenka, p.41) . But
just where Marx does draw this line is obscure.
There are passages in The German Ideology which indicate that 
Marx did not exclude men's moral attitudes and values from the 
factors determining social change :
. . . The social structure and the State are continually 
evolving out of the life processes of definite 
individuals, but of individuals, not as they may appear 
in their own or other people's imagination, but as they 
really are: i.e. as they operate, produce materially,
and hence as they work under definite material limits, 
presuppositions and cOTiditions independent of their will.
The production of ideas, of conceptions, of conscious­
ness, is at first directly interwoven with the material 
activity and the material intercourse of men, the 
language of real life . . . .  Men are the producers of
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their conceptions, ideas, etc. - real, active men, as 
they are conditioned by a definite development of the 
productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding 
to these . . . .
(Marx & Engels, p.46)
Saint Sancho [Max Stirner] presents the proletarians here 
as a "closed society", which has only to take the decision 
of "seizing" in order the next day to put a summary end 
to the existing world order. But in reality, the 
proletarians arrive at this unity only through a long 
process of development in which the appeal to their right 
[their right to equal enjoyment in return for equal work] 
also plays a part. Incidentally, this appeal to their 
right is only a means of making them take shape as "they", 
as a revolutionary, united mass.
(Ibid, p.29)
It is the activity of men in a technological context which produces, 
orders, and changes their social lives, and the attitudes and 
expectations of men (including their moral attitudes and 
expectations) are implicit in that activity. Men's professed 
morality is one expression of their attitudes and expectations: 
what men do - their social behaviour - is another.
Though Marx certainly rejects the idealist view that morality 
is an independent factor which must be added to the material 
circumstances of men's lives to account for their social 
organizations, he also takes care to distance himself from 
mechanistic materialists such as Feuerbach who would take the 
material circumstances of biological men to be the sole determinants 
of social structure. In the third of the Theses on Feuerbach, Marx 
seems to be attempting to establish a position somewhere between
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idealism and materialism:
The materialist doctrine concerning the changing of 
circumstances and upbringing forgets that circumstances 
are changed by men and that it is essential to educate 
the educator himself. This doctrine must, therefore, 
divide society into two parts, one of which is superior 
to society.
The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and 
of human activity or self-changing can be conceived and 
rationally understood only as revolutionary practice.
(Ibid, p.121)
Marx's target here is the inconsistent materialists who claim that 
the social behaviour of men can only be changed by changing their 
material circumstances, while apparently relieving those who make 
the changes (the educators) of these material constraints. Such a 
doctrine divides mankind into those who are physically determined 
and those who are motivated by ideals. To be consistent, a 
materialist would have to concede that no conscious change of 
society is possible. Marx's counterview is that men are conscious, 
purposive creatures who can change their social lives, though their 
consciousnesses and purposes are constrained or articulated by 
their material circumstances. They can only change society by 
chsinging themselves, and to make this change they must divest 
themselves of an historical legacy: the ideological inheritance
they are given along with the current productive system. The 
change from a capitalist to a communist society is so profound, Marx 
believes, that only a revolution can accomplish it:
. . . Both for the production on a mass scale of this 
communist consciousness, and for the success of the cause 
itself, the alteration of men on a mass scale is necessary, 
an alteration which can only take place in a practical 
movement, a revolution-, this revolution is necessary.
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therefore, not only because the ruling class cannot be 
overthrown in any other way but also because the class 
overthrowing it can only in a revolution succeed in 
ridding itself of all the muck of ages and become fit to 
found society anew.
(Ibid, p.95)
Men's consciousness is crucial for the maintenance and transformation 
of society.
Though Marx's repeated assertion "it is not the consciousness
of men which determines their existence but their social existence
that determines their consciousness" leaves him open to a mechanistic
materialist interpretation, it would seem from the above passages
that he takes the relation between consciousness and social existence
to be a reciprocal one: consciousness and social existence appear to
determine each other. In support of the belief that such mutual
determination is possible - and possible even in a purely mechanical
system - I offer the following remarks on clockwork :
. . . It is said that the mainspring unwinds and in 
unwinding affects the hairspring. But it is also said 
that the hairspring affects the speed and manner of 
unwinding of the mainspring. How can that possibly be?
If the normal operation of the mainspring presupposes the 
normal operation of the hairspring, how can the normal 
operation of the hairspring presuppose the normal 
operation of the mainspring? Well, it can and it does. 
Presupposition like mechanical regulation can be 
reciprocal.
(Wiggins(3) , p.159 fn 13)
That consciousness and social existence are mutually dependent 
though constrained by the material circumstances of men's lives is 
no more paradoxical than that the mutually dependent functions of 
clockwork are constrained by the physical construction of the clock.
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If men are considered as members of a species of animal with 
certain physical capacities and certain biological needs, then the 
material circumstances of life (which include forces of production 
or technology) do not seem to be adequate to determine their mode of 
social existence. The set of determining factors must be augmented 
by men's social needs, attitudes, expectations, etc., and perhaps 
even by men's moral, religious and political beliefs. But then the 
question arises Where do these additional factors come from? If 
they are not part of the material circumstances of life, then one 
may be tempted to believe that they are immaterial in origin: they
come from God or from the Soul, or are explained by some other 
variation on idealism. Marx escapes this question by assimilating 
these factors to men: man's animal nature is supplemented by
acquired social needs, attitudes and expectations. Socially 
organized men are conscious animals with a social nature which 
completes or articulates their biological nature, and it is the 
material circumstances of their lives - both current circumstances 
and past circumstances as reflected in their historical inheritance 
- which determine this social nature. The causal determination of 
men's social nature is a recursive process, in which thé social 
characteristics men have at any time contribute to the conditions 
which have as consequences men's future social nature. As moral 
attitudes are already "built-in" to a man's social nature - his 
consciousness - they needn't be added to the material factors which 
determine his social behaviour. What the mechanistic interpretation 
of Historical Materialism seems to forget is that Marx's theory is
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about the social development of persons — men with consciousness 
(and all that it entails) who live communally and who have a common 
history and common ends.
Though Marx is substantially in agreement with Aristotle's view
that societies come into existence to satisfy human needs, he does
believe that the development of societies from feudal, through
capitalist, to socialist forms is a consequence of man's progress to
"the good life". Rather, societies develop in accordance with the
development of technology and men are virtually pulled along by this
process: their consciousness - including their conception of what
"the good life" is - is a consequence of these technological
developments. It would seem, then, that the transition from a
capitalist to a socialist society is not a direct consequence of
overt political activity which aims at realizing a Utopian vision,
nor is it the culmination of a moral crusade. In Marx's view,
socialist society comes into existence as the alternative to social
stagnation and decline. The virtually automatic process of social
transformation is described in some detail in Marx's statement of
the "guiding principle" of his economic and social studies in
A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy-.
In the social production of their existence, men 
inevitably enter into definite relations, which 
are independent of their will, namely relations of 
production appropriate to a given stage in the 
development of their material forces of production.
The totality of these relations of production 
constitutes the economic structure of society, the 
r©al foundation, on which arises a legal and political 
superstructure and to which correspond definite forms 
of social consciousness. The mode of production of 
material life conditions the general process of social.
272
political and intellectual life. it is not the 
consciousness of men which determines their existence, 
but their social existence that determines their 
consciousness. At a certain stage of development, the 
material productive forces of society come into conflict 
with the existing relations of production or - this 
merely expresses the same thing in legal terms - with 
the property relations within the framework of which they 
have operated hitherto. From forms of development of 
the productive forces these relations turn into their 
fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution.
(Marx(4), Preface, p.21)
The process is described more succinctly (and more colourfully) in 
Capi tal :
The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of 
production, which has sprung up and flourished along with 
and under it. Centralization of the means of production
and socialization of labour at last reach a point where
they become incompatible with their capitalist integument.
This integument is burst asunder. The knell of private 
property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated.
(Marx(3), Vol.l, p.715)
It is implicit in Marx's account of the mechanism of revolutionary 
social change that there are not only physical limits to what 
biological human beings will endure before they react to preserve 
the conditions of biological life. There are also psychological 
and political limits, so that the threatened loss of whatever social 
benefits men do receive as members of capitalist society will 
engender collective action to defend those benefits. The high 
productive output of capitalist industry raises the expectations 
of people - and of industrial workers in particular - so that the 
deprivations consequent on capitalism in decline are considered to
be "intolerable". In those conditions, workers would feel their
very social existence to be threatened, so they would take control
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of production to assure their own survival. Even if the develop­
ment of productive forces brings about the collapse of the capitalist 
mode of production, it is the purposive behaviour of men which brings 
about the transition to communism. The conscious attitudes of men 
plays a vital - if not dominant - role in the transition process. 
[Marx's thesis that the decline of capitalism is inevitable is 
associated with his theories about the nature and laws of development 
of society as such. As my concern here is with the nature of men, 
these theories will not be discussed.]
If there is no psychological difference between men without 
a physical difference - i.e. if men's psychological properties 
are supervenient on their physical properties (see Ch.IV.3 above)
- then men in similar enough material circumstances will be 
psychologically similar. And if that psychological similarity 
extends to similar beliefs about what constitutes a good life, and 
s imilar desires to perpetuate and enhance that life, then this may 
be enough to account for men acting collectively for political 
objectives. So much is implicit in Marx's theory of the historical 
determination of human development. And so much is consistent with 
the thesis that men have a substance nature, and that the changes 
they undergo are in accordance with principles of development and 
change, or natural laws, which define that nature. It is 
consistent with the theory of essentialism expounded here, then, 
that the material circumstances of men's lives determine their 
consciousnesses and their social organizations, and the ways these 
develop. What is questionable in Marx's theory is the further
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thesis that historically determined human development converges on a 
single pattern, and, specifically, on a pattern of life in a 
collectivist commune.
Part of Marx's justification for this additional thesis is 
located in his account of the inherent instability of societies with 
class divisions : only a classless society in which men have common
ends can be enduring. But however true this doctrine may be, the
inevitability of a classless society only follows if societies 
inevitably become more stable. As the mere presence of life in the 
universe indicates that it is in accordance with nature for unstable, 
precarious structures to emerge, persist for a time, and then die 
- to be succeeded by structures which may be even more precariously 
unstable - the development of societies of ever greater stability 
can hardly be necessitated by any natural law of general structural 
development. Even individual men sometimes prefer the stimulating 
but risky to the stable and enduring. And even if most men desire 
stability, and their wishes prevail, there are alternatives to the 
stability of a classless society. Though fascist and other 
authoritarian solutions to social crisis may be only short-term 
solutions, natural processes give us little reason to believe that 
men will inevitably settle on a final or ultimate solution.
Furthermore, even the thesis that there is a final or ultimate 
solution to the problem of how men can best live and flourish is 
dubious, if there is no complete or optimum development of individual 
men. If all the natural potentials of men are not consistently 
realizable, so that there can be no such thing as a fully developed
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man (see Section 1 of this chapter), then considerations of human 
nature do not support the ultimate solution thesis. Even if the 
material circumstances of men's lives do articulate their human
needs and delimit the needs which can be satisfied, there might
still be enough of those needs which are not cosatisfiable for there 
to be options - and different ways of being for men which reflect 
these options. When there are no options - and in conditions of 
war, natural catastrophe, or even extreme technological dependency, 
there might well be only one pattern of development or way of being 
for men which is compatible with their very survival - life may 
hardly seem worth living. For the only viable way of being for men 
may be by default the best way, without being a good way. Even 
if men accurately perceive their situation, its possibilities, and 
the needs which can be satisfied - so that they know what the only 
viable way to be is - they could, it seems, still reject that way as 
not good enough. The very lack of viable alternatives - which 
effectively leaves men no choice about how they will live - may in 
itself diminish the value of the only viable way to be. But if it
is possible for men to be mistaken in their beliefs about the best
way to be in the circumstances, or possible for them to lack the 
resolve to realize this way, or possible for them to try but fail, 
then this way of being cannot be inevitable. And these things are 
possible - even if it is conceded that men's beliefs, purposes 
and efforts are historically determined — for the historical 
determination of a belief does not guarantee its truth, the 
historical determination of a purpose does not guarantee its
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realizability, and the historical determination of an effort does 
not guarantee its success. Though it is a consequence of the 
theory of historical determinism that the way men come to live at 
any time is inevitable, it is not a consequence that this way will 
conform to any preconception of the best way of life for men.
If men's beliefs, purposes and efforts are as determined as are 
their physical and social properties, then there can never be any 
real choices for men: whatever options they appear to have at any
time are only apparent. Even if indeterministic physics suggests 
that there can be historical accidents - so that everything that 
happens to a man needn't be inevitable (see Ch.III.2 above) - such 
accidents are as uncontrollable as they are unpredictable.
Whatever alternatives history may provide for men, they are not 
answerable to their wills. Clearly, the theory of historical 
determinism is not consistent with widely held and cherished beliefs 
about human freedom and responsibility. Whether or not such a 
freedom and responsibility is conpatible with men having a substance 
nature will be considered in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER VI
HUMAN NATURE AND FREEDOM
1 ACTim AND NECESSITATION
In the last chapter, it was argued that neither Aristotle nor 
Marx succeed in deriving a unique conception of moral or political 
excellence from considerations of human nature, when that nature is 
understood to be essential to substances of the human natural-kind.
It was further argued that the psychological characteristics of men 
(which include their beliefs and purposes) are contingent on 
natural, historical and social circumstance, so that these cannot 
constitute an essential human nature but only a contingent character. 
Consequently, moral or political principles derived from such a 
character are no more universal and absolute than is the character. 
But if it is a further consequence of the substance conception of 
human nature that all the properties of men (including their 
beliefs and purposes) are causally determined, then this may be 
reason enough to doubt that men have such a nature. For some 
degree of freedom, autonomy or self-determination, it may be thought, 
is essential to men and uniquely distinguishes them from other 
creatures: men, at least sometimes, can freely choose their beliefs,
purposes and actions. If the phenomenon of choice is only possible
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for creatures with a human nature when it is so restricted as to be 
compatible with causal determination, then freedom of action - and 
the kind of responsibility which goes with it - is an illusion.
Before considering the illusory character of certain beliefs 
about human autonomy, a brief summary of one line of argument in the 
previous chapters is in order. In Chapter I it was argued that our 
practice of individuating, identifying and reidentifying persisting 
material objects depends upon the application of substance concepts 
- i.e. concepts of continuants which have some properties 
essentially, and other properties which, come and go in a predictable 
manner. A material continuant identified at one time, it was argued, 
can be identical with a material continuant identified at another 
time if and only if there is a substance concept under which they 
coincide (or under which their constituents coincide - aggregates, 
artifacts). In Chapter III it was argued that continuant material 
objects can only satisfy substance concepts if they have a nature 
defined by natural laws which determine the conditions of 
persistence, development and change for the object. The holding 
of such laws, it was argued, is essential to the existence of a 
substance, and it is a consequence of these laws that any physical 
property or state of a substance follows necessarily from earlier 
physical properties or states. It was further argued that the 
existence of substances is a precondition of the identification of 
physical properties as well as physical objects, and that there 
could be no significant empirical knowledge if there were no 
substances. In Chapter IV it was argued that human beings are
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substances, and that what we know to be persons are human beings. 
Persons, then, have a substance nature which subsumes their physical 
properties under causal laws. The causal determination of the 
physical properties of persons is in accordance with natural laws 
which define a person's nature (i.e. a human nature); in having 
such a nature persons satisfy substance concepts; and in satisfying 
a substance concept persons can be individuated, identified and 
reidentified over time.
It is a consequence of the argument so far rehearsed that when 
a person has a physical property or physical state which involves 
the brain, then the causal antecedents of that state (or some of 
them) determine the state of the brain - i.e. brain states are 
effects of antecedent physical conditions, including other brain 
states, which are sufficient for that state to occur. To deny that 
brain states are ever caused is to accord to the brain an insulation 
from physical interaction that we do not accord to other physical 
objects, and is to do so in the face of all the available evidence 
- including the evidence of neurophysiology - which is to the 
contrary. The claim that brain states are sometimes not caused is 
similarly objectionable, and even less credible - for it suggests 
that the brain is sometimes insulated from physical interaction, and 
sometimes not. In so far as brain states contribute to the 
physical states of the persons the brains belong to, brain states 
are as determined as are the physical states of persons. Hence, 
the non—necessitation of brain states is not compatible with the 
substance-hood of persons.
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Some consideration was also given in Chapter IV to the 
identification of the psychological states of persons by the 
accompanying physical circumstances and behaviour, and to the 
related obstacles to justifiably attributing such states to 
creatures with other than a human nature. Many of these states 
- e.g. those associated with prepositional attitudes - are only 
reasonably attributable to human beings, and specifically to mature 
human beings with fully developed, undamaged brains. Though it is 
conceivable that dolphins, say, have prepositional attitudes, it is 
not readily conceivable what would confirm that they have. But if 
the possession of a functioning brain is a necessary condition for 
a person to have a psychological property, then it would also seem 
that some state of the brain, or some physical state of a person's 
nervous system which includes a state of his brain, is a sufficient 
condition for his having the psychological property - when the 
psychological property is intrinsic and not irreducibly relational.
A developed human being is only a candidate for having certain 
psychological properties because he is physically capable of having 
the brain states which are necessary and sufficient for the 
psychological or mental states. That there is a necessary connection 
between states of the brain and psychological states is supported not 
only by our ordinary beliefs about the attribution of psychological 
properties, but by such neurophysiological evidence as the induction 
and inhibition of psychological states by the stimulation and 
isolation of brain tissue (e.g. Penfield's e3q>eriments), But if 
intrinsic psychological states are necessitated by brain states, and
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these are necessitated by earlier physical conditions (including 
other brain states), then intrinsic psychological states are 
physically necessitated: they are determined by physical conditions
which are sufficient for their occurrence. Furthermore, the physical 
behaviour (movements and stillnesses) which often accompany 
psychological states, and which constitute a person's actions, are 
themselves physical states - or processes made i:p of physical states 
- which are necessitated by earlier physical states (including brain 
states). Then actions, like psychological states, are determined by 
physical conditions which are sufficient for their occurrence. As 
with brain states, to deny that thoughts and actions (conscious 
states and processes, and behavioural states and processes) are 
always causally determined is to accord to persons an insulation from 
physical interaction which is not accorded to other physical ctojects, 
and is to do so in opposition to neurophysiological and other 
reliable evidence. Such a denial is also of course inconsistent 
with the earlier conclusion that persons are substances. If the 
intrinsic physical properties of persons must be causally determined 
for persons to be substances, then what persons think and do - which 
are consequences of their physical properties - must be causally 
determined. But if whatever a person thinks and does is causally 
determined or necessitated by physical conditions, it follows that 
in those conditions he cannot think or do otherwise. He cannot, for 
exanple, decide or choose otherwise than he does decide and choose.
It also follows (as Honderich points out in an essay to whiCh I am 
indebted here (Honderich) ) that we are not responsible, or free in the
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sense maintained by traditional libertarian doctrines. And it 
follows that in so far as the rationality of familiar human attitudes 
and practices such as gratitude, resentment, reward and punishment 
depends upon the reality of this freedom and responsibility, these 
attitudes and practices are not rational.
The conclusion that so inportant an aspect of human 
relationships is founded on little more than a myth may be less than 
convincing in an argument so starkly presented. The argument 
will I hope appear less stark when certain objections to it are 
considered. One familiar line of objection (associated with By le, 
MacIntyre, Melden, Hamlyn and others) disputes the causal 
determination of actions by denying that actions are physical events. 
Physical events such as sets and sequences of bodily movements, it 
is argued, are individuated under concepts which engage natural laws, 
so can be explained causally, while actions are individuated under 
concepts which do not engage natural laws, so can only have non- 
causal explanations; actions are explained by citing the reasons 
for which they were done, or the intentions from which they derive.
It is further argued that as there isn't generally a one-one 
relation between action kinds and physical movement kinds (e.g. 
the action of voting may be associated with the bodily movement of 
raising a hand, marking a ballot, or stepping over a line - while 
raising a hand may be associated with voting, directing traffic 
or replacing a light-bulb) , and as the criteria of identity and 
similarity for actions and for physical events are different (e.g. 
physical measurements are not involved in judging actions to be tiie
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same), then actions and events satisfy different ranges of 
predicates, and radically different concepts are used in explaining 
them. Actions, it is suggested, have a mentalistic dimension which 
distinguishes them from physical events, so that their descriptions 
and explanations are "on a different logical level".
Though this line of objection establishes (what can hardly be 
denied) that we say very different things about actions and about 
physical events, it does not establish that particular actions and 
events do not have community of properties, so cannot be identical. 
It no more establishes this than do analogous considerations of the 
many-many relation between religious denominations and political 
affiliations, and the distinct ranges of predicates satisfied 
by clergymen per se and by politicians per se, establish that a 
vicar cannot be a Member of Parliament. These considerations, 
of course, are not strictly analogous - for we have here a clear 
conception of what it is to be the same man who satisfies distinct 
sets of religious and political predicates, and we do not have 
a clear conception of what it is to be the same phenomenon which 
satisfies both action predicates and physical movement predicates. 
But they are sufficiently analogous to make the point that distinct 
sets of predicates needn't be disjoint, or the predicates not 
cosatisfiable.
Though our propensity to say different things about actions and 
physical events does not in itself preclude action/event identities 
(it may only indicate that different sorts of descriptions of
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phenomena are appropriate to different interest) , our lack of 
criteria of identity for phenomena as such — i.e. phenomena 
considered apart from any action or event kind - may be reason 
enough to doubt that we are ever justified in asserting the identity 
of an action with a physical event. For if we have no more notion 
of what it is to be a phenomenon of no specific action or physical 
event kind than we have of what it is to be a material object of no 
specific substance or artifact kind, then we cannot know what it is 
for phenomena as such to coincide. But if there is not some 
concept of a phenomenon kind which a concept of an action kind and a 
concept of a physical event kind each qualify - as the thing-concepts 
vicar and M.P. each qualify man - then phenomena of the action kind 
and of the event kind cannot be known to be the same. But even the 
stronger conclusion that actions cannot be. events of some physical 
kind is consistent with the thesis of the causal determination of 
actions, for the argument given above for this thesis no more 
requires the identity of actions with such events than it requires 
the identity of conscious states with brain states. All it insists 
upon is that there is a necessary connection between an action and 
the physical events with which it is associated - i.e. that some 
physical event is sufficient for the occurrence of the action. And 
as a description of an action is incomplete without reference to the 
intention it includes or derives from, a description of the physical 
conditions which necessitate the action is incomplete without 
reference to the brain processes (or states and properties of the 
central nervous system) which are sufficient for that intention.
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But there are at least three relations physical conditions could 
have to actions and mental states, which imply necessitation. 
Identity is one of them: for the occurrence of a physical event is
sufficient for the occurrence of the action or mental state it is. 
Constitution is another : an action may be a set of physical
movements organized by an intention, as a material object is matter 
organized by a nature or function - while the intention itself 
indicates an organization of brain states. And causation is a 
third: actions and mental states may follow necessarily from
physical conditions in accordance with.natural laws. But whatever 
the precise relation is between actions or thoughts and the physical 
conditions which are sufficient for them, if the physical conditions 
are causally determined then so are the thoughts and actions.
It is of interest that considerations similar to those advanced 
against the identity of physical events and actions, lead Davidson 
to deny -the causal determination of mental events by physical events 
but to assert tdieir identity. Mental even-ts such as beliefs, 
desires and intentions cannot be predicted from physical events, nor 
can physical movements be predicted from mental events, Davidson 
argues (Davidson (2),(4)), because there are no causal laws linking 
events of any mental kind (or described in mental terms) with events 
of any physical kind. And there are no such psychophysical laws 
because the holistic character of mental events (e.g. intentions are 
only identified in relation to other mental events such as beliefs 
and desires) rules out a correlation between events of specific 
mental kinds and events of specific physical kinds. Events of a
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specific mental kind cannot even be correlated with a limited number 
of kinds of physical event (as similar effects can have different 
causes) because the class of physical events associated with a kind 
of mental event is open-ended: we can always discover further
physical conditions in which a certain belief, say, occurs. So 
events of a specific mental kind cannot be necessitated in accordance 
with any one of a closed set of causal laws. Davidson then goes on 
to argue that as the only causal laws there are are physical laws, 
and psychological events are both causes and effects of physical 
events, then psychological events taken one by one are describable 
in physical terms - i.e. they are physical events.
The claim that mental events are not sufficiently isomorphic 
with physical events for there to be strict deteanninistic laws 
linking them resembles claims made about artifacts in Chapter III.3 
above. There it was argued that artifacts as such do not have 
distinctive causal properties because members of the same artifact 
kind could be substances of very different kinds, or aggregates of 
substances of very different kinds. Though taken one by one 
artifacts have the causal properties of the substances they are, or 
which derive from the substances which constitute them, artifacts as 
such have distinctive properties which are functional rather than 
causal. By analogy, mental events and actions may be considered 
artifact events : though taken one by one they have causal
antecedents and consequences, artifact events as such have 
distinctive properties which are rational rather than causal. But 
as a causal description of a particular artifact will leave out the
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functional property which makes it that kind of artifact, a causal 
description of a particular action or thought will leave out the 
rational properties - or relations to reasons - which make it the 
kind of action or thought it is. But if actions and thoughts 
cannot be fully described without reference to reasons, then they 
are not describable in physical terms. We cannot know, then, that 
actions and thoughts — even considered one by one - are identical 
with physical events, or that they have the causal properties of 
physical events. Rather than demonstrating that mental events are 
physical events, Davidson's argument may demonstrate that mental 
events are neither causes nor caused, or that there are no mental 
events at all.
In as much as events occur somewhere and at some time, the 
treating of reasons as mental events is objectionable - for where 
does a desire occur? and when does a belief begin and end?
Beliefs, desires, intentions, etc., are it seems best treated as 
dispositions to behave in certain ways, and the best or only 
evidence there is for the having of such dispositions is the actions 
a person performs. If we may suppose that such dispositions inhere 
in some way in the brains of persons, then they are included among a: 
person's physical properties or states, and are as much causally 
determined as are their other physical properties. If a disposition 
along with other physical properties a person has at a time are 
sufficient for the occurrence of an action, then they determine the 
action - without any intermediating mental event or conscious state.
A person's awarenesses of his behavioural dispositions — as in the
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expressions of belief, desire, and intention which accompany and 
help to identify actions - are themselves best considered as actions, 
as they too seem to be consequences of dispositions and other 
physical conditions. Such exq>ressions (or the thoughts which 
rehearse them) are as causally determined as are other actions.
But as every effect need not be a cause, such actions needn't have 
causal efficacy. There is no more reason to attribute efficacy to 
the utterances or thoughts which indicate states or processes of the 
brain than there is to attribute it to colours which indicate the 
temperature of steel. The change in colour of steel as its 
temperature changes can be predicted from the natural laws which 
describe the nature of steel, though there are no laws of colour by 
which the future redness of steel can be predicted from its present 
blueness. Similarly, a person's changing behavioural dispositions 
may be predictable, thou^ there are no laws linking the exq)ressions 
and other actions which are indicators of those dispositions.
Causal laws it was argued (Chapter III) hold between physical 
states which are structural modifications of substances: they
needn't hold between properties which are consequences or symptoms 
of those states (cf. Locke's primary and secondary qualities).
If mental events are eliminable from theories of action (which 
is not to say that beliefs, desires, intentions, etc., are 
eliminable), then psychophysical laws are not required, and one of 
the main objections to the thesis of the causal determination of 
actions is defused. [Davidson himself suggests that they are 
eliminable in his work elsewhere on prepositional attitudes, when he
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argues that we can consider what it is for a person to hold the 
sentence 'p' true without postulating a mental entity which is the 
belief that p (Davidson(5).] Objections of a similar sort, though, 
can be raised against the identification of actions with physical 
events. If an event is whatever happens at a particular place 
between particular times, then actions appear to be events - for 
they do occur somewhere, and at some time. But if an action is a 
physical event, then the action is as causally determined as the 
event is. Furthermore, an event which is causally determined under 
one description is causally determined under any true description 
- for the way an event is described cannot alter its manner of 
origin (though there needn't be a natural law associated with every 
true description of an event) . What happens in a place at a time, 
though, can be described in radically different ways. A particular 
incident which occurred in Sarajevo in 1914 could be described as 
Georg Princip moving a finger, the assassination of an Archduke, or 
the start of World War I. If these are the same event, and it is 
an event identical with something Princip did, then it follows that 
Princip started the war - though he may not have had the intention 
or desire to do so. And if Princip's action was causally 
determined by some state of his brain, then that state of his brain 
necessitated the start of the Great War. But surely this is 
implausible : causes of wars are far more complex than causes of
finger movihgs • But if the moving of the finger and the starting 
of the war do have different causes, then they do not have community 
of properties, so cannot be the same event — even though they occur
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at the same place and time. Different events, perhaps, can coexist 
in the same happening, just as different substances can coexist in 
the same matter. And as one substance may be constituted by others, 
one event may also be constituted by others : e.g. the event which
started the war could have the killing of an Archduke as a 
constituent, while the latter event could have the firing of a 
revolver as a constituent, and so on. The constituent event which 
is Princip's flexing of his trigger finger can plausibly be regarded 
as something he did which had some state of his brain as the cause. 
But events which occur as a result of this finger flexing -i.e. 
events caused by or constituted by the finger flexing together with 
other events - will only have Princip *s brain state as part of their 
cause. That brain state is not in itself a sufficient condition 
for the revolver working, for the Archduke being there, for the
bullet reaching its target, etc........
If a distinction can be made between what a man does as a 
consequence or result of something else he does and what he does 
simply or directly, then the latter may be regarded as primary or 
unqualified actions while the former are secondary or derivative. 
Such a distinction is evident in ordinary English locutions of the 
form "He 0-d by ^-ing"; e.g. "He started the war by killing the 
Archduke", "He killed the Archduke by firing his revolver", "He 
fired his revolver by flexing his trigger finger", etc. Here, the 
presence of the "by" clause indicates that what was done was a . 
result of some other doing. But in "He flexed his finger" there is 
no "by" clause, and there cannot be one: the addition of "by
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sending a signal from the brain" would falsify the sentence, because 
that is not something he does (see Hornsby(1), pp.7-10). The 
flexing of a finger and other body movings are primary, unqualified 
actions, and they can be identified with events which are 
modifications of a person's physical structure. As such 
modifications are - by the theory of substance developed here
- necessitated by other physical conditions of persons in accordance 
with natural laws, the primary actions are causally determined. 
Secondary or derivative actions, however, cannot be identified with 
such modifications because they involve things other than the agent
- e.g. revolvers, Dukes, armies - so confer upon him properties 
which are irreducibly relational. As the natural laws which govern 
substances do not preclude their having unnecessitated relational 
properties, it is not a consequence of the theory of substance 
developed here that all the results of a man's actions are 
necessitated (see Ch.III.2 above). So what he does by moving his 
body (or failing to move it) needn't be necessitated.
Unless everything that happens is a modification to some 
substance, or a necessary consequence of modifications to some 
substances, everything a man does needn't (by the principle of 
determinism relevant here) be necessitated. If bombs can be 
triggered by random fluctuations of Geiger-counter needles (see 
Ch.III.2) , then a man who blows up a bank by planting such a device 
may be said to do something which is not causally determined. If 
the random factor alone is enough to rule out identifying such a 
happening with a man's action - because one can hardly do what is
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uncontrollable and unpredictable - then it also rules out identifying 
the event which is a man's death while playing Russian roulette with 
his action of shooting himself. But however a conception of doing 
is qualified to deal with such contexts, the sense of the claim "He 
could have done otherwise" will be equally qualified. If a man 
cannot do what is an unnecessitated consequence of his primary 
action, then he cannot do otherwise either: alternative
unnecessitated consequences are also not what he does. If the 
intended consequences of his primary action are what he does 
whether or not they are necessitated then, again, he cannot do 
otherwise: for any outcome other than what was intended would not
be his doing. But if he can do what is neither a necessitated nor 
an intended consequence of his primary action - e.g. if shooting 
himself is something he does, though he intended to win at Russian 
roulette - then he can do otherwise than he does do. He can, in 
fact, do anything which is a possible consequence of a primary 
action. Such "doings" are not entirely indistinguishable from mere 
happenings, because they are at least explained by what are 
indisputably actions (e.g. his pulling the trigger is the reason for, 
if not the deterministic cause of, his death). And there is a 
sense in which one is responsible for what one does even by accident 
("he brou^t it upon himself") . But little if anything is yielded 
to libertarianism by conceding that there are such actions. For any 
significant support for the doctrine of human freedom to be derived 
from the claim that he could have done otherwise, the claim must be 
true of actions which are not separable from intentions - e.g. the
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primary actions themselves. But these actions, it has been argued, 
are expressions or manifestations of physical modifications to 
persons which are causally determined. For the claim that he could 
have done otherwise to be true of primary actions, it would have to 
be true that a man need not have had the intentions he had.
If brain states - like Geiger-counter fluctuations - may result 
from indeterministic subatomic phenomena, then they are not always 
necessitated, so intentions consequent on brain states could have 
been otherwise than they are. But accidental intentions yield as 
little to libertarianism as do accidental consequences; random or 
coincidental happenings of intentions are not free in the sense 
required. A man is no more responsible for his accidental 
intentions than he is for his causally determined ones. The 
libertarian sense of "he could have done otherwise" seems to require 
nothing less than a causal (deterministic) lacuna between the brain 
states and intentions of an agent, which nevertheless allows those 
intentions to be produced or formed by him. This lacuna, it may be 
supposed, is filled by occurrences which are jointly sufficient with 
the brain states for the intentions, though the occurrences them­
selves are not necessitated by brain states. But if such 
occurrences are not consequences of the beliefs and wants of the 
agent - or are not necessitated by the brain states which necessitate 
these beliefs and wants - then the sense in which they are produced 
by the agent, or even belong to him, is obscure. If such occurrences 
do not have causal origins, and do not even have physical events as 
counterparts, then it would seem that they dp not even belong to the
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physical world. How, then, could they have any causal part to play 
in the formation of intentions? Such occurrences are rendered no 
less mysterious by being called "volitions" or "acts of will". As 
the insertion of such occurrences between brain states and intentions 
only provides for the causal determination of intentions by shifting 
the causal lacuna to a place between the brain states and the 
occurrences - an intellectual exercise which may be prolonged 
indefinitely by inserting occurrences into that lacuna, etc., 
ad infinitum - no explanatory purpose is served by introducing 
such occurrences in the first place. But neither, then, is any 
explanatory purpose served by inserting intentions between brain 
states and basic actions. We may distinguish actions or body 
movings from body movements in general by the peculiar relationship 
the former have to the beliefs and wants of the agent, and we may 
consider the former to constitute a class of body movements which 
are intentional, without positing an ontology of necessitating but 
unnecessitated intentions. This leaves us only with basic actions 
themselves which are necessitating but, purportedly, unnecessitated.
If the truth of libertarianism depended only on the thesis 
that a man's actions "issue" from his beliefs and wants without 
being necessitated by them, then libertarianism would be conpatible 
with the causal determination of actions. For - as the earlier 
consideration of Davidson’s views indicated - that libertarian 
thesis is consistent with the thesis that there are no causal laws 
in accordance with which events of an action kind follow necessarily 
from events of a mental kind. To concede that explanations of
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actions in terms of beliefs and wants are not strict deterministic 
explanations, a determinist need not insist that such explanations 
are inadequate or incomplete. An explanation which cites enabling 
conditions for an action may be perfectly adequate when our interest 
is in the readily modifiable conditions. The question "Why did 
he do that?" may be best answered by citing the beliefs and wants 
which made it possible for him to do it, rather than by an account 
of the brain states which necessitated the doing, when our 
understanding of the modification of beliefs and wants is better 
than our understanding of the modification of brain states. But 
from the adequacy of rational explanations for actions it does not 
follow that deterministic explanations of the events actions are 
identical with, or comprised of, are false. If a basic action is a 
body movement with a certain relationship to beliefs and wants, it 
is still a body movement. And if body movements are physical 
events - specifically, physical modifications to a substance - then 
the doctrine of substance determinism commits us to the belief that 
every body movement belongs to some physical event kind such that 
events of that kind follow necessarily from events of other physical 
kinds in accordance with natural laws. If the doctrine of 
libertarianism is to provide room for freedom and responsibility, it 
must do more than assert that actions issue from beliefs and wants 
without being necessitated by them; it must deny that events which 
are actions are causally determined. And if such a denial is to be 
at all plausible, then the onus is on the libertarian to offer some 
coherent account of how a boc^ movement of a physical event kind
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(e.g. a finger-flexing) which is causally determined when it does 
not have a certain relationship to an agent's beliefs and wants, 
is insulated from causal determination when it does have that 
relationship. Furthermore, if the absence of causal determination 
is to allow for actions which are free and responsible and not 
merely random, then some coherent account is required of how a 
physical event which is not causally determined by the physical 
states and properties of the agent is nevertheless "produced by" or 
"up to" the agent. But satisfactory accounts of these kinds seem 
to be lacking in current contributions to the libertarian doctrine., 
Anscombe considers indeterminism of physical events to be 
a necessary condition for their determination by the will; 
actions are mostly physical movements; if these physical movements 
are physically predetermined by processes which I do not control, 
then my freedom is perfectly illusory" (Anscombe, p.79). In reply 
to the objection that the determination of events by the will would 
falsify the statistical laws which subsume undetermined individual 
events, she invites us to consider a glass box filled with minute 
coloured particles which move at random when the box is shaken, 
though the word "Coca-Cola" always appears on a side of the box.
Her conclusion is "It is not at all clear that those statistical 
laws concerning the random motion of the particles and their 
formation of small unit patches of colour would have to be supposed 
violated by the operation of a cause for this phenomenon which did 
not derive it from the statistical laws." Though I welcome the 
support Anscombe perhaps inadvertently offers for the thesis that
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the necessitation of events at the macro-level is compatible with 
indeterminism at the micro-level - and the corollary that the 
determination of the properties of substances is compatible with 
the non-determination of the properties of their constituents (see 
Ch.Ill,2 above) - I fail to see how the will can be introduced into 
this analogy. For it is not claimed that those same statistical 
laws might also allow for the constant appearance of the word 
"Guinness" on a side of the box, and that some effort of will could 
determine which of these words appeared, consistently with the 
formation of colour patches being statistically probable.
Statistically probable micro-events are no more amenable to control 
by the will than are necessitated macro-events.
Wiggins suggests that there might be events which are neither 
causally determined nor random but "sinply caused": e.g. actions
which occur in the unfolding of a person's biography may be under­
determined in that they are not necessitated by the person's 
personality or character, yet are intelligible because they 
constitute conç>rehensible phases in the development of that character, 
and so are not random (Wiggins (6), p.52). But if actions may be no 
less intelligible for being causally determined, they may be no less 
intelligible for being to some degree random: e.g. whether a man
fights or runs when threatened may in some circumstamces depend on 
something like the toss of a coin, though either course of action is 
intelligible, or answerable to practical reason (cf. Jim's leap from 
the deck of the sinking Patna in Conrad's novel Lord Jim). And if a 
man is not responsible for unfoldings of his biography which are
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necessitated though intelligible, can he be any more responsible for 
unfoldings which are unnecessitated though intelligible? Or as 
Wiggins himself asks "If it is unfair to hold a man responsible for 
what through no fault of his own he is, is it not equally unfair 
to hold him responsible for his biography developing in one 
indeterministic fashion rather than another?" (ibid, p.54). To
answer these questions we need a better understanding of what it is 
for an action to be not only "simply" caused, but simply caused by 
the agent - and we also need an understanding of what it is about 
that "simply" which blocks an action's identity with some physical 
event which is causally determined. Without that understanding, 
simple causes are as mysterious as volitions.
Chisholm's theory of agent causation is an attempt to meet the 
requirement that actions are caused by agents but not determined. 
Actions, Chisholm believes, are caused, but caused by persons, while 
determinism is about the necessitation of events which are caused by 
events. And as agent causation is not reducible to event causation, 
Chisholm concludes that actions do not fall within the scope of 
determinism (Chisholm). As no event qualifies as an action unless 
it is related to the thoughts of a person, we may accept that 
sentences of the form "Event E caused A" are not equivalent to or 
entailed by sentences of the form "Agent P caused A" - where "A" 
designates an action, and "P" designates a person. But neither, 
then, are denials of event causation entailed - i.e. it does not 
follow from the irreducibility of agent causation that actions are 
not also causally determined by events. If the action an agent
299
causes is identical with or constituted by physical events, then 
they are as much candidates for causal determination as any other 
physical events. That they are not causally determined is a 
further claim. If we are not to believe that an agent interrupts 
the natural course of events when he acts, so that actions have 
no causal relation to prior events, then we must understand agent 
causation to involve a contribution to évents which makes them 
sufficient for their effect. For Chisholm, agents indirectly cause 
events by directly causing endeavours, which are contributions to 
the events which cause events. But if an agent causes his 
endeavour as he causes his action - i.e. if that is what is 
required for that endeavour to be his - then an infinite regress of 
endeavours would, it seems, be generated. If he does not cause his 
endeavour in this way, then it is not clear how he does cause it, or 
how he causes the action which ensues. If, as Hornsby suggests 
(Hornsby (1) , p. 101) , we take "P causes A" to be coextensive with "A 
is an action of P", then our understanding of agent causation depends 
upon a prior understanding of what it is for an event to be an 
action of someone, and that understanding involves a conception of a 
causal link between events in which agents participate and events 
for which they may be held responsible. Agent causation, then, 
does not fall outside of the scope of determinism.
If the libertarian conception of free action depends essentially 
on the thesis that the physical events which are the causal 
antecedents of a man's action are not sufficient for that action, 
then it is a consequence of libertarianism that two men with
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indistinguishable physical properties - including indistinguishable
brain states - can perform different actions. If the actions are
distinguished by the thoughts which accompany them, then it follows
that different thoughts can have physical correlates which are
similar - or they need not have physical correlates at all.
Honderich says of this consequence:
Who can believe, to take one consequence of denying 
the [correlation] thesis, that one's judgment on some 
occasion, of whatever character, might have been different 
in some respect without one's brain having been in a 
different state? Since this is on a par with a belief 
in ghosts, I am inclined to accept Hume's dictum that 
next to the ridicule of denying an evident truth is the 
ridicule of taking much pains to defend it.
(Honderich, p.252)
If the mind/body dualism Honderich implicitly attacks does not 
attribute causal efficacy to thoughts, and so avoids the introduction 
of the ghost-like by taking refuge in occasionalism, then it abandons 
the belief that there are actions. For if it is conceivable that 
there are physical events which just happen though there are not 
sufficient conditions for them to happen (e.g. indeterministic 
phenomena), and it is conceivable that thoughts similarly can just 
happen, then the synchronization of an event and a thought may 
only be a coincidence. But such a coincidence can hardly be 
characterized as an action, though it may be characterized as a 
wish that happens to come true. It cannot be sufficient for the 
occurrence of an action that a body movement makes a wish come true, 
or realizes an intention - for my movement might realize a wish or 
intention of anyone. Actions can only occur when body movements
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are explained by intentions, and it is a necessary condition for 
there to be such an explanation that the movement and the intention 
it realizes occur in the body of the same person. But thoughts, 
movements and actions are only attributable to a particular person 
because that is where their causal antecedents and consequences 
place them. Thoughts and actions are only mine because they are 
enmeshed in the complex of causal relationships which constitute me. 
The libertarian conception of freedom and responsibility seems to 
require that events in the world which are determined enough to be 
embedded in a causal nexus that makes them the actions of a person, 
are nevertheless undetermined enough to be free. Against this, 
the conception of the causal determination of actions is a model of 
clarity.
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2 RESPONSIBILITY
If actions are causally determined, so that what a man does 
on particular occasions is always necessitated by prior physical 
conditions, then it is false that he could have done otherwise in 
those conditions. And it is also false that he is responsible 
for what he does, if that responsibility depends on there being 
alternatives. Though one may be responsible for an event 
occurring because one participates in the causal sequences which 
necessitate the event - much as a dislodged stone is responsible 
for an avalanche - this is not the sort of responsibility which 
rationalizes punishment and reward, resentment and gratitude, and 
a host of other practices and attitudes which are peculiar - and 
parhaps essential - to interpersonal relationships. When the 
responsibility a man has for his actions is such that he is to blame 
for them, then it may be assumed that he chose to do those actions, 
and that there were real alternatives to those choices. If this 
assumption is correct but there never are real alternatives, then 
no one is ever to blame for his actions, and a belief in the causal 
determination of actions is not compatible with persisting in 
practices and attitudes which entail the attribution of blame.
If our commitment to the libertarian conception of personal 
responsibility is such that we ignore this incompatibility, or 
ignore the adequate reasons for belief in a theory of action 
determinism, then this commitment is irrational.
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Peter Strawson, however, has argued that a belief in determinism
cannot lead to the abandonment of interpersonal attitudes, because
our commitment to these attitudes is such that we are rationally
incapable of giving them up. Having argued that a commitment to
determinism would not in practice undermine attitudes such as
resentment, Strawson goes on to say:
It might be said that all this leaves the real question 
unanswered . . . .  For the real question is not a 
question about what we actually do, or why we do it.
It is not even a question about what we would in fact 
do if a certain theoretical conviction gained general 
acceptance. It is a question about what it would be 
rational to do if determinism were true, a question 
about the rational justification of ordinary inter­
personal attitudes in general. To this I shall reply, 
first, that such a question could seem real only to 
one who had utterly failed to grasp the purport of the 
preceding answer, the fact of our natural commitment 
to ordinary inter-personal attitudes. This commitment 
is part of the general framework of human life, not 
something that can come up for review within this general 
framework. And I shall reply, second, that if we could 
imagine what we cannot have, viz, a choice in this matter, 
then we could choose rationally only in the light of an 
assessment of the gains and losses of human life, its 
enrichment or impoverishment; and the truth or falsity 
of a general thesis of determinism would not bear on 
the rationality of this choice.
(Strawson, p.13)
But Strawson's conviction that interpersonal attitudes are rationally 
invulnerable to the threat of determinism is insecure. First, it is 
not clear why commitments to interpersonal attitudes, or any other 
beliefs which are part of the general framework of human life, are 
any more immune to revision than are the empirical beliefs which are 
part of the framework of a science. If the set of beliefs we have 
about persons is not a deductive system in which beliefs about
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interpersonal attitudes are the axioms, then the latter beliefs can 
come up for review within the context of that set, just as beliefs 
about causal determination have come up for review in subatomic 
physics. If interpersonal attitudes are not the same for all 
men at all times but vary as the conditions of social life vary 
(see Chapter V above), then a revision of our own attitudes is not 
inconceivable. Furthermore, the beliefs which make up the 
framework of human life can hardly constitute a set which is 
separate and distinct from the set of causal beliefs, when both 
sets of beliefs have as common subjects persons and their actions.
If the properties attributed to these common subjects in each of 
the sets of beliefs are contrary properties - e.g. the same action 
is believed to be determined from the causal viewpoint and 
undetermined from the interpersonal viewpoint - then the beliefs 
are inconsistent. Though, rationally, one can have inconsistent 
beliefs without believing them to be inconsistent (one may believe 
that p and believe that not-p without believing that p and not-p) , 
there can be no rational belief that the same action both is and 
is not determined (pace Kant). Strawson's second reply appears to 
be that it is in accordance with practical rationality to tolerate 
inconsistent beliefs when it is expedient to do so. But how can an 
assessment of the gains and losses to human life which gives us a 
vested interest in a belief that actions are free have any bearing 
on the credibility of determinism? If we have good reason to 
believe that actions are determined, then surely it does bear on the 
rationality of our "choosing" to believe otherwise. If our
305
commitment to the interpersonal is such that we deny a deterministic 
thesis which we have adequate reason to believe is true, then 
we preserve a convention of our social life by a sustained self- 
deception. But it can hardly be the case that a refusal to modify 
our attitudes and practices to bring them in line with our knowledge 
and reasoned beliefs - however expedient that refusal may be - is 
in accordance with a rationality which prevails over theoretical 
rationality's demand that our beliefs be consistent. And it is 
certainly the case that, however vulnerable these attitudes and 
practices may be to a belief in a thesis of determinism, the thesis 
is not thereby refuted.
But the thesis that interpersonal attitudes are not vulnerable 
to the threat of determinism may be true, though Strawson's 
rationale for that thesis is flawed. Rather than it being in 
some way rational to persist in interpersonal attitudes which are 
generally incompatible with a belief in the causal determination of 
actions, the truth may be that most of these attitudes are 
compatible with such a belief, and those that are not are marginal 
and eliminable. If most of our attitudes to persons are associated 
with a sympathetic regard for creatures like ourselves, with whom 
we can have interactive, participative relationships, and those 
attitudes are appropriate even to children and other persons who are 
not regarded as blameworthy, then the abandonment of resen-tment, 
remorse and the other attitudes associated with guilt and blame 
might leave the framework of human life substantially intact. If 
tolerance, compassion, kindness - intolerance, disdain, cruelty
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- and the other interpersonal attitudes which do not presi:ppose 
blame cannot sustain all the human relationships and institutions 
we are familiar with, they may still sustain enough to perpetuate 
what are recognizably communities of persons. Christian 
missionaries to isolated South American tribes continue to be 
thwarted by their hosts' apparent lack of comprehension of notions 
of guilt and blame (see Sunday Times Magazine, 15 May 1983) , and 
there have been highly developed societies in which men are held 
accountable even for what they did not do (of. the vendetta, or the 
Christian doctrine of original sin). These attitudes by themselves, 
however, might constitute too rare or strange a medium to sustain 
any system of personal interactions which we would find acceptable. 
Without resentment, gratitude and the other attitudes which do . 
presuppose personal responsibility, there could it seems be neither 
rights, obligations nor justice, and a community in which these 
concepts were inapplicable might for us be too stark to be tolerable. 
[See Colin Turnbull's chilling account of the consequences attending 
the loss of a sense of personal responsibility among the Ik tribe 
(Turnbull) .] If any human society we can imagine ourselves 
thriving in is one in which men are at least sometimes believed to 
be responsible for what they do, then an acceptance of a thesis of 
determinism which rendered those beliefs false may well be 
anticipated with despair. The prognosis might be less pessimistic, 
however, if some serviceable notion of personal responsibility is 
compatible with determinism. If many of the interpersonal 
attitudes which do appear to be vulnerable to a belief in determinism
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actually presuppose only a personal responsibility or accountability 
which does not require freedom of choice, then these attitudes would 
be appropriate to actions even if their agents could not have done 
otherwise. An absence of causation, I suggest, is not a 
precondition for the correct application of the concept of personal 
responsibility we have.
In the preceding section, I argued that our conception of free 
or voluntary action is largely a negative one because such actions 
are best described in terms of what they are not; though they 
issue from an agent's beliefs and wants or intentions they are not 
causally determined by them, and they are not random or associated 
with them by mere coincidence. Attempts to provide a positive 
account of what it is for actions to so "issue from" these conscious 
states have yet to succeed. I've argued, even in being intelligible. 
As is to be e:qpected, a conception of personal responsibility which 
presupposes voluntary action is also a negative one. For we can 
describe clearly enough conditions under which this personal 
responsibility does not. obtain, though we have no satisfactory 
positive account of how it does. Typically, a person is not held 
responsible for an event under a particular action description if he 
did not do it (e.g. someone else did), if some feature of the event 
described was not intended by him (e.g. though Oedipus intentionally 
married Jocasta, he did not intentionally marry his mother), if his 
judgement was impaired, or if the action was forced. In general, 
responsibility is waived when an event does not issue from the 
agent's uncoerced intentions - or does not have the right
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relationship to his beliefs and wants to fully qualify as his action 
- and there are specific circumstances which account for this lack 
of intentionality (e.g. ignorance, duress, mental illness, coercion). 
That one could not have done otherwise in these circumstances 
indicates that the extenuating circumstances are in fact operative. 
But that one could not have done otherwise does not as such seem to 
be an extenuating circumstance, for responsibility may not be waived 
when an agent's character is such that he could not have done 
otherwise (e.g. "I could not help it, given my (violent /greedy / 
cowardly / . . .) disposition"), nor may it be waived when his 
convictions leave him with no real alternatives (e.g. Socrates* 
drinking of the hemlock, Luther's publication of the Ninety-five 
Theses) . One's responsibility for an action may be unavoidable 
just because it is "compelled by the facts" or - as Iris Murdoch has 
put it - "obedient to reality". What is valuable and feasible in a 
situation may be so clearly apprehended that the action which is a 
response has no rational alternatives;
If I attend properly I will have no choices and this is
the condition to be aimed at.
(Murdoch, p.40)
Though we do not normally consider this sort of "determination" to 
be causal or necessitating, it does not follow that actions so 
determined cannot be necessitated - i.e. it does not follow from 
our not as a rule explaining behaviour causally, that behaviour is 
not as a rule causally explainable. If it may be true that, for 
exanple, an unintentional injury is one an agent cannot help but 
inflict, it may also be true that he could not help but inflict
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an intentional injury. The essential relationship intentional 
behaviour has to the beliefs and wants of agents does not rule out 
the causal determination of that behaviour. Responsibility is 
typically waived when specific circumstances obtain which account 
for illusion or error. If this "account" may be a deterministic 
one, so may it be when none of the extenuating circumstances obtain 
but other circumstances account for the action. But responsibility 
is also waived when there is no causal explanation of a person's 
behaviour - e.g. when the behaviour is a consequence of a random 
twitching or some other aberration. It is the absence of certain 
sorts of causes rather than the absence of any cause at all, which 
seems to be a precondition for an action to be responsible.
If we do in fact hold persons responsible for their actions 
when circumstances are such that they could not have done otherwise, 
then either we are mistaken in doing so, or we are mistaken in 
sharing the assumption that there is personal responsibility for an 
action only when some other action was possible. However much the 
rationality of some interpersonal attitudes and practices may depend 
on the truth of this assumption (especially attitudes and practices 
which are mediated by conceptions of justice), it is a consequence 
of the essentialist theory expounded here that there never are such 
alternatives when a man acts. A conviction that an agent could 
have done otherwise when we do hold him responsible may rest, I 
suggest, at least in part on logical errors which resemble those 
exposed in the doctrine of the necessity of origin (see 
Chapter III.4 above). Usually, the question of responsibility
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arises when an action deviates from some norm of behaviour; men are 
praised or blamed for their actions when they exceed or fall short of 
certain expectations. For such deviations to be even possible, it 
cannot be necessary that men's behaviour conforms to the norm. So 
if 0 is some norm of behaviour (such as paying taxes or keeping 
promises) which is not always adhered to, then it is not true that 
all men necessarily 0. It cannot be inferred from this premise, 
however, that each man can do otherwise than 0, or that no man need 
0 - though it can be inferred that some man need not 0 (i.e.
"~(x)D 0x 3 ix'H2 0x" is invalid) . If it is only invalid inferences 
of this sort which lead to beliefs that particular men can do 
otherwise when they act, then these beliefs are clearly ill-founded. 
However, if all men need not 0, then it is not essential to men or 
in their nature to 0, so there may be no good reason to believe of 
any man in particular that he 0's necessarily. But the belief that 
it is physically possible, or in accordance with the laws of nature 
which define men, for particular men to do otherwise than they do is 
not in conflict with the deterministic "he could not have done 
otherwise", and it is not the sort of possibility presupposed by 
libertarian responsibility. The deterministic claim is hypothetical 
rather than categorical; "he could not have done otherwise" is 
always elliptical for "he could not have done otherwise in the 
circumstances which obtained". To infer the categorical claim from 
the hypothetical one is to commit the logical fallacy of transferring 
the modal qualifier of a conditional to its detached consequent 
(" G(P 3 Q) & P 3 □ Q" is invalid) . The deterministic claim is
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consistent with the "he could have done otherwise" of human 
possibility, but it is not consistent with the similar libertarian 
claim, which is elliptical for the hypothetical "he could have done 
otherwise in the circumstances which obtained". Clearly, the full 
libertarian claim is not entailed by the claim about human 
possibility. Though it may be true that another man in the semie 
circumstances would have kept his promise, and even true that the 
same man in other circumstances would have kept his promise, it is a 
mistake to conclude that the same man in the same circumstances 
could have kept his promise, and that he has the responsibility of 
one who breaks his promise by choice. [The belief that another man 
in the same circumstances could have done otherwise becomes less 
plausible the more couple te ly the circumstances are specified. The 
circumstances which necessitate one man's action (circumstances 
which include his dispositions and brain states) will similarly 
necessitate any man's action.]
A personal responsibility which does not presuppose that one 
could have done otherwise in the circumstances is not the mere 
impersonal responsibility of the stone which causes the avalanche.
For the stone cannot have beliefs, wants or intentions, so making 
the avalanche happen is not something it does. Nor is it the mere 
accountability that men have for their actions as such ("He did it"). 
If a man's actions issue from intentions which in turn issue from 
abilities and dispositions that are peculiarly his, then he has a 
personal responsibility for them which he does not have for actions
312
which issue only from faculties and dispositions every man must 
have. The responsibility a man has (or is held to have) for 
actions which are such that he could not have done otherwise given 
his character, sustains a range of interpersonal attitudes which are 
not appropriate to actions which are such that he could not have done
otherwise given his nature. If these attitudes cannot sensibly
include resentment and the other attitudes associated with blame 
(on the grounds that a man can hardly be to blame for actions which 
issue from his character if he is not to blame for his character, 
and he cannot plausibly choose that without already having one) 
they can still include some attitudes of approval and disapproval 
which go beyond the basic sympathetic attitudes we take to fellow 
creatures.
A person's freedom to do otherwise is not a presupposition of
our admiring or detesting his actions, and if it is a person's
misfortune rather than his fault when circumstances so combine that 
his actions depart from moral norms, the actions may be no less 
repugnant. Furthermore, if a person's future behaviour and the 
dispositions which constitute his character can be influenced by 
attitudes of approval and disapproval, then there is at least a 
point to the practices of reward and punishment which may express 
these attitudes : for they may encourage acceptable behaviour and
dispositions to behave acceptably. Thexre may even be a point when 
there is no prospect for refoxnning the offender; expressions of 
revulsion - moral or otheiwise - are at the very least defences 
against contamination; e.g. the point in destroying one's
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tormenter may only be to escape his future attentions. Consequences 
of attitudes which give them a point, though, needn't be the reason 
for the attitudes : e.g. attitudes may have as a result social order,
without the desire for social order motivating the attitudes (see 
Hertzberg) . But if justice demands that a man is punishable only 
when his behaviour is free as well as intentional, then actions which 
issue from his character are no more justly punishable than are 
actions which issue from his nature: what is effectively punishable
needn't be justly punishable. And the punishment would be no less 
unjust for being motivated by natural attitudes rather than by 
utilitarian considerations. If the only personal responsibility 
there can be is the attenuated responsibility which is conpatible 
with the causal determination of actions, then punishment seems at 
most to be expedient. Punishment, or a system of penalties and 
rewards, may be one technique among others which ensure that the 
idiosyncratic behaviour of persons accords with moral norms and 
ideals. Punishment alone, however, cannot be an adequate technique, 
for one cannot be discouraged by punishment from intentionally 
acting wickedly if one does not know what wicked actions are. 
Techniques for instilling an awareness of the moral norms and 
ideals (e.g. argument, persuasion, indoctrination) are prerequisites 
for punishment even to be effective. If it is unjust to coupe1 
persons to submit to such education or training when their behaviour 
is a danger to the community, then this is an injustice we have good 
reason to tolerate. But here we may suspect that the operative 
conception of justice is faulty, or at least not of practical
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relevance to the behaviour of human beings.
A thorough examination of that aspect of human practical 
rationality which is manifested in our discriminations of the just 
and the unjust is not within the scope of this dissertation. Here 
I can do little more than suggest that these discriminations depend 
on perceptions of reciprocity, equity and obligation, which are 
implicit in the communal organization of men who sympathetically 
identify with one another, and that these perceptions do not 
presuppose but are prior to beliefs about freedom of action.
We may, I suspect, be misled by an abstract theoretical model of 
interactive interpersonal attitudes and practices in conditions of 
reciprocity, if we take voluntariness to be criterial for justly 
punishable behaviour. If communities of persons may be supposed to 
come into existence and to persist for the mutual benefit of their 
members (see Ch. V above) , and these benefits can only be mutual if 
each member limits the satisfaction of his personal wants, then 
membership in a community implicitly confers upon a person both 
benefits and obligations. And if it is essential to the 
continuance of the community that a balance be maintained between 
benefits and obligations, then in so far as persons are aware of 
this need, they will expect benefits a person acquires to the 
detriment of others to be compensated for by some commensurate 
obligations or loss of benefit. Abstractly, we may consider a 
member of a community to be entitled to benefits and liable to 
obligations as if he had freely entered into a social contract and 
accepted the penalty clauses for unmet obligations. But, in fact.
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hardly anyone (apart from naturalized citizens) ever does enter into 
such a contract. In so far as a person is accepted as a member of 
a community, he is taken to have these entitlements and obligations 
independently of his will. If the existence of a community is of 
benefit to persons, and it is compatible with the causal 
determination of persons ' actions that they behave in such a way as 
to optimize their benefits, then there can be a deterministic 
explanation of persons behaving as if they had subscribed to such a 
contract voluntarily. But evidence that a person did not in fact 
voluntarily contract to accept his obligations is not evidence 
that he is not bound by them - any more than evidence that material 
objects are not point masses is evidence that they are not bound by 
Newton's Laws of Motion. Whatever the extenuating circumstances 
may be in which responsibility for meeting obligations is waived, 
the absence of a voluntary acceptance of the obligations is not 
among them. Nor is an inability to meet an obligation as such 
an extenuating circumstance; it depends on the character of the 
inability. Responsibility may be waived when circumstances are 
such that a person cannot meet his obligation thou^ he has the 
intention to do so, but it may not be waived when he does not 
- and in the circumstances cannot - have the intention. [An 
obligation to do what cannot be done in the circumstances is not 
an obligation to do the inpossible. As "not-possibly (PoQ) & P" 
does not entail "not-possibly Q", the first premise may be 
consistent with "Q is obligatory" though the second is not. There 
is no support here for a denial that "ought" inplies "could".]
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Persons who participate in a community and enjoy its benefits 
approximate to theoretical free agents (or may be regarded as acting 
voluntarily) to the extent that they intentionally meet or fail to 
meet obligations they would willingly subscribe to if a choice were 
possible. But persons who are ignorant of their obligations, or 
conpelled to disregard them - or are so deprived of the benefits of 
society that they would not accept the obligations if they did have 
a choice in the matter - do not intentionally meet or fail to meet 
their acknowledged obligations, so they cannot be regarded as even 
approximating to free agents in the moral world (see Murphy) .
If in conditions of reciprocity it is just to deny to agents 
the benefits of actions which are intentionally counter to their 
obligations - or to deprive them of other benefits to compensate for 
benefits they intentionally secure at the expense of other persons 
- then this justice does not require that actions be undetermined to 
be penalizable. Actions may be justly penalizable just because 
they are intentionally wicked, and the operation of a free will is 
not a necessary condition for an action to be intentionally wicked. 
The concepts justly penalizable and responsible are not coextensive, 
thoughr for one may be justly rewardable for a responsible action.
It is a presupposition of an action's being justly punishable that 
it is a responsible action, but not the converse. [It is in 
accordance with military justice for soldiers to be punished for 
sleeping on sentry duty even when circumstances were such that it 
was physically impossible for them to remain awake. But as the 
falling asleep, here, need not have been intentional, this sort of
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"justice" is not ny concern.] It is enough, I suggest, for a man 
to be responsible, at fault, or to blame for his behaviour that he 
could have done otherwise if he had wished to. But the power or 
the capacity to do as one wishes needn't be a power to act 
voluntarily. A person cannot choose to do other than he wishes, 
for behaviour which does not conform to his wishes is not action.
Nor, it seems, can a person choose his wishes. [Doctrines such as 
existentialism which maintain that persons select the objects of 
desire - or confer values on the world by efforts of will - are not 
plausible. For without some natural wants and needs which respond 
to what is there in the world, persons could not value anything.
These natural wants and needs, together with the features of a 
situation (which include a person's history and what he perceives to 
be attainable) , would seem to be enough to determine what a person 
wants most in the situation, without the introduction of a spurious 
free choice (cf. Wiggins(9) ).]
It may be objected, however, that the notion of justice 
associated with reciprocity is just as artificial as military 
justice. For if a person cannot help having the beliefs and wants 
which distinguish his intentional behaviour from his unintentional 
behaviour, then the special accountability he has for what he happens 
to do - in contrast to what just happens to be his behaviour - rests 
on a distinction which is arbitrary. But it has been supposed that 
beliefs, wants and intentions are expressions of dispositions which 
are constitutive of a man's character or personality. The 
accountability a man has for what he does is of a different order
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from the accountability he has for events he is merely involved in, 
because of the dominant role his character plays in the occurrence 
of the former events. In blaming a man for his action we do not 
merely disapprove of the action - we disapprove of the man, and we 
disapprove of the character of the man from which the action 
emanates. If we may only blame a man for what he does, then we 
cannot blame him for having the character he has - for his having 
that character is not intentional, much less voluntary (though we 
may blame someone else for the actions which result in the man 
having that character). But it is not a condition for a man being 
blamed for what he does, or being detested for doing it, that anyone 
is to blame for his being the way he is. In having a character of 
a certain sort, one may be the victim of causality or chance and 
suffer the penalties for it without one's misfortune being anyone's 
intention. Though such a state of affairs may be tragic, it is not, 
I maintain, unjust. A stricter notion of justice, which permits 
the imposition of penalties only for actions which are actually 
freely done, would excuse the man who could not help but commit his 
crime - but it would also excuse the man who could not help but 
impose the penalty. If an action is not a crime unless it is 
voluntary, then punishment which is equally involuntary is also not 
a crime or unjust - for the punisher also acts unjustly only if he 
could have done otherwise. If it is unjust to be punished for what 
one does intentionally when the intentions are not freely chosen, 
then the injustice is the world's, not the punisher's. But the 
world is not an agent, and only agents may be unjust. If no one is
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ultimately responsible, then there is neither justice nor injustice 
in the world, and considerations of strict justice do not mediate 
the affairs of men. The notion of justice associated with 
reciprocity, however, appears to take it as axiomatic that men are 
responsible for their intentional behaviour. It is in accordance 
with this notion of justice that a causal account of how a person 
came to have a bad character may make his wicked behaviour less 
mysterious, without making it excusable.
If a person is responsible (in the restricted sense of 
"responsible") for what he does intentionally, then in conditions 
of reciprocity it may be just to subject one's offender to 
resentment and anger - even though the offence is not thereby undone, 
and even though he could not help but offend. In so far as 
resentment and anger are affective attitudes, and one who is subject 
to these attitudes suffers disbenefit, then the offence may be 
compensated for by the attitudes. The need for justice can be 
satisfied when the response to an offence which is causally determined 
is a rebuff which is equally causally determined. This satisfaction 
may be frustrated, however, when the rebuff is ineffective. If the 
offender is mentally ill or abnormal in some other respect which 
makes him a non-participant in the affective attitudes, then justice 
may be unobtainable. It often is. If it is not just to forcibly 
train or treat such an offender because the conditions for 
reciprocity do not obtain, then it is not unjust either - for a 
person who cannot recognize and meet his obligations, presumably 
cannot recognize and suffer the loss of any commensurate rights.
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It may be expedient to forcibly treat such persons so that the 
conditions for reciprocity can be established, but no more just 
or unjust to do so than it is to control a dangerous animal.
But considerations of a similar sort suggest that justice is not 
relevant to the issues of abortion and euthanasia.
In Chapter IV above, I rejected any defence of abortion or 
euthanasia based on the premise that foetuses or some victims of 
severe brain damage are not persons. Such a premise, I argued, 
is false because underdeveloped and brain-damaged human beings are 
persons by nature. But as this rejection depends on the thesis 
that the nature of a creature is defined by deterministic causal 
laws, it does not support opponents of abortion and euthanasia 
either - at least, not opponents of the Kantian persuasion, who hold 
that persons have a natural right to life and a natural claim to 
justice because they are essentially autonomous. For the substance 
nature of persons, I have argued, rules out autonomy. If only the 
possession of a free will could give a creature a right to life and 
a claim to justice, then no human being has such a right or claim 
(the claim that persons have certain rights, or have intrinsic value, 
by divine ordinance is another matter) . The Kantian case against 
abortion and euthanasia leaves exposed the security of everyone.
[The enthusiasm shown for Kant's doctrine, that persons are ends 
in themselves, or have intrinsic value, by those who reject Kant's 
reason for regarding human beings as persons - i.e. they approximate 
to purely rational beings - is one of the wonders of contemporary 
moral philosophy. For Kant, the categorical imperative is not a
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dogma.] If, however, rights, obligations and justice are grounded; 
in reciprocity rather than in autonomy (as reciprocity is a feature 
even of mechanical systems such as clockwork, it does not presuppose 
autonomy) , then the personhood of each human being is not a 
sufficient condition for these moral entitlements. Persons, we may 
suppose, only acquire these entitlements by their participation 
in relationships mediated by reciprocity. If persons who are not 
participants in the interactive, affective attitudes - and who do 
not even act intentionally - do not have rights, obligations, and 
claims to justice, then the killing of such persons does not violate 
their rights, and is not unjust. If a foetus, by its circumstances, 
cannot have obligations, then it also cannot have rights. [if a 
foetus cannot be to blame for what it does because it cannot do 
anything, then it is fatuous to speak of it as innocent,! Abortion, 
and euthanasia in some circumstances, may be expedient, but - like 
the incarceration or forced treatment of dangerous psychopaths 
- neither just nor unjust. There may be other moral objections to 
abortion and euthanasia, but our ordinary, non-transcendental sense 
of justice does not, I believe, consider persons as such to have a 
right to live (ordinary justice does not even accord participants 
this right without qualification) . Any derivative claim to justice 
which potential or former participants in a community may be granted 
would hardly prevail against an opposing claim by an actual 
participant: e.g. a woman whose life is threatened by her pregnancy.
[The termination of a pregnancy which is merely inconvenient for a 
participant, however, does seem to callously disregard the foetus's
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derivative rights. But the case for safeguarding the lives of 
foetuses and other helpless persons may only be confused by appealing 
to rights and justice: pity, compassion, and love are, perhaps,
grounds enough for that case.]
As the sense of justice associated with reciprocity does 
acknowledge rights of participants, no appeal to doctrines of 
transcendental intrinsic rights is required to reject the 
retributionist case for the inposition of the death penalty. A 
sanction which does not contribute some good to society to compensate 
for a loss, and which does not redeem an offender but ends him, 
compounds the damage to reciprocity rather than repairs it. If the 
principle of compensation in kind is implicit in our sense of justice, 
so that participants in a community may be presumed to subscribe to 
the principle that one who takes a life forfeits his own, then it 
may be presumed that a murderer would willingly accept the death 
penalty if a choice were possible. It may also be presumed that he 
will obligingly indicate as much by executing himself. If it 
cannot be presumed that the murderer would agree to his execution, 
then the imposition of the death penalty violates his rights and his 
claim to justice, so it cannot be regarded as just punishment. The 
killing of a person whose crime puts him beyond the pale may be an 
effective way of dealing with an enemy, but acts of war or 
extermination ought not to be confused with just punishment. Our
sense of justice, however, does not insist on compensation in kind, 
but may be satisfied by compensation of equivalent value: e.g.
blood-money and its variants. A penalty which allowed a murderer
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to redeem himself by his labour is one we may presume he would 
accept if he could choose to. Popular demand for a reversion to 
the rigid provisions of Hammurabi's Code may indicate a widespread 
dissatisfaction with the existing alternatives to retaliation or 
compensation in kind (for who can believe that imprisonment redeems 
the offender, or adds benefit to anyone?) rather than a desire for 
revenge which is rooted in human nature. But if a need for justice 
is rooted in human nature, and if human beings live communally to 
satisfy that need (among others), then there may be circumstances in 
which revenge alone is appropriate. Some crimes may so outrage a 
sense of good and evil which is also rooted in human nature that 
there is no commensurate alternative to retaliation. Though there 
often may be a jus ter response to a crime than retaliation, when 
there is not, a refusal to retaliate is a refusal to see justice 
done.
If it is one's intentions rather than volitions which are 
criterial for responsible behaviour, then a belief in the thesis 
that men's actions are determined - i.e. that they are necessitated 
by circumstances in accordance with the natural laws which define a 
man's nature - does not have as a consequence a belief in the 
unlimited extension of the mitigation of responsibility. 
Responsibility is only mitigated when there is a lack of 
intentionality, so that behaviour does not fully qualify as action. 
One sort of circumstance in which responsibility is mitigated is 
covered by the McNaghten Rules: "mental abnormality relieves from
criminal responsibility only if the person did not know what he was
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doing or did not know what he was doing was wrong" (Chambers).
Under these circumstances, a person's behaviour cannot constitute 
criminal action because the criminal consequences are not intended. 
Attempts to liberalize the principles of criminal justice so that 
any mental abnormality relieves one of responsibility would result 
in the exculpation of everyone, whatever the circumstances, if 
criminal behaviour itself is evidence of mental abnormality. But 
even if one must be mentally flawed or diseased to have the sort of 
character from which criminal actions emanate, we would still, I 
think, hold men responsible for the evil that they intentionally do. 
A belief that any man with that mental defect would behave in that 
way seems to be only a specific case of the general belief that men 
in extreme circumstances will behave extremely (e.g. the drowning 
man who steals another man's life-preserver). Such a belief may 
encourage us to forgive the crime and to pity the criminal without, 
however, absolving him. If there can only be forgiveness where 
there is blame, these attitudes are not incompatible. It may be 
objected that the concept of blame applied in such circumstances is 
not our concept: for us, blame presupposes an ability or freedom to
do otherwise. But we may concede that no one is to blame in that 
sense, if actions are causally determined, without leaving nothing 
where blame was. A man who acts badly may feel regret, shame and 
disgust for what he has done even though he knows he could not have 
done otherwise. In encouraging him to feel that way about himself, 
our at-titude toward him would be very much like blaming, and a
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society ordered so as to minimize the occurrences of these feelings 
and attitudes might be very much like our own.
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